Ein paar ganz interessante Dokumente zum "Nuclear Sharing":
NATO Strategy Documents
MC 14/2, “Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of the NATO Area”
24. Our chief objective is to prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to aggression. The principal elements of the deterrent are adequate nuclear and other ready forces and the manifest determination to retaliate against any aggressor with all the forces at our disposal, including nuclear weapons, which the defense of NATO would require.
25. In preparation for a general war, should one be forced upon us,
- We must first ensure the ability to carry out an instant and devastating nuclear counter-offensive by all available means and develop the capability to absorb and survive the enemy’s onslaught.
- Concurrently and closely related to the attainment of this aim, we must develop our ability to use our land, sea and air forces for defense of the territories and sea areas of NATO as far forward as possible to maintain the integrity of the NATO area, counting on the use of nuclear weapons from the outset. We must have the ability to continue these operations in combination with the nuclear counter-offensive until the will and ability of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed.
11. In general war NATO forces will be largely dependent on trained personnel, bases, facilities, material and supplies in-being and accessible to them in the early stages. In the conditions likely to follow a nuclear exchange, Western Europe will be heavily dependent for its support on overseas resources, on the sea communications carrying them and on the unloading facilities. Such support may not be readily available from North America because of damage on that continent.
14. The concept for the defense of Western Europe in general war is to carry out a nuclear strategic counter-offensive and to sustain operations to maintain the territorial integrity of Western Europe until the ability and will of the enemy to pursue general war has been destroyed. Under conditions other than general war, the concept is to deal instantly and in appropriate strength with any form of incident such as infiltration, incursion or hostile local action.
15. Operations to fulfil this strategy should be based on the provision of a fully effective nuclear retaliatory force provided with all the necessary facilities, adequate land, sea and air shield forces, having an integrated nuclear capability, and the development of the maximum practicable air defense of the area.
17. Operations should aim at destroying the enemy’s nuclear capability, his forces and his resources and communications. Operations of the shield forces should be developed along defensiveoffensive principles, generating appropriate targets for Allied nuclear weapons, exploiting terrain to create situations which will inflict maximum attrition on the enemy and halting his attack, while retaining the maximum combat effectiveness.
18. The task of the shield forces includes:
a. Effective protection of the nuclear retaliatory capability in Europe.
b. Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Western Europe.
MC 48/2, “Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept”
28. The Southern European area is divided into three major land compartments: Italy, the NATO area of the Balkans and Asian Turkey. Throughout almost the whole area the terrain is mountainous. It is suitable for the deployment of mechanized formations principally in the Northern Italian Plain, in Northern Greece and east of the Vermion-Olympus Range and through the Monastir Gap to the South, in Thrace and on the Anatolian Plateau. The area lends itself to the channelization of advancing enemy ground forces, making them prime targets for tactical nuclear weapons.
32. In planning for the defense of the area, full account must be taken of:
a. The availability of naval and air nuclear striking forces in the Mediterranean and North Africa.
b. The availability of an integrated ground nuclear delivery capability in Southern Europe.
Standing Group Liaison Office Paris Memoranda
Item LOM 002/60 - ANALYSIS OF DISCUSSIONS AT DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING
2. INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Council heard a statement by SACEUR on the present Situation with regard to the introduction of nuclear weapons into the NATO Shield Forces. Among the handicaps to more rapid progress mentioned by General Norstad were the lack of storage sites and delays in implementing Agreements between the United States and certain member countries providing for the exchange of classified Information. The provision of storage sites was
causing particular problems in Germany; it was already generally subject to delays in implementing construction programmes.
The French Minister of Defence reaffirmed his country's agreement on the need to equip the Shield Forces with nuclear weapons as foreseen in the strategic concept approved by tho Council. His Government did not find the proposed conditions for the storage of nuclear weapons on French territory acceptable. They deplored the absence of such agreements and desired a rapid solution to the problem whoso serious consequences they
http://archives.nato.int/analysis-of-di ... al-meeting
The German Minister of Defence urged countries who were at present unable to accept the storage of nuclear weapons on their territories to re-examine their attitude, particularly in view of the difficulties which this created for public opinion in Germany.