Krieg in der Ukraine

[theoderich]

[theoderich]

Brüssel hat kaum Geld, aber viele Worte für Europas Aufrüstung

Zur Erinnerung: die Ukraine benötigt rund 200.000 Mörsergranaten pro Monat. Die kann sie allein nicht beschaffen. „Die Europäische Kommission wird keine Waffen für die EU kaufen, und auch nicht das EU-Budget dazu einsetzen“, betonte ein Kommissionsbeamter gegenüber Journalisten die Grenzen, welche die EU-Verträge der Kommission in Fragen des Militärischen ziehen.

Genau betrachtet geht es bei diesem Vorschlag darum, die Mitgliedstaaten dazu zu animieren, mehr Rüstungsgüter gemeinsam zu entwickeln, und weniger Waffen und sonstiges Rüstungsmaterial außerhalb der EU zu beschaffen. Die Kommission hat dafür in gewohnter Manier zeitlich definierte Quotenziele definiert. Bis zum Jahr 2030 soll der EU-interne Handel mit Rüstungsgütern zumindest 35 Prozent des gesamten EU-Rüstungsmarktes ausmachen. Im selben Jahr soll mindestens die Hälfte der nationalen Rüstungsausgaben der Mitgliedstaaten von europäischen Herstellern bezogen werden, fünf Jahre später sollen das 60 Prozent sein. Zudem sollen 40 Prozent aller in diesem Jahr beschafften Rüstungsgüter gemeinschaftlich beschafft werden, also von mehreren Mitgliedstaaten zusammen.

„Priorität für EU-Industrie“

Wie die Kommission auf diese Zahlen gekommen ist, geht weder aus ihren Dokumenten hervor, noch konnten die drei zu ihrer Präsentation angetretenen Mitglieder derselben erklären. „Die europäische Industrie muss eine gewisse Priorität haben“, sagte Josep Borrell, der Hohe Vertreter der EU für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Thierry Breton wiederum, der Kommissar für Binnenmarkt, Dienstleistungen, Verteidigung und Raumfahrt, ruderte von seiner im Jänner geäußerten Forderung nach einem 100-Milliarden-Euro-Fonds für Rüstungsfragen zurück. Das sei eine Frage für die nächste Kommission, sagte er.

An konkretem, frischen Geld hingegen gibt es nur 1,5 Milliarden Euro, welche die Kommission gerne für die Jahre 2025 bis 2027 hätte. Das sind die letzten drei Jahre der laufenden Finanzperiode, darüber hinausgehende Verpflichtungen kann sie politisch und rechtlich nicht eingehen. Diese 1,5 Milliarden Euro sind allerdings nicht mehr umstritten, die Mitgliedstaaten haben sich auf die Umschichtung hin zum Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds, der das Geld verwalten soll, bereits geeinigt. Dieses Geld soll Innovationen und den Ausbau bestehender industrieller Rüstungskapazitäten in den Mitgliedstaaten hebeln. „1,5 Milliarden Euro ist nicht viel Geld für die Verteidigungsindustrie. Aber sie können als Anreiz wirken“, gab Wettbewerbskommissarin Margrethe Vestager zu.

Darüber hinaus ist in den beiden umfassenden Dokumenten der Kommission wenig inhaltlich Werthaltiges zu finden. Die Kommission mahnt die Mitgliedstaaten beispielsweise zu mehr gemeinsamer Entwicklung und Beschaffung von Waffensystemen, doch das tut sie seit Jahren schon. Sie erklärt auch, unter welchen Umständen der Kauf von Rüstungsgütern von der Mehrwertsteuer befreit werden könnte.

Die konkret wirksamste politische Maßnahme, die sich in diesen Vorschlagen findet, betrifft die Europäische Investitionsbank (EIB). Die europäische Rüstungsindustrie „kann prinzipiell schon von bestehenden EU-Finanzinstrumenten profitieren“, heißt es da. „Allerdings stellt die gegenwärtige Kreditpraxis der europäischen finanziellen Akteure, einschließlich der EIB-Gruppe, eine große Hürde für den Einsatz solcher Instrumente dar.“

EIB soll investieren

Der Grund liegt darin, dass die EIB nur Investitionen in Güter finanziert, die sowohl militärisch als auch privat eingesetzt werden können (sogenannte „dual-use goods“). Das ist aber bei Mörsergranaten, Schützenpanzern oder Marschflugkörpern nicht der Fall. „Diese Kreditpraxis zu ändern ist darum notwendig und eine Hauptpriorität, um sicherzustellen, dass der Verteidigungssektor Zugang zu EU-Finanzinstrumenten hat, und von ihnen voll profitieren kann.“ Noch heuer, so mahnt die Kommission, solle die EIB dies tun. Dazu ist aber ein Beschluss der Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten nötig, die in ihrem Verwaltungsrat sitzen.

https://www.diepresse.com/18246045/brue ... ufruestung

[muck]

Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof hat Haftbefehl gegen den Befehlshaber der russischen Schwarzmeerflotte, Admiral Viktor Sokolow, sowie gegen den Kommandeur der russischen Fernfliegerkräfte, Generalleutnant Sergej Kobylasch, erlassen. Beiden werden Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit vorgeworfen. Nach Überzeugung des Gerichts besteht dringender Tatverdacht, dass die Beschuldigten absichtlich Angriffe auf zivile Ziele und unmenschliche Methoden der Kriegsführung befohlen hätten. Überdies wird ihnen zu Last gelegt, über das Maß der militärischen Erforderlichkeit hinaus zivile Kollateralschäden verursacht zu haben. Im Falle einer Verurteilung droht ihnen lebenslange Haft. (Quelle)

[theoderich]

Mehrheit gegen Taurus-Lieferung

https://www.thepioneer.de/graphics/mehr ... ieferung-2


Annalena Baerbock ist offen für Taurus-Ringtausch

Außenministerin Annalena Baerbock zeigt sich offen für den Vorschlag ihres britischen Kollegen David Cameron, der Ukraine über einen Ringtausch neue Marschflugkörper zur Verfügung zu stellen. "Das wäre eine Option", sagte die Grünenpolitikerin am Sonntagabend in der ARD-Sendung Caren Miosga. Sie verwies darauf, dass es einen solchen Ringtausch bereits bei anderem Material gegeben habe.

Cameron hatte in einem Interview der Süddeutschen Zeitung seine Absicht bekundet, "engstens mit unseren deutschen Partnern zusammenzuarbeiten, um der Ukraine zu helfen". Dabei hält Cameron auch einen Ringtausch für möglich, der die Bedenken von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz (SPD) zerstreuen könnte.

Baerbock ließ erkennen, dass sie Taurus-Lieferungen befürworten würde. Sie habe schon im Sommer deutlich gemacht, dass die Ukraine mit Blick auf den Minengürtel im Osten des Landes weitreichende Waffensysteme brauche, sagte sie und ergänzte auf Nachfrage: "in Klammern: auch Taurus". Dazu zählten aber auch zum Beispiel Raketenwerfer und Panzerhaubitzen, die Deutschland bereits geliefert habe. Diese Frage habe man eigentlich schon mal diskutiert.

Die Union will am Donnerstag im Bundestag erneut einen Antrag stellen, mit dem die Bundesregierung aufgefordert wird, Taurus-Marschflugkörper "unverzüglich" an die Ukraine abzugeben. Der Grünenpolitiker Anton Hofreiter schließt nicht aus, für den Oppositionsantrag zu stimmen. "Ich bin noch nicht entschieden", sagte Hofreiter am Sonntag dem Nachrichtenportal The Pioneer.

Es gibt Anzeichen, dass dieser Antrag auch von anderen Politikern der Ampelkoalition unterstützt werden könnte. Die FDP-Verteidigungspolitikerin Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann kündigte ihre Zustimmung an – ähnlich wie bei einem ähnlichen Unionsantrag vor zwei Wochen. Der stellvertretende FDP-Chef Wolfgang Kubicki will sein Votum laut Rheinischer Post von der Formulierung des Antrags abhängig machen.

https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland ... britannien

[theoderich]

13.03.2024 Auswärtiges — Antrag — hib 151/2024
BSW stellt sich gegen Taurus-Lieferungen an die Ukraine

https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kur ... gen-993506

[theoderich]

The truth behind the EU’s new €5B weapons fund for Kyiv

Europe's new €5 billion fund for Ukraine was lauded as a big win for Kyiv, but the program is more of an accounting procedure than an actual pile of cash.

EU countries agreed Wednesday to create the Ukraine Assistance Fund, which ostensibly boosts the bloc's off-budget European Peace Facility (EPF) with an extra €5 billion. The EPF is used to partially reimburse member countries for the weapons they provide to Ukraine.

But despite its name, the "fund" won't actually see a €5 billion infusion — as bilateral weapons shipments can count as “in-kind contributions.”

The end result will still mean billions of euros worth of weapons are sent to Ukraine — some of them directly by donors, whereas if countries give less they'll have to actually pay into the fund.

Bilateral arms shipments to Ukraine will be discounted from cash contributions to the fund at a level of around 43 percent. That means that for every €2.30 in weapons that a country gives Ukraine, it can deduct €1 from what it owes to the fund.

For all countries, this means that as long as they give enough bilateral aid, they won’t have to give any new cash to the fund.

It’s “creative accounting,” one official told POLITICO’s Brussels Playbook.

Germany, for example, has to chip in around €1.2 billion a year, but as long as it gives Ukraine at least €2.4 billion in weapons, it will be off the hook. This year Berlin has pledged it will give €7 billion.

Germany has already said it will count its own arms shipments as its contribution.

However, some countries will likely prefer to send money to the fund rather than give weapons directly to Ukraine, a senior EU official said.

"The bilateral in-kind contributions make sense for countries that have a big weapons industry, as they can buy from their own producers," the official said.

But that dry accounting procedure belies the excited talk in Brussels that greeted Wednesday's deal.

EU leaders, who took weeks to reach agreement on the package amid objections from France, Germany and Hungary, promptly flourished the deal as a victory for the EU and Kyiv, which desperately needs more weapons and ammunition.

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-weap ... raine-war/


Lieferung von Taurus-Marschflugkörpern an die Ukraine abgelehnt

Die Unionsfraktion ist mit ihrem Antrag zur Lieferung des Marschflugkörpers Taurus an die Ukraine gescheitert. In namentlicher Abstimmung wandten sich am Donnerstag, 14. März 2024, 494 Abgeordnete gegen ihren Antrag (20/9143), 188 Abgeordnete stimmten dafür, es gab fünf Enthaltungen. Die Abstimmung zugrunde lag eine Beschlussempfehlung des Auswärtigen Ausschusses (20/10433). Die Union hatte unter anderem die aus ihre Sicht zu zögerliche Haltung der Bundesregierung beziehungsweise eine „Reihe von Ausreden“ kritisiert. „Wenn die Bundesregierung tatsächlich das Ziel verfolgt, dass die Ukraine diesen Krieg gewinnen muss, dann sollte sie ein so wirksames System nicht zurückhalten, sondern gerade dieses liefern.“ Es sei im eigenen Sicherheitsinteresse, der Ukraine die Waffen zu geben, die sie brauche, um den Aggressor Russland militärisch zurückzudrängen.

https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/text ... ine-992936

14. März 2024
Lieferung des Taurus-Marschflugkörpers (Beschlussempfehlung)

https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/plen ... ung?id=906

[muck]

Ein Bericht des Hohen Kommissars für Menschenrechte der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCHR) beschuldigt Russlands Armee der "Verachtung grundsätzlicher völkerrechtlicher Prinzipien" und "systematischer" Rechtsverletzungen in der Ukraine. Der Bericht nennt u.a. gezielte Angriffe auf Zivilisten, Hinrichtungen, Vergewaltigungen, Plünderungen, Deportationen von Zivilisten und systematische Folter. Ukrainische Kriegsgefangene würden misshandelt und unzureichend versorgt. Der Bericht sieht Verdachtsmomente, dass Russland einen Völkermord am ukrainischen Volk begeht. Der Bericht erwähnt überdies, dass in "einigen wenigen Fällen" ukrainische Staatsorgane Menschenrechtsverletzungen an mutmaßlichen Kollaborateuren begangen hätten.

(Quelle)

[muck]

Dimitri Medwedew, russischer Präsident a.D., Vorsitzender der Staatspartei Einiges Russland und Vizechef des Sicherheitsrates der Russischen Föderation, hat auf Telegram einen "Friedensplan" für das Ende des Ukraine-Krieges veröffentlicht. Zwei Möglichkeiten stünden der Ukraine zur Auswahl, eine "sanfte Formel" und eine "harte Formel".

Die sanfte Formel:

1. Vollständige und bedingungslose Kapitulation der ehemaligen [sic] Ukraine, vertreten durch die Neonazis [sic] in Kiew. Entmilitarisierung der ehemaligen Ukraine und Verbot der künftigen Aufstellung paramilitärischer Kräfte.

2. Anerkennung des Nazi-Charakters durch die internationale Gemeinschaft des ehemaligen [sic] Regimes in Kiew und erzwungene Entnazifizierung aller Regierungsorgane unter UN-Aufsicht.

3. Verlusterklärung der UN-Mitgliedschaft der ehemaligen Ukraine mitsamt Verlust der internationalen Rechtspersönlichkeit und der Freiheit, ohne Zustimmung Russlands einem Militärbündnis beizutreten.

4. Rücktritt aller verfassungsrechtlichen Autoritäten der ehemaligen Ukraine und sofortige Abhaltung von Wahlen zum provisorischen Parlament des selbstverwalteten Territoriums in der ehemaligen Ukraine.

5. Verabschiedung von Gesetzen durch das provisorische Parlament über die Zahlung aller erforderlichen Reparationen an Russland, einschließlich Zahlungen an die Angehörigen toter Russen, und für auf dem Gebiet der Russischen Föderation erlittene Gesundheits- und Sachschäden.

6. Offizielle Anerkennung durch das Interimsparlament der ehemaligen Ukraine, dass ihr gesamtes Territorium zum Territorium der Russischen Föderation gehört. Annahme eines Gesetzes zur Wiedervereinigung mit Russland.

7. Selbstauflösung des provisorischen Parlaments. UN-Anerkennung des Aktes der Wiedervereinigung.

Die harte Formel:



Meine Damen und Herren: die Nummer drei im Regime. Absolut irre. In jedem normalen Land würde so jemand aus dem Amt gejagt. Ich würde wirklich gerne hören, wie der Papst und Gleichgesinnte mit solchen Leuten verhandeln wollen.

[theoderich]

Guerre en Ukraine : le gouvernement belge approuve trois paquets d’aide supplémentaire pour 412 millions

Le conseil des ministres a approuvé vendredi trois paquets d’aide militaire supplémentaire à l’Ukraine pour un montant de 412 millions d’euros, a annoncé la ministre de la Défense, Ludivine Dedonder, dans un communiqué.

La Défense fournira des munitions d’artillerie supplémentaires à l’Ukraine, d’une part à partir du stock de la Défense, et d’autre part, par un achat groupé international auprès de diverses entreprises. Le montant libéré du Fonds Ukraine pour ce paquet s’élève à 373,1 millions d’euros.

Des navires chasseurs cédés

En coopération avec les Pays-Bas, trois navires chasseurs de mines (CMT) seront cédés à l’Ukraine. La Belgique organisera la formation de base du personnel à l’Académie navale et les Pays-Bas assureront la formation « on the job » pour les équipages. La Défense belge mettra le navire Narcis à l’entretien avant de le céder à l’Ukraine.

Le montant libéré s’élève à 6 millions d’euros.

Dans le cadre de la coopération Benelux, les gouvernements belge, néerlandais et luxembourgeois ont par ailleurs convenu d’acheter des ambulances blindées, de les faire moderniser et puis de les remettre à l’Ukraine. Des drones de reconnaissance seront également achetés. Il est question ici d’un montant de 32,9 millions d’euros.

La Défense belge livrera enfin près de 300 véhicules Lynx (type « Light Multirole Vehicle ») à l’Ukraine.

https://www.lesoir.be/574870/article/20 ... uets-daide


https://www.facebook.com/TheBelgianNavy ... vss6F8eRXl


https://www.facebook.com/belgianarmy/ph ... 9105/?_rdr

Darüber hinaus wollen die BENELUX-Länder gepanzerte Sanitätsfahrzeuge und Aufklärungsdrohnen an die Ukraine liefern.

Die harte Formel:

Ich habe interessehalber nach dem Foto gesucht:

World war 2, december 19, 1943, still from a film on the kharkov trial produced by artkino, long shot of the execution, a truck was driven under the gallows, a chair placed on it, and the criminal on the chair.

https://www.gettyimages.at/detail/nachr ... /170986032

The Judicialization of International Atrocity Crimes: The Kharkov Trial of 1943

In the Ukraine, some of the fiercest battles between the German forces and the Red Army took place around Kharkov, Ukraine’s second largest city. As a result of these battles, the Kharkov region became the only Soviet territory that changed hands four times during the war. The Germans captured Kharkov and the rest of eastern Ukraine in October 1941. In May 1942, the Soviet Red Army led a disastrous counter-attack in an attempt to recapture the city. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers lost their lives in what military historian David Glantz calls “one of the most catastrophic offensives in Russian military history.” In February 1943, the Red Army launched another offensive, this time successfully liberating the city. Soon thereafter, German forces countered with another attack, recapturing Kharkov in March 1943. This turned out to be the last major German victory on the Eastern Front. On August 23, 1943, the Red Army carried out Operation Rumyantsev and finally liberated Kharkov, once and for all, from German occupation.

In December 1943, the Soviet Union conducted a trial in Kharkov of three captured Germans and one Russian collaborator, charging them with the murder of Kharkov civilians, almost all Jews. The highly
publicized Kharkov trial was the first trial of Germans held by any of the Allied Powers. Earlier in the year, the Soviets held a public trial at Krasnodar, but the defendants were all Soviet citizens tried for treason stemming from their collaboration with the German invaders. The Soviets had also been conducting summary military trials of captured Germans, followed by quick executions. These, however, were not public trials and so were virtually unknown to the outside world.

By contrast, the Kharkov trial was a highly publicized affair, and an attempt (albeit partly successful—see discussion below) by the Soviets to conduct a Western-style legal proceeding.

https://digital.sandiego.edu/ilj/vol14/iss1/4/

Dieses Foto als Illustration zu verwenden, ist blanker Zynismus.

Nebenbei hat Medvedev auch noch dem lettischen Staatspräsidenten, Edgars Rinkēvičs, mit der Ermordung gedroht und Lettland das Existenzrecht abgesprochen.
_____________________________________________________

Die Ukraine ist erst 2008 im außenpolitischen Konzept der Russischen Föderation aufgetaucht. Offenbar als direkte Folge des NATO-Gipfels von Bukarest (Bucharest Summit Declaration).

• 11.07.2000 00:00:00
  Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации
  
  https://www.ng.ru/world/2000-07-11/1_concept.html
  

  Russia is prepared to consent for a further reduction of its nuclear potential on the basis of bilateral agreements with the United States of America, and — in a multilateral format - with the participation of other nuclear powers on condition that strategic stability in the nuclear sphere will not be upset. Russia shall seek preservation and observance of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems - the cornerstone of strategic stability. The implementation of the plans of the United States to create a national missile defense system will inevitably compel the Russian Federation to adopt adequate measures for maintaining its national security at a proper level;
  
  Russia reaffirms its unswerving course toward participating jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, as well as relevant materials and technologies. The Russian Federation is an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant international regimes, including the creation of a Global system of control over non-proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. The Russian Federation to firmly adheres to its commitments under the Treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, and urges all countries of the world to join it;

  Russia regards international peacemaking as an effective instrument for resolving armed conflicts, and calls for the strengthening of its legal foundation in strict accordance with the principles in the U.N. Charter. Supporting the measures to build up and modernize the potential of the United Nations' anti-crisis rapid response, the Russian Federation intends to continue its active participation in peacekeeping operations conducted both under the auspices of the United Nations, as well as in specific cases of regional and sub-regional organizations. The need for and degree of such participation shall be measured against the national interests and international commitments of our country. Russia proceeds from the premise that only the U.N. Security Council has the authority to sanction use of force for the purpose of achieving peace;
  
  Russia proceeds from the premise that the use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter is unlawful and poses a threat to the stabilization of the entire system of international relations. Attempts to introduce into the international parlance such concepts as "humanitarian intervention" and "limited sovereignty" in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the U.N. Security Council are not acceptable. Being prepared for a constructive dialogue on upgrading the legal aspects of employing force in international relations in conditions of globalization, the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact that the search for concrete forms of response on the part of the international community in different acute situations, including humanitarian crises, must be conducted collectively on the basis of strict observance of the norms of international law and the U.N. Charter;

  Relations with European states is Russia's traditional foreign policy priority. The main aim of Russian foreign policy in Europe is the creation of a stable and democratic system of European security and cooperation. Russia is interested in the further balanced development of the multi-functional character of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and will make efforts in this direction.
  
  It is important to fully use the rule-making potential which continues to be fully valid, that this organization has accumulated after the adoption in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act. Russia will strongly oppose the narrowing down of the OSCE functions, specifically the attempts to redirect its specialized activities to the post-Soviet space and the Balkans.
  
  Russia will work for making the adapted Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe into an effective means of European security and for imparting a comprehensive nature to confidence-building measures, including, specifically, coalition activities and
  naval activities.

  Of key importance are relations with the European Union (EU). The on going processes within the EU are having a growing impact on the dynamic of the situation in Europe. These are the EU expansion, transition to a common currency, the institutional reform, and emergence of a joint foreign policy and a policy in the area of security, as well as a defense identity. Regarding these processes as an objective component of European development, Russia will seek due respect for its interests, including in the sphere of bilateral relations with individual EU member countries.
  
  The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations.
  
  [...]
  
  The EU's emerging military-political dimension should become an object of particular attention.
  
  Realistically assessing the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia proceeds from the importance of cooperation with it in the interests of maintaining security and stability in the continent and is open to constructive interaction. The necessary basis for that was laid in the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of May 27, 1997. The intensity of cooperation with NATO will depend on its compliance with key clauses of this document, primarily those concerning non-use or threat of force, and non-deployment of conventional armed forces groupings, nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in the territories of the new members.
  
  At the same time, on a number of parameters, NATO's present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them. This primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new strategic concept, which do not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO.
  
  Substantive and constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO is only possible if it is based on the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the sides and an unconditional fulfillment of mutual obligations assumed.

  https://www.bits.de/EURA/russia052800.pdf

Bucharest Summit Declaration

Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuable contributions to Alliance operations. We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and Georgia and look forward to free and fair parliamentary elections in Georgia in May. MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP. Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their December 2008 meeting. Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi ... dLocale=en

• THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
  
  Approved by Dmitry A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation,
  on 12 July 2008
  

  The main objective of the Russian foreign policy on the European track is to create a truly open, democratic system of regional collective security and cooperation ensuring the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, in such a way as not to allow its new fragmentation and reproduction of bloc-based approaches which still persist in the European architecture that took shape during the Cold War period. This is precisely the essence of the initiative aimed at concluding a European security treaty, the elaboration of which could be launched at a pan-European summit.
  
  Russia calls for building a truly unified Europe without divisive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the European Union and the United States. This would strengthen the positions of the Euro-Atlantic States in global competition. Being the biggest European State with multinational and multiconfessional society and centuries-old history, Russia stands ready to play a constructive role in ensuring a civilizational compatibility of Europe, and harmonious integration of religious minorities, including in view of various existing migration trends.
  
  Russia advocates a strengthened role of the Council of Europe as an independent and universal European organization that determines the level of legal standards in all its Member States without applying discriminatory practices against or extending privileges to anyone, as an important instrument of eliminating dividing lines on the continent.
  
  It is in Russia's interests that the OSCE fulfill in good faith its function of being a forum for an equitable dialogue between the OSCE participating States and for collective consensus decision-making on the basis of a comprehensive approach to military and political, economic and humanitarian aspects of security based on the balance of interests. In order to fully implement this function the whole process of OSCE functioning should be underpinned by a solid regulatory framework ensuring the supremacy of collective intergovernmental bodies' prerogatives.
  
  In the military and political sphere Russia will seek to fix the imbalances present in the sphere of conventional arms and armed forces reduction and to adopt new confidence-building measures.
  
  The Russian Federation will develop its relations with the European Union, which is a major trade, economic and foreign-policy partner, will promote strengthening in every possible way the interaction mechanisms, including through establishment of common spaces in economy, external and internal security, education, science and culture. From the long-term perspective, it is in the interests of Russia to agree with the European Union on a strategic partnership treaty setting special, most advanced forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation with the European Union in all spheres with a view to establishing a visa-free regime.
  
  The Russian Federation is interested in the strengthening of the European Union, development of its capacity to present agreed positions in trade, economic, humanitarian, foreign policy and security areas.

  Proceeding from a realistic assessment of the role of NATO, Russia deems it important to ensure progressive development of interaction within the format of the Russia-NATO Council in the interests of ensuring predictability and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Region, the utmost utilization of the existing potential for a political dialogue and practical cooperation in resolving issues relating to responses to common threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional crises, drug trafficking, natural and man-made disasters.
  
  Russia will build its relationship with NATO taking into consideration the degree of the alliance's readiness for equal partnership, unswerving compliance with the principles and standards of international law, the implementation by all its members of the obligations, assumed within the framework of the Russia-NATO Council, not to ensure one's security at the expense of security of the Russian Federation, as well as the obligation to display military restraint. Russia maintains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, notably to the plans of admitting Ukraine and Georgia to the membership in the alliance, as well as to bringing the NATO military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders on the whole, which violates the principle of equal security, leads to new dividing lines in Europe and runs counter to the tasks of increasing the effectiveness of joint work in search for responses to real challenges of our time.
  
  Russia builds its relations with the USA taking into account not only the vast potential of that country for mutually advantageous bilateral trade, economic, scientific, technological and other cooperation, but also its key influence on the state of global strategic stability and international situation as a whole. Russia is interested in making effective use of the existing broad infrastructure for interaction, including a continued dialogue on foreign policy, security and strategical stability issues, which permits to find mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of coinciding interests.
  
  To this end, it is necessary to transform the Russian-US relations into strategic partnership, overcome the barriers of strategic principles of the past and focus on real threats, while working for the resolution of differences between Russia and the USA in the spirit of mutual respects in the areas where they persist.
  
  Russia has been consistently favoring new agreements with the United States on disarmament and arms control in the interests of preserving continuity of this process, strengthening confidence building and transparency measures in space activity and anti-missile defense, as well as on issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, secure development of peaceful nuclear energy, broadening cooperation in countering terrorism and other challenges and threats as well as settlement of regional conflicts.
  
  Russia is interested in US actions in the world stage be based on the principles and norms of international law, first of all the UN Charter.
  
  The long-term priorities of the American track in the Russian policy consist in putting the relationship with the USA on a solid economic foundation, ensuring joint development of a culture for resolving differences on the basis of pragmatism and respect for the balance of interests, which will permit to ensure greater stability and predictability in the Russian-US relations.

  https://russiaeu.ru/userfiles/file/fore ... nglish.pdf

• 1 December 2016
  
  Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016)
  

  Rule of Law in International Relations
  
  26. Russia consistently advocates strengthening the legal foundation of international relations and complies with its international legal obligations in good faith. Maintaining and strengthening international rule of law is among its priorities in the international arena. The rule of law in international relations is intended to ensure peaceful and fruitful cooperation among States while seeking to balance their interests, as well as to guarantee the overall stability of the global community. Russia intends:
  
  [...]
  
  b. to counter attempts by some States or groups of States to revise the generally accepted principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of October 24, 1970, as well as in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975; counter politically motivated and selfintereste d attempts by some States to arbitrarily interpret the fundamental international legal norms and principles such as non-use of force or threat of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, right of peoples to selfdetermination; counter attempts to represent violations of international law as "creative" applications of such norms; counter attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of States with the aim of unconstitutional change of regime, including by supporting non-State actors, such as terrorist and extremist groups;
  
  c. to prevent military interventions or other forms of outside interference contrary to international law, specifically the principle of sovereign equality of States, under the pretext of implementing the "responsibility to protect" concept;
  
  [...]
  
  f. to step up efforts to finalize international legal procedures to delimitate the state boundary of the Russian Federation as well as its maritime boundaries, within which Russia exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction, in unconditional support of its national interests, primarily security and economic interests, while taking into consideration the importance of strengthening trust and cooperation with neighbouring States.

  IV. Regional Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian Federation
  
  [...]
  
  56. Russian Federation is interested in developing political, economic, cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine in all areas on the basis of mutual respect and commitment to building partnership relations with due regard for Russia’s national interests. Russia undertakes to make every effort to promote political and diplomatic settlement of the internal conflict in Ukraine in cooperation with all the interested States and international agencies.

  https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/def ... ration.pdf

Putin entsendet Truppen in Ostukraine

Der russische Präsident Wladimir Putin hat die Entsendung von Truppen in die Ostukraine angeordnet. Die Einheiten sollen in den von Moskau nun als unabhängige Staaten anerkannten „Volksrepubliken“ Luhansk und Donezk für Frieden sorgen, wie aus einem Dekret hervorgeht, das der Kremlchef heute in Moskau unterzeichnete.

https://orf.at/#/stories/3248244/



Die Dekrete sind hier zu finden. Die zynische "Argumentation":

• "Weigerung" der Ukraine, den Konflikt in Übereinstimmung mit den Minsker Vereinbarungen friedlich zu lösen

• Anweisung an das Außenministerium, mit der "Partei" von Donetsk/Luhansk den Entwurf eines "Vertrags über Freundschaft, Kooperation und gegenseitigen Beistand" auszuarbeiten und diesen zur Unterschrift vorzulegen

• In Erwiderung an den Aufruf des Oberhaupts der Volksrepublik von Donetsk/Luhansk an das Verteidigungsministerium der Russischen Föderation sind die Streitkräfte der Russischen Föderation vor Abschluss des Vertrags auf dem Gebiet der Volksrepublik von Donetsk/Luhansk zur "Friedenssicherung" einzusetzen.

• 31.03.2023 15:00
  Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 31 марта 2023 г.)
  

  European region
  
  59. Most European states pursue an aggressive policy toward Russia aimed at creating threats to the security and sovereignty of the Russian Federation, gaining unilateral economic advantages, undermining domestic political stability and eroding traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, and creating obstacles to Russia's cooperation with allies and partners. In this connection, the Russian Federation intends to consistently defend its national interests by giving priority attention to:
  
  1) reducing and neutralizing threats to security, territorial integrity, sovereignty, traditional spiritual and moral values, and socio-economic development of Russia, its allies and partners from unfriendly European states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Council of Europe;
  
  2) creating conditions for the cessation of unfriendly actions by European states and their associations, for a complete rejection of the anti Russian course (including interference in Russia's internal affairs) by these states and their associations, and for their transition to a long-term policy of good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia;
  
  3) the formation of a new model of coexistence by European states to ensure the safe, sovereign and progressive development of Russia, its allies and partners, and durable peace in the European part of Eurasia, taking into account the potential of multilateral formats, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
  
  60. Objective prerequisites for the formation of a new model of coexistence with European states are geographical proximity, historically developed deep cultural, humanitarian and economic ties of the peoples and states of the European part of Eurasia. The main factor complicating the normalization of relations between Russia and European states is the strategic course of the USA and their individual allies to draw and deepen dividing lines in the European region in order to weaken and undermine the competitiveness of the economies of Russia and European states, as well as to limit the sovereignty of European states and ensure US global domination.
  
  61. The realization by the states of Europe that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial equal cooperation with Russia, an increase in the level of their foreign policy independence and a transition to a policy of good neighbourliness with the Russian Federation will have a positive effect on the security and welfare of the European region and help European states take their proper place in the Greater Eurasian Partnership and in a multipolar world.

  13. Considering the strengthening of Russia as one of the leading centres of development in the modern world and its independent foreign policy as a threat to Western hegemony, the United States of America (USA) and their satellites used the measures taken by the Russian Federation as regards Ukraine to protect its vital interests as a pretext to aggravate the longstanding anti-Russian policy and unleashed a new type of hybrid war. It is aimed at weakening Russia in every possible way, including at undermining its constructive civilizational role, power, economic and technological capabilities, limiting its sovereignty in foreign and domestic policy, violating its territorial integrity. This Western policy has become comprehensive and is now enshrined at the doctrinal level. This was not the choice of the Russian Federation. Russia does not consider itself to be an enemy of the West, is not isolating itself from the West and has no hostile intentions with regard to it; Russia hopes that in future the states belonging to the Western community will realize that their policy of confrontation and hegemonic ambitions lack prospects, will take into account the complex realities of a multipolar world and will resume pragmatic cooperation with Russia being guided by the principles of sovereign equality and respect for each other's interests. The Russian Federation is ready for dialogue and cooperation on such a basis.

  https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/offici ... s/1860586/

[muck]

@theoderich

Die Ukraine ist erst 2008 im außenpolitischen Konzept der Russischen Föderation aufgetaucht. Offenbar als direkte Folge des NATO-Gipfels von Bukarest (Bucharest Summit Declaration).

Mit Verlaub, aber diese Aussage kann irreführend wirken, wenn man sie nicht streng wortwörtlich auf das "außenpolitisch[e] Konzept" im Sinne eines Schriftstücks, der außenpolitischen Leitlinien der Russischen Föderation, bezieht.

Denn in außenpolitischen Konzepten Russlands taucht die Ukraine natürlich schon vorher auf.

Seit der Kastanienrevolution von 2005 verschlechterten sich die Beziehungen beider Staaten, spätestens ab dem Gasstreit 2006 betrieb Russland de facto eine Politik, die darauf abzielte, eine autonome ukrainische Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik zu unterbinden. Erst infolge des Gasstreits gewannen überhaupt Fürsprecher einer Westbindung der Ukraine in der Kastanienbewegung Oberwasser, was schließlich zu ihrem Scheitern aufgrund innerer Konflikte führte.