Report to Congressional Defense Committees
Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense
August 9, 2018
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/09/2 ... ONENTS.PDFREPORT REQUIREMENT
Pursuant to Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY 2018), Public Law 115-91, this report follows the interim report submitted to the congressional defense committees on March 1, 2018, and provides results of a review of the organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense (DoD).
- Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Future of the U.S. Military in Space
Issued on: August 9, 2018
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... ary-space/
- Remarks by President Trump at a Meeting with the National Space Council and Signing of Space Policy Directive-3
Issued on: June 18, 2018
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... rective-3/THE PRESIDENT: [...] I want to also say that when it comes to space, too often, for too many years, our dreams of exploration and discovery were really squandered by politics and bureaucracy, and we knocked that out. So important for our psyche, what’s you’re doing. It’s going to be important monetarily and militarily. But so important for right up here — the psyche. We don’t want China and Russia and other countries leading us. We’ve always led — we’ve gone way far afield for decades now, having to do with our subject today. We’re going to be the leader by far. We’re behind you a thousand percent.
America’s vital interest in space lost out to special interests in Washington, except, of course, for the senators and congressmen here. They would never do it. Right, Dana?
But all of that is changing. We know that. My administration is reclaiming America’s heritage as the world’s greatest space-faring nation. The essence of the American character is to explore new horizons and to tame new frontiers. But our destiny, beyond the Earth, is not only a matter of national identity, but a matter of national security. So important for our military. So important. And people don’t talk about it.
When it comes to defending America, it is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space. So important.
Very importantly, I’m here by directing the Department of Defense and Pentagon to immediately begin the process necessary to establish a space force as the sixth branch of the armed forces. That’s a big statement.
We are going to have the Air Force and we are going to have the Space Force — separate but equal. It is going to be something. So important. General Dunford, if you would carry that assignment out, I would be very greatly honored, also. Where’s General Dunford? General? Got it?
GENERAL DUNFORD: We got it.
THE PRESIDENT: Let’s go get it, General. (Applause.) But that’s the importance that we give it. We’re going to have the Space Force.
Department of Defense
Report to Congressional Defense Committees
Interim Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense
1 March 2018
https://www.defense.gov/News/Publications/
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence
13 February 2018
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/New ... d-SSCI.pdfSPACE AND COUNTERSPACE
Continued global space industry expansion will further extend space-enabled capabilities and space situational awareness to nation-state, nonstate, and commercial space actors in the coming years, enabled by the increased availability of technology, private-sector investment, and growing international partnerships for shared production and operation. All actors will increasingly have access to space-derived information services, such as imagery, weather, communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing for intelligence, military, scientific, or business purposes.
Foreign countries—particularly China and Russia—will continue to expand their space-based reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems in terms of the numbers of satellites, the breadth of their capability, and the applications for use.
Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems. Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space systems and services with military operations in other domains.
Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years. China’s PLA has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles. Russia probably has a similar class of system in development. Both countries are also advancing directed-energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote sensing or missile defense.
Of particular concern, Russia and China continue to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. Some technologies with peaceful applications—such as satellite inspection, refueling, and repair—can also be used against adversary spacecraft.
Russia and China continue to publicly and diplomatically promote international agreements on the nonweaponization of space and “no first placement” of weapons in space. However, many classes of weapons would not be addressed by such proposals, allowing them to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain.
- H.R.2810 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... -bill/2810TITLE XVI--STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Subtitle A--Space Activities
Sec. 1601. Space acquisition and management and oversight.
[...]
(c) Review of Structure.--
(1) Review.--The Deputy Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review and identify a recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, that implements the organizational policy guidance expressed in this section and the amendments made by this section.
(2) Interim report.--Not later than March 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an interim report on the review and recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, under paragraph (1).
(3) Final report.--Not later than August 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a final report on the review and recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, under paragraph (1), including--
(A) a proposed implementation plan for how the Deputy Secretary would implement the recommendations;
(B) recommendations for revisions to appointments and qualifications, duties and powers, and precedent in the Department;
(C) recommendations for such legislative and administrative action, including conforming and other amendments to law, as the Deputy Secretary considers appropriate to implement the plan; and
(D) any other matters that the Deputy Secretary considers appropriate.
(4) Prohibition on delegation.--The Deputy Secretary of Defense may not delegate the authority to carry out this subsection.
(d) Independent Plan to Establish Military Department.--
(1) Plan.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center that is not closely affiliated with the Department of the Air Force to develop a plan to establish a separate military department responsible for the national security space activities of the Department of Defense. Such plan shall include recommendations for legislative language.
(2) Interim report.--Not later than August 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an interim report on the plan developed under paragraph (1).
(3) Final report.--Not later than December 31, 2018, the Deputy Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a final report containing the plan developed under paragraph (1), without change.
Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017
In late 2015, President Xi introduced a series of reforms that seek to improve leadership, administration, and command of joint operations across the PLA by 2020. In 2016, these reforms included:
[...]
- Developing the Strategic Support Force. Throughout 2016, China continued to develop the Strategic Support Force (SSF), an organization it established late in 2015 to unify space, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Military Doctrine. In 2015, the PLA National Defense University published the latest version of “Science of Strategy,” an overview of the PLA’s concept of military strategy. The new version not only shares broad similarities with other recent authoritative publications, but it also highlights the PLA’s growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime domain, the PLAAF’s shift towards more offensive operations, long-distance mobility operations of the PLA Army (PLAA), space and cyber operations, and the need for China’s military to be capable of securing growing overseas national interests.
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. China’s space program continues to mature rapidly. The PLA, which has historically managed the effort, continues to invest in improving its capabilities in the fields of space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. In addition to its on-orbit assets, China has built a vast ground infrastructure supporting spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink. China also continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to degrade and deny the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict.
In 2016, China launched 22 SLVs, of which 21 were successful. These launches orbited 33 spacecraft, including navigation, ISR, and test/engineering satellites. Other activities last year included:
- Two New Launch Vehicles. China successfully debuted the Long March 7 (LM-7) in June 2016 and the LM-5 in November 2016. The LM-7 is a medium-lift SLV designed to launch up to 13,500 kg into low Earth orbit, mainly supporting China’s human spaceflight program. The LM-5 is set to become China’s new heavy-lift SLV, launching up to 25,000 kg into low Earth orbit. It is intended to play an important role in the assembly of the Chinese Space Station starting around 2018.
- World’s First Quantum Science Satellite. In August 2016, China launched the first experimental quantum communications satellite, marking a notable advance in cryptography research. The developer of the satellite claimed it has “enormous prospects” in defense, moving China closer to more secure communications.
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing anti-satellite capabilities and probably has made progress on the anti-satellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.
- Crewed Space Laboratory. China launched its second crewed laboratory, Tiangong-2 (TG-2), in September 2016. The laboratory will validate technologies associated with space station assembly in preparation for the launch of the Chinese Space Station core module around 2018. China also launched a crewed mission (Shenzhou-11) in October 2016 to TG-2 to carry out experiments and gain experience in mid-to-long term human spaceflight.
Although Chinese defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies, China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an anti-satellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance...and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT
[...]
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). China is taking steps to develop a BMD capability. It is developing a missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic-energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes (greater than 80 km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. In July 2016, Chinese official media confirmed China’s intent to go forward with mid-course missile defense capabilities on both land and sea assets, reflecting work on BMD dating back several decades.
When operational, the HQ-19 may fill the mid-tier of China’s BMD network. China has tested the HQ-19 interceptor missile specifically used for intercepting a ballistic missile at mid-course, according to regional media. The HQ-19 is still undergoing PLAAF-organized testing; as of May 2016, China was focused mainly on testing the HQ-19’s capability to intercept 3,000 km-ranged ballistic missiles.
The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a limited capability against ballistic missiles. China’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM system is expected to have a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 500 km. China’s fielded SA-20 PMU2 SAMs and future S-400 SAMs may have some capability to engage ballistic missiles depending on the interceptors and supporting infrastructure.
Additionally, new indigenous radars, the JL-1A and JY-27A, are designed to address the ballistic missile threat; the JL-1A is advertised as capable of the precision tracking of multiple ballistic missiles.
[...]
Space and Counterspace. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems—and to deny them to adversaries—as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Although PLA doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations will probably form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions that counter third-party intervention. China is seeking to utilize space systems to establish a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system, and to enhance C2 in joint operations. These advancements include the Beidou navigation satellite system and space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in space.
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docum ... 141328-770Leading-edge Technologies. China has identified certain industries and technology groups with the potential to provide technological breakthroughs, to remove technical obstacles across industries, and to improve international competitiveness. Examples of applications include radar, counterspace capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies. China is focusing on the following technologies for rapid development:
- Information Technology. Priorities include intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc networks, and virtual reality technologies.
- New Materials. Priorities include smart materials and structures, high-temperature superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies.
- Advanced Manufacturing. Priorities include extreme manufacturing technologies and intelligent service advanced machine tools.
- Advanced Energy Technologies. Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies, alternative fuels, and advanced vehicle technologies.
- Marine Technologies. Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring technologies; fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies; and deep-sea operations technologies.
- Laser and Aerospace Technologies. Priorities include the development of chemical and solid-state laser technologies to field a weapon-grade system, ultimately, for ground-based and airborne platforms.
2017 Russia Military Power Report
http://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications/Space/Counterspace
The Russian General Staff postulates that modern warfare is increasingly reliant on information, particularly from space, because of the expansion of the geographic scope of military action and the information needs of high-precision weapons. Russia has a significant constellation of satellites in orbit. According to Colonel Sergey Marchuk, chief of the Main Test Space Center, Russia has more than 130 spacecraft, civilian and military, performing communications, navigation, geodetic survey support, meteorological, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering missions.
Russia’s space program is both formidable and in a state of rebuilding. Moscow seeks to maintain the health of its current constellations while deploying a next-generation architecture on par with Western space systems. Over the next several years, Russia will prioritize the modernization of its existing communications, navigation, and earth observation systems, while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelligence and early warning system constellations.
Russia’s current systems provide an array of capability including high-resolution imagery, terrestrial and space weather, communications, navigation, missile warning, electronic intelligence, and scientific observations. With a long-standing heritage in space, Russia gains a sense of national pride from its space program, which has included manned missions and leading the world in space launches. Currently ranked third in total number of satellites in orbit behind the United States and China, the figure below displays a breakdown of Russia’s satellites in orbit.
Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy in space has a decisive impact on the outcome of future conflicts. According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, militarization of outer space is a “main external military danger.” The 2014 update to Russia’s military doctrine calls out Western global strike capability by name. Russia, in military journals, has observed that Western operations have shifted to non-contact operations that rely on long-range, space-supported precision-guided munitions. Russia has been very vocal expressing its concerns about Western precision strike capabilities and missile defense plans. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin compared U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts in Eastern Europe to the Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 and stated that such an effort justifies the development of Russian counterspace programs.
The Russian General Staff argues for pursuing in wartime such strategies as disrupting foreign military C2 or information support because they are so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology conflicts characteristic of modern warfare. Russia believes that having the military capabilities to counter space operations will deter aggression by space-enabled adversaries and enable Russia to control escalation of conflict if deterrence fails. Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes against satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting space operations.
On 1 August 2015, Russia created the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces by merging the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops. Defense Minister Shoygu stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity… towards the aerospace sphere” and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine. This merged force includes Russia’s space forces who have the mission of conducting space launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space object surveillance and identification network.
Russia also reorganized its space industry responsible for space research, design, and production. Russia merged the government-owned United Rocket and Space Corporation (ORKK), which previously absorbed the majority of the space industry corporations in 2013, with the Federal Space Agency. President Putin finalized the dissolution of the Federal Space Agency on 1 January 2016, naming the joint organization the Roscosmos State Corporation.
Ich habe bisher erst einen deutschsprachigen Artikel gefunden, der sich nicht höhnisch über die Pläne des DoD auslässt, sondern feststellt, dass die Initiative vom Kongress ausging. Er wurde heute veröffentlicht:
So neu ist Trumps "Space Force" gar nicht
https://www.n-tv.de/politik/So-neu-ist- ... 67632.html
______________________________________________
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242465.pdf
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19 ... 814fef.pdf
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-172.pdf
https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-s ... Speech.pdf
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssd/index.html
- Anti-satellite (ASAT) Options
20 Oct 86
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssd/nssd-4-86.pdf
Air Force launches 3rd X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (11. Dezember 2012)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... t-vehicle/
Air Force technicians launch second unmanned spacecraft (5. März 2011)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... pacecraft/
Air Force to launch second orbital test vehicle (2. März 2011)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... t-vehicle/
Air Force's X-37B historical landing advances space vehicle technologies (7. Dezember 2010)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... hnologies/
X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle lands at Vandenberg AFB (3. Dezember 2010)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... nberg-afb/
New unmanned spacecraft set to launch (16. April 2010)
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display ... to-launch/
