https://www.facebook.com/bundesheer/pos ... ic3cyUzxUl
iceman hat geschrieben: ↑Fr 17. Mai 2024, 19:30
Was wird von anderen Armeen als ungeschütztes Gruppenfahrzeug eingesetzt?
Abgesehen von einem in der Erprobung befindlichen Fahrzeug in den USA werden dezidierte "Gruppenfahrzeuge" mit einer Transportkapazität von mindestens sechs Soldaten nirgends verwendet:
https://www.army.mil/article/265471/inf ... production
Dieses
Infantry Squad Vehicle macht hauptsächlich
Probleme und weckt Kritik der Benutzer.
In Norwegen gibt es bei der Heimevernet ein leichtes Patrouillenfahrzeug, den
MB 290 Multi III, von dem ein Teil jüngst nach
Nordmazedonien verkauft worden ist. Hauptsächlich wird von dieser Teilstreitkraft der
VW Amarok eingesetzt - als unbewaffnetes Verbindungsfahrzeug.
Und in Kanada wird seit mehreren Jahren das Polaris MRZR getestet - aber für Luftlandeeinsätze. Im Rahmen eines ca. zwanzig Jahre alten Projekts:
GALEA Dave:
A Light Force Capability for the Army, in: The Canadian Army Journal (Summer
2005), p. 9-18
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/ ... 1-8-2E.pdf
Canadian Military Contracts Polaris Defense to Provide Turbo Diesel MRZRs and Trailers for Light Infantry Battalions (23. August 2016)
Winnipeg, MB (August 23, 2016) – Public Services & Procurement Canada has contracted Polaris to deliver 36 Polaris Defense turbo diesel MRZR (MRZR-D) utility task vehicles and 12 tactical trailers through Polaris Industries Ltd, the Canada-based office of Polaris Industries Inc. MRZRs provide mission-critical ultralight, off-road mobility coveted by the expeditionary forces that use them in the U.S. and more than 20 allied countries.
To be as deployable as the warfighters that use them, MRZR vehicles are H-47 (Chinook), H-53 and V-22 (Osprey) air transportable and can be configured a number of ways, including two-, four- and six-person. The turbo-charged diesel engine in the new MRZR-D has been engineered to meet the performance and physical specs of the original MRZR vehicles. While many key features – like the dimensions, payload, towing, ground clearance, accessories, handling, and other features – remain the same, Polaris incorporated feedback from the field in the new product, including updated occupant seating space, ergonomics and sightlines. The MRZR-D also provides increased auxiliary power and greater range, making it even more effective.
For the Canadian Army, each MRZR-D will be equipped with IR lighting, a 2,041 kg (4500 lb) winch and many other standards and tactical features used by the U.S. and other allied forces. The tactical trailer provides an additional 454 kg (1000 lb) payload. It is designed to keep up with the MRZR and boasts a fully independent suspension system and a removable tongue and pintle style hitch to allow for 180 degrees of rotation in small spaces, increased mobility and easier transportation and storage. The sides are removable and the back gate folds for maximum storage flexibility and capability.
The contract was awarded in June by Public Services & Procurement Canada on behalf of the Department of National Defence, with an option for up to 18 more MRZR-Ds and up to six more tactical trailers. The vehicles and trailers will be delivered to the light infantry battalions stationed at the Canadian Forces Bases in Edmonton, Petawawa and Valcartier for user evaluation later this year. Production continues for the original gas powertrain MRZR 2 and MRZR 4 as well under the LTATV program for USSOCOM and other international contracts.
https://www.polaris.com/en-ca/news/comp ... attalions/
Up The Creek Without A Paddle, in: The Canadian Army Journal (17. 3. 2017), p. 154-161
The probability of our infantry coming under contact against tanks or heavy infantry fighting vehicles without immediate combined arms or air support is not one to be discounted. There will be times and places where our infantry will be engaged in isolating manoeuvres by armoured threats (e.g. during the first few hours of a stability operation when light forces are deployed to secure a bridgehead). The very notion of adaptive dispersed operations implies that such situations could indeed occur during established, mature operations too (e.g. as regional conditions shift unexpectedly requiring the battle group to physically regroup within its area of operations to head-off a rapidly emerging symmetric threat).
We believe that beyond the current reintroduction of the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) anti-tank missile in our mechanized battalions, our infantry’s broader anti-armour capability—which includes doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, equipment and training—needs to be seriously reassessed and improved to maintain our relevance, survivability and effectiveness in the future security environment, where tanks, next-generation infantry fighting vehicles and small unit bunkers should be expected to upset our aforementioned assumptions on the matter.
Starting with a hypothesis about a widening gap in our anti-armour capabilities, we designed and conducted a week-long field tactical exercise that brought together some 300 participants, primarily from infantry and combat engineer regiments, both Regular Force and Reserve Force. We ‘stress-tested’ our infantry’s ability to take on an armoured force conventionally. More precisely, we sought to ascertain whether a task-tailored, dismounted infantry company could defeat mechanized opposing forces through defensive operations with a one-to-three force ratio (friendly to enemy).
The exercise was split into three phases. The first phase consisted of multiple iterations of an infantry company group (three rifle platoons plus one ‘light’ TOW platoon equipped with all-terrain vehicles and open trailers) defending against a short-changed mechanized opposing forces regiment. The 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment provided the opposing forces—a reinforced platoon with seven light armoured vehicles (acting as T-80 main battle tanks and in some cases heavy infantry fighting vehicles, both of which were supported by dismounted infantry). The platoon was allowed to ‘reset’ itself in order to simulate the engagement of up to two opposing forces combat teams. Every iteration brought a change to a control variable to test for outcomes such as kill and survivability rates. Variables included: tank-hunting team configurations and weapons mix, use of terrain (urban vs. natural), open-fire policy distances (min-max), etc.
Building on lessons learned from the first phase, the second phase of the exercise consisted of a 36-hour field tactical exercise that pitted a reduced light infantry battalion6 against the same opposing forces mechanized regiment. The battalion fought a guard action followed by a main defensive battle in an urban area, and followed again by a battalion ambush against follow-on forces at night. The third and final phase of the exercise involved 84-mm live fire with live tank-hunting team demonstrations.
In our view, the exercise provided valuable training for those involved. However, the exercise also demonstrated that our light infantry was generally ‘up the creek without a paddle’ against armoured or mechanized opposing forces. Individual tank hunting teams did wonders, and progressed incredibly over a single week of rapid, iterative, closed-loop learning. They responded with creativity when incorporating complementary weapons, namely the C14 command-detonated, rocket-propelled anti-tank mine and ground laid mines. Teams made best use of the additional firepower, increasing both their survivability and kill rates. But no amount of tactical innovations, of which there were many at all levels, could compensate for the fact that our infantry lacked some of the critical weaponry and related tactics, techniques and procedures to credibly defeat a sizeable armoured threat and live to fight another day.
Currently, the greatest gap, in our view, is the absence of a portable medium-range weapon system (500 to 1500 metres) that would allow for the standoff destruction of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and strongpoints. Such a weapon system is needed now in order to improve survivability and freedom of movement to acceptable levels for dismounted infantry companies and light infantry battalions.
Next, our short-range weapons systems (84 mm) should be upgraded to include uncooled thermal sights that would allow our infantry to engage enemy armour or strongpoints in low-visibility conditions at short range (75 to 500 metres)
Finally, in closed terrain, our infantry should be equipped with and specially trained on existing systems such as ground-laid and remote-detonated anti-tank mines that can neutralize or destroy armour at very close range (0 to 75 metres).
https://publications.gc.ca/collections/ ... -3-eng.pdf
- Defence Investment Plan 2018
Light Forces Enhancement
Objective
LFE will deliver a mobile, light weight, all-terrain vehicle to enhance the mobility of the Canadian Army's Light Forces. This will enable them to function with increased range and response time while reducing overall soldier burden during operations within complex terrain and unique operations environments.
Requirements
This project is expected to deliver between 150 and 300 light vehicles and trailers comprised of tactical mobility platform vehicles designed to rapidly deliver teams of soldiers to combat zones in complex terrain and tactical mobility cargo vehicles focused on the transportation of bulky combat materiel. It is intended that the vehicles will be distributed to both regular and reserve forces.
Funding Range
$50 million to $99 million
https://apps.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-ca ... sp?id=1617
- Light Forces Enhancement Project
Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is requesting Industry feedback regarding the Light Forces Enhancement (LFE) project for the Government of Canada (GC), the Department of National Defence (DND), and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).
The Canadian Light Forces (LF) need new light tactical personnel and cargo carrying capabilities. These capabilities will move soldiers and equipment across complex terrain which currently can only be reached on foot. It will lighten CAF soldiers’ on-person combat burden by carrying additional equipment and supplies, and will cover a larger area of operation through increased speed, range, and duration. This powerful, lightweight solution is expected to operate in domestic and expeditionary deployments, up to and including high threat environments.
https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender- ... -319-28038
2. Project Information
2.1. Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), Initiative 38 states the Government’s commitment to “acquire communications, sustainment, and survivability equipment for the Army light forces, including improved light weight radios and soldier equipment.”
2.2. As part of a review in support of the Adaptive Dispersed Operations concept, the Canadian Light Forces (LF) need new light tactical personnel and cargo carrying capabilities. These capabilities will move soldiers and equipment across complex terrain which currently can only be reached on foot. It will lighten CAF soldiers’ on-person combat burden by carrying additional equipment and supplies, and will cover a larger area of operation through increased speed, range, and duration.
This powerful, lightweight solution is expected to operate in domestic and expeditionary
deployments, up to and including high threat environments.
2.3. The LFE project will seek to acquire up to 330 Tactical Mobility Platform (TMP) vehicles and light trailers that serve two (2) distinct operational purposes/requirements:
a) TMP-Personnel to carry soldiers and their loads, and
b) TMP-Cargo to carry larger loads.
2.4. Two TMP variants, or a single TMP variant that can be easily configured to fulfill both variant’s requirements, are both viable solutions.
2.5. The TMP vehicle will be able to carry a crew of two (2) to four (4) CAF soldiers, their weapons and effects, and combat supplies to sustain them for a minimum of 24 and up to 72 hours on operation.
The light trailer will be used to carry any other loads as required. The Project also plans to acquire Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) elements to operate and maintain the fleet. A list of preliminary requirements can be found in Annex A- Technical Requirements.
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/202 ... BSU000.PDF
Tactical Mobility for Light Forces (23. Dezember 2020)
When Canadian Army Light Forces next deploy into a conflict zone, it could be on a fleet of four-wheeled, lightweight, off-road vehicles. A request for information (RFI) went out to industry this fall to help the Directorate of Land Requirements project team fine-tune a capability that would help light infantry reach off-road objectives far quicker and easier than by foot.
“I’ve written the statement of requirements (SOR) for this vehicle based on feedback from the user community and the Canadian Army Land Warfare Center (CALWC), and it will go out along with the RFI to gauge how much of it they can meet and at what cost,” said Major Tony Ross, the project director for what is known as Light Forces Enhancement (LFE).
The project received Defence Capability Board approval last October, and the Army hopes to have the first vehicles with its light infantry battalions by 2023 and achieve initial operating capability by the summer of 2024.
“We want to get this capability to the units in line with the [Army’s] 2017 Master Implementation Directive – Light Forces, which saw full operating capability in 2025,” he said.
Ideally, that would be a single platform soldiers can modify in the field to meet their needs. But conversations with potential suppliers suggest the more likely solution is a platform available in two variants, combat and cargo, along with trailers, explained Ross.
The tactical mobility platforms (TMP), as they will be known, should be capable of transporting enough equipment, including weapons, ammunition and water, to sustain soldiers for 48 to 72 hours.
“They will be operated by one driver, with space on the top for a gunner who will be able to operate the section’s heavy weapon systems, up to a TOW missile or automatic grenade launcher system,” added Ross.
Final quantities have yet to be determined, but the plan includes enough for the Army’s three light infantry battalions, as well as the three light engineer squadrons and three light artillery tactical groups.
A first tranche of TMPs will also be delivered to Reserve platoons with mission tasks such as mortars, direct fire support and mobility support, previously known as pioneers. At present, there are three of each within Canadian Brigade Groups across the country. A second tranche may go to Reserve troops tasked with infantry reconnaissance.
The vehicles might also be added to the inventory of specialized units such as light electronic warfare and intelligence support, and to Reserve influence activities companies.
“We figure between 300 and 330 ultra-light tactical mobility platforms,” said Ross, “210 to 230 of the tactical variants and 90 to 100 of the cargo variants. I have proposed a few recommendations of how these would go out, but ultimately it will be up to the Infantry Corps and Corps directors, working with the chains of command, to decide how these are distributed.”
Ross has viewed a number of options and said at least seven or eight vendors could submit bids when the request for proposals is released. Possible contenders include Polaris, Jankel, Haulotte Group, Supacat and DEW Engineering, Plasan, Pardus, Oshkosh Defense, and AADS J8 Jeep.
The Army conducted a buy and try with ultra-light mobility in 2017 and 2018, acquiring and distributing 36 Polaris MRZR-D four-wheeled utility task vehicles and 12 trailers across the three light battalions to determine how well a lightweight off-road vehicle could handle the various operational scenarios in difficult terrain. While the vehicle received some favourable reviews and proved the concept of getting soldiers and gear to a target much quicker than humping in on foot, the trials demonstrated, especially in Quebec, a need for a more robust capability for obstacle crossing in wetlands, forests, and other terrain.
“Whatever capability we provide, it has to be better at obstacle crossing,” he said. “But the MRZR did meet a lot of the needs of the Light Forces in that it provided that platform to carry gear and get soldiers around quickly, especially out West on the prairies.”
The Canadian Special Operations Forces Command procured the Polaris DAGOR, a larger variant of the MRZR, and took delivery of the vehicles in late 2017 and early 2018.
The Light Forces directive, based on guidance from the defence policy, was divided into three spirals focused on the structure, capability and final delivery of Light Forces. Under capability, the initial list of equipment included tactical mobility platforms, dismounted anti-armour weapon systems, light weight soldier equipment such as load carriage, close combat modular fighting rig, body armour and specialized tools, communications systems, micro unmanned aerial systems, lightweight engineering and electronic warfare equipment, and a portable ground-based air defence system.
Those were eventually distilled down to three priorities: dismounted anti-armour weapon system, light infantry specific personal equipment and tactical vehicles. Most have since been assumed by other projects, leaving LFE to focus on tactical mobility.
Lightweight radios will be acquired through the Land Command Support System Tactical Communications Modernization project while new and lighter weight load carriage and body armour will be addressed by the Soldier Operational Clothing and Equipment Modernization program. A Carl Gustav upgrade project and an Anti-Tank Guided Missile Replacement project will provide some of the lighter and more effective anti-armour weapon systems.
The need for better structured and more capable Light Forces is being driven by a future security environment that predicts conflict, humanitarian and natural disaster response in dense urban megacities and over mountain and jungle terrain medium forces might struggle to navigate. It is also in line with the Army’s operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations, where lighter forces might be better equipped to disperse for routine tasks and then aggregate to tackle larger missions.
“There will be some missions in the future where medium and heavy forces are not well suited,” he said. “Light Forces are strategically agile in that they provide a quickly deployable force that can prepare a theatre for follow-on medium forces if needed. They have a dual role. They can mitigate a tense security situation when Canada wants to act quickly in advance of slower deploying medium forces, or they can go in for those select operational environments where medium and heavy forces don’t work very well, especially situations involving complex terrain and the need to interact face-to-face with locals.”
Ross acknowledged that the adoption of an ultra-lightweight vehicle for Light Forces is probably counterintuitive given the lessons of recent conflict, where improvised explosive devices have been ubiquitous. Survivability in those conditions has often been equated with more armour. However, scientists with Defence Research and Development Canada have in recent years focused on lighter soldier loads to increase mobility, and therefore survivability.
“In Afghanistan, we started to think that more armour was going to make our guys safer, so we kept piling them up with more and more kit,” he noted. “The enemy can always develop a bomb that will penetrate the thickest armour. But if you give soldiers more mobility, they arrive fresher, less tired, and so more alert to danger. And they will be able to move across places that they weren’t able before, keeping the adversary guessing about the direction of the next move.”
https://canadianarmytoday.com/tactical- ... ht-forces/
https://www.facebook.com/canadianarmy/p ... 62/?type=3
https://www.facebook.com/3rd3eRoyalCana ... zhK3YG8HRl
Strike hard, strike fast: 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, enhancing lethality on the battlefield
After a year working with technical specialists to prove the concept of mounting heavy weapons onto MRZR tactical vehicles, 3 RCR was ready to take the next step. Integrating support from the RCAF for inserting and extracting vehicles and their crews, 3 RCR’s Direct Fire Support (DFS) platoon increases the tactical and operational reach of 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG).
Aboard a pair of CC-130J Hercules aircraft, four MRZRs and their crews were dispatched via parachute drop in Petawawa. Equipped to operate for 48-96 hours without resupply, the MRZRs armaments included the M2 Browning heavy machine gun, the C16 Automatic Grenade Launcher System, and TOW missile system.
When asked what it all means for commanders on the ground, Captain Choquette, a platoon commander with 3 RCR, explained, “commanders will now have the flexibility to deploy light forces across hundreds of kilometers of battlespace. With this capability, a small team can be inserted deep behind the forward edge of the battle area with a CC-130J Hercules, be self-sustaining for 96 hours, and then be extracted via CH-147 Chinook or resupplied for follow-on missions.”
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-nat ... field.html
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=56 ... 4876157385
Members of 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (3 RCR) recently participated in Exercise LETHAL WEAPON in order to prove the new concept of adding anti-armour capabilities to the MRZR .
https://www.facebook.com/2CMBG2GBMC/pos ... iQbi8a8c5l
https://www.facebook.com/canadianarmy/p ... DNYurj6yyl
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