USA: "Space Force"

Wehrtechnik & Rüstung, Sicherheit und Verteidigung außerhalb Europas
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Department of Defense
Report to Congressional Defense Committees

Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense

August 9, 2018
REPORT REQUIREMENT

Pursuant to Section 1601(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY 2018), Public Law 115-91, this report follows the interim report submitted to the congressional defense committees on March 1, 2018, and provides results of a review of the organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense (DoD).
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/09/2 ... ONENTS.PDF

  • Remarks by President Trump at a Meeting with the National Space Council and Signing of Space Policy Directive-3

    Issued on: June 18, 2018
    THE PRESIDENT: [...] I want to also say that when it comes to space, too often, for too many years, our dreams of exploration and discovery were really squandered by politics and bureaucracy, and we knocked that out. So important for our psyche, what’s you’re doing. It’s going to be important monetarily and militarily. But so important for right up here — the psyche. We don’t want China and Russia and other countries leading us. We’ve always led — we’ve gone way far afield for decades now, having to do with our subject today. We’re going to be the leader by far. We’re behind you a thousand percent.

    America’s vital interest in space lost out to special interests in Washington, except, of course, for the senators and congressmen here. They would never do it. Right, Dana?

    But all of that is changing. We know that. My administration is reclaiming America’s heritage as the world’s greatest space-faring nation. The essence of the American character is to explore new horizons and to tame new frontiers. But our destiny, beyond the Earth, is not only a matter of national identity, but a matter of national security. So important for our military. So important. And people don’t talk about it.

    When it comes to defending America, it is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space. So important.

    Very importantly, I’m here by directing the Department of Defense and Pentagon to immediately begin the process necessary to establish a space force as the sixth branch of the armed forces. That’s a big statement.

    We are going to have the Air Force and we are going to have the Space Force — separate but equal. It is going to be something. So important. General Dunford, if you would carry that assignment out, I would be very greatly honored, also. Where’s General Dunford? General? Got it?

    GENERAL DUNFORD: We got it.

    THE PRESIDENT: Let’s go get it, General. (Applause.) But that’s the importance that we give it. We’re going to have the Space Force.
    https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... rective-3/

Department of Defense
Report to Congressional Defense Committees

Interim Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense

1 March 2018

https://www.defense.gov/News/Publications/

Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community

Daniel R. Coats
Director of National Intelligence

13 February 2018
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE

Continued global space industry expansion will further extend space-enabled capabilities and space situational awareness to nation-state, nonstate, and commercial space actors in the coming years, enabled by the increased availability of technology, private-sector investment, and growing international partnerships for shared production and operation. All actors will increasingly have access to space-derived information services, such as imagery, weather, communications, and positioning, navigation, and timing for intelligence, military, scientific, or business purposes.

Foreign countries—particularly China and Russia—will continue to expand their space-based reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems in terms of the numbers of satellites, the breadth of their capability, and the applications for use.

Both Russia and China continue to pursue antisatellite (ASAT) weapons as a means to reduce US and allied military effectiveness. Russia and China aim to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia or China, either country would justify attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems. Military reforms in both countries in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space systems and services with military operations in other domains.

Russian and Chinese destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years. China’s PLA has formed military units and begun initial operational training with counterspace capabilities that it has been developing, such as ground-launched ASAT missiles. Russia probably has a similar class of system in development. Both countries are also advancing directed-energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote sensing or missile defense.

Of particular concern, Russia and China continue to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. Some technologies with peaceful applications—such as satellite inspection, refueling, and repair—can also be used against adversary spacecraft.

Russia and China continue to publicly and diplomatically promote international agreements on the nonweaponization of space and “no first placement” of weapons in space. However, many classes of weapons would not be addressed by such proposals, allowing them to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain.
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/New ... d-SSCI.pdf

  • H.R.2810 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
    TITLE XVI--STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, CYBER, AND INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

    Subtitle A--Space Activities

    Sec. 1601. Space acquisition and management and oversight.

    [...]

    (c) Review of Structure.--

    (1) Review.--The Deputy Secretary of Defense shall conduct a review and identify a recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, that implements the organizational policy guidance expressed in this section and the amendments made by this section.

    (2) Interim report.--Not later than March 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees an interim report on the review and recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, under paragraph (1).

    (3) Final report.--Not later than August 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a final report on the review and recommended organizational and management structure for the national security space components of the Department of Defense, including the Air Force Space Command, under paragraph (1), including--

    (A) a proposed implementation plan for how the Deputy Secretary would implement the recommendations;

    (B) recommendations for revisions to appointments and qualifications, duties and powers, and precedent in the Department;

    (C) recommendations for such legislative and administrative action, including conforming and other amendments to law, as the Deputy Secretary considers appropriate to implement the plan; and

    (D) any other matters that the Deputy Secretary considers appropriate.

    (4) Prohibition on delegation.--The Deputy Secretary of Defense may not delegate the authority to carry out this subsection.

    (d) Independent Plan to Establish Military Department.--

    (1) Plan.--Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall seek to enter into a contract with a federally funded research and development center that is not closely affiliated with the Department of the Air Force to develop a plan to establish a separate military department responsible for the national security space activities of the Department of Defense. Such plan shall include recommendations for legislative language.

    (2) Interim report.--Not later than August 1, 2018, the Deputy Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees an interim report on the plan developed under paragraph (1).

    (3) Final report.--Not later than December 31, 2018, the Deputy Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a final report containing the plan developed under paragraph (1), without change.
    https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... -bill/2810

Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017
In late 2015, President Xi introduced a series of reforms that seek to improve leadership, administration, and command of joint operations across the PLA by 2020. In 2016, these reforms included:

[...]
  • Developing the Strategic Support Force. Throughout 2016, China continued to develop the Strategic Support Force (SSF), an organization it established late in 2015 to unify space, cyber, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Military Doctrine. In 2015, the PLA National Defense University published the latest version of “Science of Strategy,” an overview of the PLA’s concept of military strategy. The new version not only shares broad similarities with other recent authoritative publications, but it also highlights the PLA’s growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime domain, the PLAAF’s shift towards more offensive operations, long-distance mobility operations of the PLA Army (PLAA), space and cyber operations, and the need for China’s military to be capable of securing growing overseas national interests.
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. China’s space program continues to mature rapidly. The PLA, which has historically managed the effort, continues to invest in improving its capabilities in the fields of space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. In addition to its on-orbit assets, China has built a vast ground infrastructure supporting spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink. China also continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to degrade and deny the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict.

In 2016, China launched 22 SLVs, of which 21 were successful. These launches orbited 33 spacecraft, including navigation, ISR, and test/engineering satellites. Other activities last year included:
  • Two New Launch Vehicles. China successfully debuted the Long March 7 (LM-7) in June 2016 and the LM-5 in November 2016. The LM-7 is a medium-lift SLV designed to launch up to 13,500 kg into low Earth orbit, mainly supporting China’s human spaceflight program. The LM-5 is set to become China’s new heavy-lift SLV, launching up to 25,000 kg into low Earth orbit. It is intended to play an important role in the assembly of the Chinese Space Station starting around 2018.
  • World’s First Quantum Science Satellite. In August 2016, China launched the first experimental quantum communications satellite, marking a notable advance in cryptography research. The developer of the satellite claimed it has “enormous prospects” in defense, moving China closer to more secure communications.
  • Crewed Space Laboratory. China launched its second crewed laboratory, Tiangong-2 (TG-2), in September 2016. The laboratory will validate technologies associated with space station assembly in preparation for the launch of the Chinese Space Station core module around 2018. China also launched a crewed mission (Shenzhou-11) in October 2016 to TG-2 to carry out experiments and gain experience in mid-to-long term human spaceflight.
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the research and possible development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing anti-satellite capabilities and probably has made progress on the anti-satellite missile system that it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and probably is testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.

Although Chinese defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies, China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an anti-satellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007. PLA writings emphasize the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance...and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
PLA CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT

[...]

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). China is taking steps to develop a BMD capability. It is developing a missile defense umbrella consisting of kinetic-energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudes (greater than 80 km), as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. In July 2016, Chinese official media confirmed China’s intent to go forward with mid-course missile defense capabilities on both land and sea assets, reflecting work on BMD dating back several decades.

When operational, the HQ-19 may fill the mid-tier of China’s BMD network. China has tested the HQ-19 interceptor missile specifically used for intercepting a ballistic missile at mid-course, according to regional media. The HQ-19 is still undergoing PLAAF-organized testing; as of May 2016, China was focused mainly on testing the HQ-19’s capability to intercept 3,000 km-ranged ballistic missiles.

The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a limited capability against ballistic missiles. China’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM system is expected to have a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to 500 km. China’s fielded SA-20 PMU2 SAMs and future S-400 SAMs may have some capability to engage ballistic missiles depending on the interceptors and supporting infrastructure.

Additionally, new indigenous radars, the JL-1A and JY-27A, are designed to address the ballistic missile threat; the JL-1A is advertised as capable of the precision tracking of multiple ballistic missiles.

[...]

Space and Counterspace. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems—and to deny them to adversaries—as central to enabling modern informatized warfare. As a result, the PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Although PLA doctrine does not appear to address space operations as a unique operational “campaign,” space operations will probably form an integral component of other PLA campaigns and serve a key role in enabling actions that counter third-party intervention. China is seeking to utilize space systems to establish a real-time and accurate surveillance, reconnaissance and warning system, and to enhance C2 in joint operations. These advancements include the Beidou navigation satellite system and space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in space.
Leading-edge Technologies. China has identified certain industries and technology groups with the potential to provide technological breakthroughs, to remove technical obstacles across industries, and to improve international competitiveness. Examples of applications include radar, counterspace capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies. China is focusing on the following technologies for rapid development:
  • Information Technology. Priorities include intelligent perception technologies, ad hoc networks, and virtual reality technologies.
  • New Materials. Priorities include smart materials and structures, high-temperature superconducting technologies, and highly efficient energy materials technologies.
  • Advanced Manufacturing. Priorities include extreme manufacturing technologies and intelligent service advanced machine tools.
  • Advanced Energy Technologies. Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies, alternative fuels, and advanced vehicle technologies.
  • Marine Technologies. Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring technologies; fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies; and deep-sea operations technologies.
  • Laser and Aerospace Technologies. Priorities include the development of chemical and solid-state laser technologies to field a weapon-grade system, ultimately, for ground-based and airborne platforms.
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docum ... 141328-770


2017 Russia Military Power Report
Space/Counterspace

The Russian General Staff postulates that modern warfare is increasingly reliant on information, particularly from space, because of the expansion of the geographic scope of military action and the information needs of high-precision weapons. Russia has a significant constellation of satellites in orbit. According to Colonel Sergey Marchuk, chief of the Main Test Space Center, Russia has more than 130 spacecraft, civilian and military, performing communications, navigation, geodetic survey support, meteorological, reconnaissance, and intelligence gathering missions.

Russia’s space program is both formidable and in a state of rebuilding. Moscow seeks to maintain the health of its current constellations while deploying a next-generation architecture on par with Western space systems. Over the next several years, Russia will prioritize the modernization of its existing communications, navigation, and earth observation systems, while continuing to rebuild its electronic intelligence and early warning system constellations.

Russia’s current systems provide an array of capability including high-resolution imagery, terrestrial and space weather, communications, navigation, missile warning, electronic intelligence, and scientific observations. With a long-standing heritage in space, Russia gains a sense of national pride from its space program, which has included manned missions and leading the world in space launches. Currently ranked third in total number of satellites in orbit behind the United States and China, the figure below displays a breakdown of Russia’s satellites in orbit.

Russia has concluded that gaining and maintaining supremacy in space has a decisive impact on the outcome of future conflicts. According to Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, militarization of outer space is a “main external military danger.” The 2014 update to Russia’s military doctrine calls out Western global strike capability by name. Russia, in military journals, has observed that Western operations have shifted to non-contact operations that rely on long-range, space-supported precision-guided munitions. Russia has been very vocal expressing its concerns about Western precision strike capabilities and missile defense plans. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin compared U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts in Eastern Europe to the Strategic Defense Initiative of 1983 and stated that such an effort justifies the development of Russian counterspace programs.

The Russian General Staff argues for pursuing in wartime such strategies as disrupting foreign military C2 or information support because they are so critical to the fast-paced, high-technology conflicts characteristic of modern warfare. Russia believes that having the military capabilities to counter space operations will deter aggression by space-enabled adversaries and enable Russia to control escalation of conflict if deterrence fails. Military capabilities for space deterrence include strikes against satellites or ground-based infrastructure supporting space operations.

On 1 August 2015, Russia created the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces by merging the former Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops. Defense Minister Shoygu stated the change was “prompted by a shift in the center of gravity… towards the aerospace sphere” and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike doctrine. This merged force includes Russia’s space forces who have the mission of conducting space launches and maintaining the ballistic missile early warning system, the satellite control network, and the space object surveillance and identification network.

Russia also reorganized its space industry responsible for space research, design, and production. Russia merged the government-owned United Rocket and Space Corporation (ORKK), which previously absorbed the majority of the space industry corporations in 2013, with the Federal Space Agency. President Putin finalized the dissolution of the Federal Space Agency on 1 January 2016, naming the joint organization the Roscosmos State Corporation.
http://www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications/

Ich habe bisher erst einen deutschsprachigen Artikel gefunden, der sich nicht höhnisch über die Pläne des DoD auslässt, sondern feststellt, dass die Initiative vom Kongress ausging. Er wurde heute veröffentlicht:

So neu ist Trumps "Space Force" gar nicht

https://www.n-tv.de/politik/So-neu-ist- ... 67632.html
______________________________________________

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242465.pdf


https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19 ... 814fef.pdf


https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-172.pdf


https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-s ... Speech.pdf


https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nssd/index.html
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Remarks by President Trump at a Signing Ceremony for H.R. 5515, “John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019”

Issued on: August 13, 2018
In order to maintain America’s military supremacy, we must always be on the cutting edge. That is why we are also proudly re-asserting America’s legacy of leadership in space. Our foreign competitors and adversaries have already begun weaponizing space, developing new technologies to disrupt vital communications, blind satellites, and just — I mean, you look at what they’re doing. They’ve given me rundowns. I’ve seen things that you don’t even want to see, what they’re doing and how advanced they are. We’ll be catching them very shortly. They want to jam transmissions, which threaten our battlefield operations, and so many other things. We will be so far ahead of them in a very short period of time your head will spin.

China even launched a new military division to oversee its warfighting programs in space. Just like the air, the land, the sea, space has become a warfighting domain. It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.

So that is why, just a few days ago, the Vice President outlined my administration’s plan to create a sixth branch of the United States military, called the United States Space Force. (Applause.) Got to get it, Joe. Got to get it, Joe. Right, Joe? Right?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... year-2019/


FY 2019
Defense Budget


https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Re ... 18_Budget/
  • Defense Budget Overview
    United States Department of Defense
    FY 2019 Budget Request

    MISSILE DEFENSE

    [...]

    The budget includes $12.9 billion for missile defense, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

    [...]

    The MDA will also deliver an experimental space-based kill assessment capability for defense of the homeland as part of an integrated post intercept assessment solution.
    Das klingt dramatisch, ist aber nur ein System zur Verifizierung einer erfolgreichen Bekämpfung ballistischer Raketen.
    SPACE AND SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS

    The FY 2019 budget request for space and space-based systems addresses Satellite Communications (SATCOM); Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities; Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT); and Space Launch systems. The Department continues to sustain existing systems, while moving out on development of follow-on capabilities supporting operations in a contested space environment. The simultaneous actions of sustaining and modernizing these critical space capabilities reflect the Department’s emphasis on increasing the capacity and lethality of the Joint Force.

    The Air Force will continue the production of Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) Space Vehicles 5 and 6 to address OPIR requirements, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) Space Vehicles 5 and 6 to meet military SATCOM (MILSATCOM) needs in the FY 2019 budget. Resiliency improvements are being incorporated into the production line for SBIRS Space Vehicles 5 and 6 and AEHF Space Vehicles 5 and 6. Additional resilience initiatives will continue to be investigated and implemented where possible.

    The FY 2019 budget request funds the Air Force’s Next-Generation Strategic Missile Warning system as part of a transition to the future OPIR architecture. The Next-Generation system accelerates implementation of mature resiliency features to increase strategic survivability in a contested environment. The Air Force will incorporate a technology refresh of the sensor to assure missile warning capabilities equal to or greater than today’s SBIRS, taking advantage of sensor technology improvements.

    The FY 2019 budget request continues resiliency improvements in the PNT mission, incorporating Regional Military Protection capability into the next generation Global Positioning System (GPS) III constellation. This enhancement assures PNT capabilities in contested environments and for disadvantaged users. The request also funds improvements to the GPS ground segment to enable implementation of advanced Military code (M-Code), which improves the anti-jamming and secure access of the military GPS signals in contested environments.

    The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program has been aligned with satellite launch schedules in FY 2018 and FY 2019 and continues to pursue a public private partnership approach for future launch service acquisitions. The Air Force strategy is to ensure the existence of two commercially-viable, domestically sourced space launch service providers with the requirement of also eliminating the use of foreign-made propulsion systems.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

    [...]

    Nuclear Deterrence

    The FY 2019 budget reflects the U.S. commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and strategic bombers provide two legs of the Nation’s nuclear triad. Dual-capable bombers and fighters extend deterrence and provide assurance to U.S. allies and partners. The FY 2019 budget invests in modernizing integrated terrestrial, air and space-based Nuclear Command, Control and Communication systems to ensure secure, survivable connectivity with the President and national command leadership.

    [...]

    Space Superiority

    The Department’s joint and allied forces rely on the space capabilities provided by the Air Force to effectively and efficiently project power globally. However space is now a contested domain, with adversaries rapidly challenging United States space superiority. The FY 2019 request begins a distinct pivot to address the threat and ensure space capabilities persist in multi-domain operations today and in the future. It begins the transition to a new architecture focused on space resiliency. The Air Force is transitioning to the next-generation Overhead Persistent Infrared system designed for survivability, which will detect and report on current, emerging, and anticipated threats.

    The FY 2019 request also protects satellite communications through improvements in Advanced Extremely High Frequency maneuver capability, initiation of Evolved Strategic Satellite Communications, and additional tactical/hostable payloads.

    The FY 2019 request increases funding for anti-jam, anti-spoof, and anti-tamper military GPS development and integration into multiple joint platforms, and continues to grow Space Situational Awareness and Space Control capabilities to address growing threats while enhancing the Air Force’s ability to identify, characterize, and attribute threatening actions. Finally, the Air Force funds a Weather Satellite follow-on program with sensors to conduct timely, reliable, and high-quality space-based capabilities to meet joint force combatant requirements for atmospheric, terrestrial, and oceanographic observations.
    https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docum ... w-Book.pdf
Hier etwas detaillierter:
  • H.R. 5515—FY19 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL

    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Section 16XX—Development of Persistent Space-Based Sensor Architecture

    This section would direct the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the Commander of Air Force Space Command, and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to complete a plan and initiate development in fiscal year 2019 for a space-based missile defense sensor architecture. This section would limit obligation or expenditure of funds to initiate the space-based missile defense layer program until the plan is submitted to Congress. This section would also amend section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91) to require the Director of the MDA to submit a report to the congressional defense committees and congressional intelligence committees by January 31, 2019, on options to use other transactional authorities to accelerate development of this architecture.
    SEC. 16 [Log 67348] DEVELOPMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

    (1) Absent a missile defense review, the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2019 did not propose funding for efforts within the Missile Defense Agency to further develop the Missile Defense Tracking System (a future space sensor architecture) and instead funds were provided to the Air Force to determine the plan of the Department of Defense for future missile warning and tracking capabilities.

    (2) Delaying development and deployment of a space-based missile tracking capability further places the United States at a disadvantage against hypersonic threats.

    (b) DEVELOPMENT REQUIRED.—Subsection (a) of section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131. Stat. 1777) is amended by striking "If consistent with the direction or recommendations of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review that commenced in 2017, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency" and inserting "Beginning fiscal year 2019, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the Commander of the Air Force Space Command, and the Commander of the United States Strategic Command,".

    (c) PLAN.

    (1) LIMITATION.—Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2019 for the Department of Defense for the development of the space-based sensor architecture under subsection (a) of section 1683 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115–91; 131 Stat. 1777), not more than 25 percent may be obligated or expended until the date on which the Director of the Missile Defense Agency submits the plan under subsection (e) of such section.
    https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29 ... 5515ih.pdf
  • Defense Wide Budget Documentation - FY2019
    Missile Defense Agency
    PE 0603895C / Ballistic Missile Defense System Space Programs

    [...]

    A. Mission Description and Budget Item Justification

    This program element primarily funds the Spacebased Kill Assessment (SKA) project, a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) experiment to demonstrate kill assessment from space. MDA experience with intercept testing on the Aegis BMD program provided solid understanding of the physics of kill assessment.

    Several events set the stage for the kill assessment experiment that later became known as SKA:
    • Section 237 in the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directed MDA to improve kill assessment for the GMD program with an initial kill assessment capability by December 31, 2019
    • An MDA study called the Space Layer Option Study found that disaggregated systems could provide sensor capabilities at lower costs
    • A once in a decade opportunity became available when the commercial sector offered hosted payload services at costs far below what MDA could expect if it used traditional DOD space acquisition models
    One feature of the SKA acquisition plays a crucial role in the execution of the experiment: schedule discipline. Since MDA cannot impact the schedule of the commercial host, maintaining schedule pace is priority #1 on the program. If SKA payloads are delivered late to the commercial host, they miss their opportunity to be launched into space.

    SKA incorporates Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations to examine the operational feasibility of disaggregating large satellites (report number GAO-15-7) and to provide data for the business case for shared or dedicated satellite control, including the ground antenna networks (report number GAO-13-315). The SKA experiment will utilize a network of small IR sensors integrated onto commercial host satellites which, while on orbit, will observe missile defense intercepts and deliver a kill assessment declaration to the BMDS. SKA has the opportunity to change the economics of the defense of the American homeland from enemy ballistic missiles.

    This program element also funds engineering trade studies and concept evaluations for current and future space based sensors.
    MD33 / MD Space Exp Center (MDSEC)

    [...]

    A. Mission Description and Budget Item Justification

    The SKA system is composed of two segments: a space segment and a ground segment.
    • The space segment is composed of a network of small infrared (IR) sensors (sensors, processor cards and cabling), each mated to a different satellite. The total number of sensors and where they are placed in the network are specifically tailored for the kill assessment mission. The space segment includes key design features to improve its resiliency.
    • The ground segment is a small network of desktop computers, servers and routers that monitor the health of the on-orbit sensors, command the sensors to perform the kill assessment mission and analyze the data to make a kill assessment determination for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The ground segment also includes the equipment necessary for communications security and information assurance. The Missile Defense Space Center (MDSC) is the communications hub for SKA data, routing SKA data between the commercial payload integrator and the SKA Payload Analysis Center.
    The SKA sensors are hosted on satellites that are not developed by MDA, thus schedule performance is the highest priority of the experiment. Since the launch of the host satellites will not wait for hosted payloads that are delivered late, the management of the SKA project focuses on the ability to meet schedule commitments. In the past year, the commercial satellite host and the launch site owner have made small changes to the launch schedule; however, those changes have not affected SKA delivery commitments to the satellite integrator - the SKA project remains on schedule.

    Missile Defense Tracking System (MTS)

    Similar to the BMDS, a future Missile Defense Layer is composed of a system of systems in space:
    • OPIR Global Scanning for alert and characterization (Air Force)
    • Regional Staring Sensors for detection, warning and cueing (MDA)
    • Narrow Field of View for precision fire control tracking (MDA)
    • EO/IR Kill Assessment (MDA)
    Space provides critical vantage point necessary to address rapidly advancing threats across multiple regions of interest (i.e. trans-regional). The space layer will be a collaboration between MDA and the Air Force to provide a more robust and capable sensor architecture. MTS will be an integral part of a future operational space layer providing a robust and resilient Ballistic Missile Defense sensor architecture and will be designed to detect and track threats using space-based sensing.
    D. Acquisition Strategy

    SKA leverages experience that the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) has with its extensive history of performing kill assessment activities and conducting experiments associated with the Aegis BMD program. JHU/APL is the developer of the SKA experiment and its primary subcontractor will be responsible for payload integration and hosting accommodation using a firm fixed price contract to contain costs. The SKA experiment uses a commercial satellite program as the platform host for a DOD payload, taking full advantage of a multi-billion dollar space and ground system that already exists. Since MDA and JHU/APL cannot impact the launch schedule of the commercial satellite host, fiscal stability and commitment is required which is a small tradeoff for the significant cost savings that commercial hosting provides.
    https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget- ... ification/

Defense Budget Materials - FY2019

https://comptroller.defense.gov/budgetm ... t2019.aspx

Besonders aufregende Entwicklungen findet man hier nicht. Die USAF hat gewisse Mittel zur Entwicklung von Laserwaffen veranschlagt:

https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/FM-Resources/Budget/
  • Air Force Research Development Test and Evaluation Vol I FY19
    PE 0603605F / Advanced Weapons Technology

    [...]

    A. Mission Description and Budget Item Justification

    This program provides for the development, integration, demonstration, and detailed assessment of directed energy weapon technologies for potential application on Air Force platforms. These include high energy laser, high power microwaves, and other unconventional weapon generation and transmission technologies, which can support a wide range of Air Force applications. The program develops a corresponding susceptibility, vulnerability, and lethality database for directed energy weapons.

    This program also develops laser-enabled atmospheric-compensated optical imaging for space situational awareness. Efforts in this program have been coordinated through the Department of Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee process to harmonize efforts and eliminate duplication.
    https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/ ... 094324-170
theoderich
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Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Contracts for Aug. 14, 2018
AIR FORCE

[...]

Lockheed Martin Space Systems, Sunnyvale, California, has been awarded a $2,935,545,188 not-to-exceed undefinitized contract for three Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Space Vehicles. This contract encompasses requirements analysis, design/development, critical path flight hardware procurement, early manufacturing, and risk reduction efforts leading to a system critical design review. Work will be performed in Sunnyvale, California, and is expected to be completed by April 30, 2021. This award is the result of a sole-source acquisition and is not a multiyear contract. Fiscal 2018 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $80,000,000 are being obligated at the time of award. Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California, is the contracting activity (FA8810-18-C-0005).
https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/ ... e/1602348/


Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared (Next Gen OPIR) Polar Orbit Space Vehicles 1&2

https://govtribe.com/project/next-gener ... ehicles-12
theoderich
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Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Failure to launch? Trump’s Space Force faces Senate skeptics
When Vice President Mike Pence laid out plans last week for a new space-focused military branch to be created by 2020, the White House had not obtained buy-in ahead of time from two key constituencies: the Senate’s Republican leaders and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

“Traditionally, this has been a role played by the Air Force, and I’ve not yet heard a compelling case why we need a separate force,” Senate Majority Whip John Cornyn, R-Texas, told reporters Aug. 16. “Maybe there is a case to be made, I just haven’t heard it yet.”
The White House contends it is working with lawmakers on the relevant committees, and at least one of them, House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers said he has spoken by phone with Trump. Rogers, R-Ala., led the effort in Congress last year create a space corps, subordinate to the Air Force.

Two House Republican leaders — Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy of California and GOP Whip Rep. Steve Scalise of Louisiana — are backing Trump’s proposed Space Force, the Associated Press reported Aug. 16. The two are lead contenders to become House speaker when Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis., retires at the end of his term in January.
The powerful Senate Appropriations Committee chairman, Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., said that while space is important and he’s open to persuasion, the administration has not adequately made its case.

“My concern might be satisfied with, you know, information, but do we need to create another Air Force, Army, Navy, Space Force, and will that be another bureaucracy? Will that help us do things that we can’t do within the Air Force?” Shelby said. “I don’t know those answers.”

Members of Senate Armed Services Committee — whose jurisdiction over military policy makes it a key gatekeeper for a new service — this week expressed varying degrees of skepticism.

SASC Ranking Member Sen. Jack Reed said he favors bringing military space assets together but held fast to his opposition to a new service. That could make him a major obstacle to any effort to make the proposal part of the 2020 defense authorization bill.

“I think the concept itself is not the right direction,” said Reed, of Rhode Island. “We have models that work very well in terms of joint and unified commands. We don’t need a specialized force with all of the bureaucracy, all of the trappings.

SASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee chairwoman Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., last year openly opposed the House’s effort to create a space corps. She appeared to soften her language somewhat this week, but it seemed clear the White House had not sought her out.

“I’m looking forward to hearing more details,” Fischer said. “I need to hear from the [Defense] Department about how they plan to implement this and if we have personnel available in order to fill those positions.”

Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, and a member of the Airland and Strategic Forces subpanels, votes in favor of the president’s positions 93 percent of the time. But he saw this effort as out of step with the push from Congress and the Pentagon to boost military readiness.

“Readiness has plummeted of the five services—plummeted,” said Sullivan, a Marine Reserve officer. “Where I’ve been focused is let’s get the five services we currently have back to the readiness levels the American people think we should have … Once we get there, then we can talk about a space force.”

SASC Emerging Threats and Capabilities Chairwoman Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, was convinced threats in space needed to be taken seriously, but she was concerned a reorganization would be the wrong answer.

“There is a need for this. We just need to figure out the most efficient way to deliver on this project, whether its part of the Air Force,” said Ernst, a former Iowa National Guard officer. “How do we protect tax payer dollars and make sure they’re most efficiently used to achieve the objective.”

High-profile South Carolina Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham said he was, “open-minded” to a Space Force. Still, the administration’s announcement left him with questions.

“I mean do we really need another branch of the [military]? What would be the benefits of having a separate branch?” said Graham, a SASC member. “Can you do it within the existing military structure? I’d be curious to see what the military says about this.”
“I don’t believe that they have changed their minds about it,” New Hampshire Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, a SASC member and lead appropriator, said of military leaders. “I think there are people in the White House who have pushed them to change their minds, but I think the facts on the ground have not changed in the last year to suggest to me we should take a different action.”

Democrats said the White House’s roll-out last week without widespread engagement on Capitol Hill was typical of this administration.

Virginia Sen. Tim Kaine, dubious of the idea and that it was achievable by 2020, called Pence’s announcement light on details, “like a brochure.”

“It seems a little fantastical to me, and especially that they hadn’t come and briefed us, ‘Here’s why this is a good idea,’” said Kaine, the top Democrat on SASC’s readiness subpanel. “They’re not taking cyber seriously enough and now they’re going to do a space force. It seemed odd.”

At least one Democrat on the panel who was open to hearing more, Seapower Ranking Member Maizie Hirono, of Hawaii, said she’d been turned off by the administration’s unilateral policy pronouncement.

“I think this is an example of the White House just announcing something without going through what I would call an appropriate discussion about whether or not we should create another force,” Hirono said.

“What I object to more is just the way the president tends to make all these big announcements. And whether or not it will happen, he moves on to the next crisis—which he generally creates himself.”
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/20 ... -skeptics/
Acipenser
Beiträge: 1971
Registriert: Sa 5. Mai 2018, 18:22

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von Acipenser »

Wird wohl eine Roboter Force im All. Menschlicher Einsatz im All ist extrem aufwendig und gefährlich (Weltraumschrott). Böse Zungen behaupten das Nordkorea und Co. absichtlich Weltraumschrott oder vergleichbare Satelliten ins Weltall schießen um US Spionagesatelliten zu stören oder zu zerstören.
Trump sollte statt einen Militärkommando im All lieber ein Müll-itärkommando ins All schießen, eine Weltraumputze sozusagen.
Schon Obama hat das sehr aufwendige NASA Raumprogramm, das ja mehr als die Hälfte rein militärisch war, zurückgefahren (Pendlerprogram, das riesige Spionagesatelliten einfangen konnte um sie zu reparieren oder zurück auf die Erde zu bringen). Inzwischen gibt es Drohnen und der technischen Entwicklung geschuldet vergleichbar kleinere Spionagesatelliten.
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Annual Report to Congress
Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018

Space and Counterspace Capabilities.

China’s space program continues to mature rapidly. The PLA, which has historically managed the effort, continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. China has built an expansive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including spacecraft and SLV manufacture, launch, command and control, and data downlink. Additionally, China is developing multiple counterspace capabilities to degrade and deny adversary use of space-based assets during a crisis or conflict.
The PLA is acquiring a range of technologies to improve China’s counterspace capabilities. In addition to the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers, China is also developing direct-ascent and co-orbital kinetic kill capabilities and has probably made progress on the anti-satellite missile system it tested in July 2014. China is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.

Although China has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an anti-satellite missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007, Chinese defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies. These scholars stress the necessity of “destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance . . . and communications satellites,” suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
Space and Counterspace. PLA strategists regard the ability to use space-based systems – and to deny them to adversaries – as central to modern warfare. The PLA continues to strengthen its military space capabilities despite its public stance against the militarization of space. Space operations are viewed as a key enabler of PLA campaigns aimed at countering third-party intervention, although PLA doctrine has not elevated them to the level of a separate “campaign.” China seeks to enhance C2 in joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system and is increasing the number and capabilities of its space systems, including various communications and intelligence satellites and the Beidou navigation satellite system. China also continues to develop counterspace capabilities, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as to expand space surveillance capabilities that can monitor objects across the globe and in space and enable counterspace actions.
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2 ... REPORT.PDF
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Russia develops co-orbital anti-satellite capability

https://www.janes.com/images/assets/463 ... bility.pdf
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Missile Defense Review

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Potential Adversary Missile Defense and Antisatellite (ASAT) Advancements

Despite frequently criticizing the United States and allies for developing and fielding missile defense systems, potential adversaries have long made substantial investments in their own missile defense systems. Russia and China are also developing ASAT capabilities that could threaten U.S. space-based assets.

For example, Russia maintains and modernizes its longstanding strategic missile defense system deployed around Moscow, including 68 nuclear-armed interceptors, and has fielded multiple types of shorter-range, mobile missile defense systems throughout Russia. In addition, Russia is developing a diverse suite of ground-launched and directed-energy ASAT capabilities, and continues to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated onorbit activities to advance Russian counterspace capabilities.

China is aggressively pursuing a wide range of mobile air and missile defense capabilities, including the purchase of S-400 systems from Russia, each with four interceptor missiles, and is developing additional theater ballistic missile defense systems. China also has announced that it is testing a new mid-course missile defense system. Further, China is developing a suite of antisatellite weapons, continues to launch “experimental” satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities to advance counterspace capabilities, and has conducted multiple ASAT tests using ground-launched missiles.
Principles Governing U.S. Missile Defense

[...]

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. It calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.
Elements of Missile Defense Strategy

Comprehensive Missile Defense Capabilities. Effective deterrence is the preferred strategy to prevent missile attack. However, a broader approach is required to address the increasingly complex missile threat environment. The United States will field, maintain, and integrate three different means of missile defense to identify and exploit every practical opportunity to detect, disrupt, and destroy a threatening missile prior to and after its launch. These include: first, active missile defense to intercept adversary missiles in all phases of flight; second, passive defense to mitigate the potential effects of offensive missiles; and third, if deterrence fails, attack operations to defeat offensive missiles prior to launch.

[...]

Importance of Space. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats. Space-based sensors, for example, can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors, and can provide “birth to death” tracking that is extremely advantageous.

As rogue state missile arsenals develop, the space-basing of interceptors may provide the opportunity to engage offensive missiles in their most vulnerable initial boost phase of flight, before they can deploy various countermeasures. Space-basing may increase the overall likelihood of successfully intercepting offensive missiles, reduce the number of U.S. defensive interceptors required to do so, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the attacker’s territory rather than the targeted state. DoD will undertake a new and near-term examination of the concepts and technology for space-based defenses to assess the technological and operational potential of space-basing in the evolving security environment.
IV. U.S. Missile Defense Programs and Capabilities

[...]

More complex offensive missile threats to the homeland, such as HGV and advanced cruise missiles, are on the horizon. DoD is enhancing ways to collect and process information from existing space-based and terrestrial sensors to track current and emerging cruise missile and HGV threats. Enhancing our ability to track these emerging threats will make defending against cruise missile and HGV threats possible.

[...]

Space-basing for sensors provides significant advantages. Such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles.

The space-basing of interceptors also may provide significant advantages, particularly for boost-phase defense. As directed by Congress, DoD will identify the most promising technologies, and estimated schedule, cost, and personnel requirements for a possible space-based defensive layer that achieves an early operational capability for boost-phase defense.
Importance of Space

As rogue state missile arsenals develop, space will play a particularly important role in support of missile defense. The exploitation of space provides a missile defense posture that is more effective, resilient and adaptable to known and unanticipated threats. Space-based sensors, for example, can monitor, detect and track missile launches from locations almost anywhere on the globe – they enjoy a measure of flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the constraints that geographic limitations impose on terrestrial sensors.

In addition, unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not require basing rights or agreements with foreign states. This enables them to be placed where necessary to achieve the ideal viewing geometry for launch detection, missile tracking, threat discrimination, and intercept detection/kill assessment of missile threats to the U.S. homeland, our forces abroad and to our allies and partners. Such “birth to death” tracking of incoming missile threats from space is extremely advantageous. Missile defense sensors in space also possess inherent capabilities for other essential missions, including theater missile warning and technical intelligence.

The unique benefits and attributes of space sensors, including persistent and global access to missiles launched from almost any location, may extend to the basing of defensive interceptors in space. For example, the space-basing of interceptors may provide the opportunity to engage offensive missiles in their most vulnerable initial boost phase of flight, before they can deploy various countermeasures. Space basing may increase the overall likelihood of successfully
intercepting offensive missiles, reduce the number of U.S. defensive interceptors required to do so, and potentially destroy offensive missiles over the attacker’s territory rather than the targeted state.

Much has changed since the United States last considered space-based interceptors in a potential architecture, including major improvements in technologies applicable to spacebasing and directed energy. Given the rapid advancement and diffusion of offensive missile threats and technology, and in response to the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), DoD will undertake a new and near-term examination of the concepts and technology for space-based defenses. This examination may include on-orbit experiments and demonstrations. New DoD analysis will evaluate the possible effectiveness of space-based interceptor technologies and their cost-effectiveness when compared to other systems based on land, sea, and in the air. This examination will provide an informed contemporary foundation for assessing the technological and operational potential of space-basing in the evolving security environment.
U.S. Homeland Defense

Current Posture


[...]

DoD is also investing in and deploying improved capabilities to confirm that a U.S. missile defense interceptor has destroyed the attacking warhead, a process called “kill assessment.” With the Space-based Kill Assessment (SKA) program, DoD is deploying a network of space-based infrared sensors that will provide an improved kill assessment capability to the missile defense system. Adding a reliable post-intercept assessment capability will enable USNORTHCOM to examine alternate engagement strategies, such as “shoot-assess-shoot,” and will assist in consequence management efforts if needed. A network of SKA sensors will be placed on orbit by the end of 2018.
Building New Systems

[...]

In accordance with the FY 2017 NDAA, DoD is preparing a strategic roadmap for the development and fielding of directed energy weapons and key enabling capabilities. When completed, this roadmap will inform high-energy laser investments in the preparation of the President’s Budget Request for FY 2020.

Given the significant advantages of space-basing for sensors, and potentially interceptors, particularly for boost-phase defense, MDA will study development and fielding of a space-based missile intercept layer capable of boost-phase defense and provide a report to USDR&E, and USDP within six months after the release of the MDR. It will identify the most promising technologies, and estimated schedule, cost, and personnel requirements for a possible space-based defensive layer that achieves an early operational capability for boost-phase defense. This examination and a boost-phase study directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense will inform DoD considerations, including budgetary, with regard to the pursuit of a space-based missile intercept layer for boost-phase defense.
https://www.defense.gov/Experience/2019 ... se-Review/


Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence Announcing the Missile Defense Review
Fourth, we will recognize that space is a new warfighting domain, with the Space Force leading the way.

My upcoming budget will invest in a space-based missile defense layer. It’s new technology. It’s ultimately going to be a very, very big part of our defense and, obviously, of our offense. The system will be monitored, and we will terminate any missile launches from hostile powers, or even from powers that make a mistake. It won’t happen. Regardless of the missile type or the geographic origins of the attack, we will ensure that enemy missiles find no sanctuary on Earth or in the skies above.

This is the direction that I’m heading. We have some very bad players out there, and we’re a good player but we can be far worse than anybody, if need be. I’ve always known — and I’ve watched and I’ve seen — the stronger you are, the less you will need, whatever that strength may be.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... se-review/


16. Januar 2019

USAF, NASIC releases unclassified ‘Competing in Space’ assessment

https://www.nasic.af.mil/News/Article-D ... ssessment/ ___________________________________________________________

US-Raketenabwehr:
Weltall für Trump "Kriegsschauplatz"


https://orf.at/stories/3108072/


The Latest: Trump Calls for Expanded Missile Defense Program

By The Associated Press

https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2019/0 ... atest.html


North Korea Called 'Extraordinary Threat' in Trump Missile Defence Review

By Reuters

https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/01 ... korea.html


Trump Heads to Pentagon to Announce Expansion of Missile Defenses
President Trump is heading to the Pentagon on Thursday morning to announce what the White House has billed as a “Missile Defense Review” at 11 a.m. He will be accompanied by Vice President Mike Pence, John R. Bolton, the White House national security adviser, and other senior members of his administration.
The document that Mr. Trump will unveil, known as the Missile Defense Review, was originally planned for release last year, but was delayed. The changes mark the first update to the policy since a 2010 review by the Obama administration.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us/p ... e=Homepage


Trump's New Missile Defense Strategy Eyes Space-Based Sensors (16. Januar 2019)

By Reuters
U.S. President Donald Trump is due to unveil a revamped U.S. missile defense strategy on Thursday that looks at ways to boost America's security, including by possibly deploying a new layer of space-based sensors to detect and track enemy missiles.

The Missile Defense Review will also recommends studying experimental technologies, including prospects for space-based weaponry that might be able to shoot down enemy missiles -- a throwback to Ronald Reagan's so-called "Star Wars" initiative in the 1980s.

"Space, I think, is the key to the next step of missile defense," a senior Trump administration official told reporters ahead of the document's release on Thursday, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"A space-based layer of sensors is something we are looking at to help get early warning and tracking and discrimination of missiles when they are launched."

The official stressed that the viability of space-based missile defense weaponry was only being studied and no decisions had been made.

The investments come on top of previously announced U.S. plans to increase the number of ground-based interceptors over the next several years, hiking the number positioned at Fort Greely, Alaska to 64 from 44.
Pentagon officials contend that U.S. missiles defenses are too few to be able to counter a first-strike on the U.S. homeland by a major nuclear power, like Russia or China. Washington hopes those countries will instead be deterred from attacks by America's nuclear arsenal.

Still, Russia views U.S. missile defense advances as a threat and Trump's report is likely to stoke tensions with Moscow.

China, in turn, has also alarmed the Pentagon with advances in super-fast "hypersonic" technology, which could allow Beijing to field missiles that are far harder to detect.

In a report earlier this week that singled out the hypersonic threat, the Pentagon warned China's military was "on the verge of fielding some of the most modern weapon systems in the world."

"In some areas, it already leads the world," the report said.

U.S. officials, including Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin, believe a space-based sensor layer could help detect missiles moving at hypersonic speeds.

(Reporting by Phil Stewart; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)
https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/01 ... siles.html
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Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Sa 2. Feb 2019, 19:17, insgesamt 1-mal geändert.
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Meeting with Sergei Lavrov and Sergei Shoigu
Vladimir Putin: Good.

In this connection, there is one more thing I wanted to ask you. Every six months we hold meetings in Sochi to discuss the implementation of the state defence order with the commanders of the Armed Forces and the defence sector representatives.

Starting this year, I propose modifying this format.
I want to see how efforts to deploy our systems are progressing. This refers to the Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile, the Peresvet combat laser weapon, which has already been delivered to the army, and the Avangard system, which is now in serial production, having completed the test phase. I want to see how the production of the Sarmat missile is advancing alongside preparations for placing it on combat duty.

Several days ago, you reported to me on the completion of a key stage in testing the Poseidon multipurpose strategic unmanned underwater vehicle. We have to look at how these efforts are advancing.

We are aware of the plans by some countries to deploy weapons in outer space. I want to hear a report on how this threat can be neutralised.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59763
theoderich
Beiträge: 20036
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Space Force"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Text of Space Policy Directive-4: Establishment of the United States Space Force

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential ... ace-force/
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