US-/NATO-Raketenabwehrsystem in Europa

[theoderich]

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/h ... se-program

• General Stephen N. Whiting, USSF
  Commander of United States Space Command
  Department of the Air Force
  

  To counter this threat, USSPACECOM is fully supporting the Department of Defense’s (DoD) implementation of the President’s Executive Order (EO) to establish a Golden Dome Missile Defense Shield for America. Key efforts – as directed in the EO – include assisting in the development of capability-based requirements, reference architectures, and an implementation plan; supporting the acceleration and deployment of missile defense satellites, including the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor; supporting the development and deployment of proliferated space-based interceptors; enhancing non-kinetic measures to complement kinetic missile defense; and conducting theater-based reviews to improve trans-regional missile defenses in coordination with the other Combatant Commands and key Allies and Partners.
  
  Specifically, USSPACECOM is partnering with U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and other stakeholders to write an Initial Capabilities Document aimed at defining capability-based requirements for the Golden Dome architecture, based on forecasted threat scenarios. As these capabilities develop and deliver, we stand ready to take an active role in the operation of a next-generation space architecture which will be resident in our AOR in support of protecting American citizens from attack.

  Integrated Space Fires are our most pressing need and are reflected as such in our Integrated Priority List. The UCP directs USSPACECOM to protect and defend U.S., Allied, and commercial space capabilities through necessary offensive and defensive space operations. Like all other Combatant Commands, USSPACECOM requires combat-credible lethal and non-lethal capabilities to deter and counter adversary actions.

  Consistent and persistent funding and acquisition accountability are necessary to deliver integrated fires capabilities on an accelerated timeline—by 2027—to counter growing threats and ensure the Joint and Combined Force’s freedom of action in space and on Earth.

  https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/i ... hiting.pdf

• General Anthony J. Cotton, USAF
  Commander, United States Strategic Command
  Department of the Air Force
  

  Pursuant to the January 27, 2025, Executive Order on the Golden Dome for America, and in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Northern Command, and other DoD stakeholders, we are actively assessing strategic missile threats and prioritizing a set of locations to defend against a counter-value attack by nuclear-armed adversaries.

  https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/d ... y-j-cotton

[theoderich]

Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX is frontrunner to build Trump's Golden Dome missile shield

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 025-04-17/

[theoderich]

The President’s FY 2026 Discretionary Budget Request

https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/informat ... t-request/

Program Name

DOD Topline

$ Change from 2025 Enacted (in millions)

+113,300

Brief Description of Program and Recommended Reduction or Increase

The Budget delivers on the President’s promise to achieve peace through strength by providing the resources to rebuild America’s military, re-establish deterrence, and revive the warrior ethos of America’s Armed Forces. In combination with $113 billion in mandatory funding, the Budget increases Defense spending by 13 percent, and prioritizes investments to: strengthen the safety, security, and sovereignty of the homeland; deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific; and revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base. Specifically, the Budget:

[...]

• makes a down-payment on the development and deployment of a Golden Dome for America, a next-generation missile defense shield that would protect the U.S. from missile threats coming from any adversary;

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/u ... equest.pdf



Opening Statements
DesJarlais: America Needs the Golden Dome to Defend Against Our Adversaries

Washington, D.C., April 30, 2025

https://armedservices.house.gov/news/do ... entID=5093


STR Hearing: Missile Defense & Missile Defeat Programmatic Updates

https://armedservices.house.gov/calenda ... entID=5064

[theoderich]

DIA releases ‘Golden Dome’ missile threat assessment

https://www.dia.mil/Articles/Press-Rele ... ssessment/

• https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documen ... n_dome.pdf

The product presents the agency’s unclassified intelligence on adversary missile threats and capabilities.

Na ja ... Am schrägsten ist die groteske Annahme, der Iran könnte 2035 über ca. 60 ICBMs verfügen:

and Iran has space launch vehicles it could use to develop a militarily-viable ICBM by 2035 should Tehran decide to pursue the capability

Ein Land, dessen militärische Ambitionen kaum über den Nahen und Mittleren Osten, das Kaspische Meer und den Indischen Ozean hinausgehen.

[theoderich]

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Statement on Golden Dome for America

In response to the President's bold vision and clear direction, the Department has developed a draft architecture and implementation plan for a Golden Dome system of systems that will protect our homeland from a wide range of global missile threats.

As the President stated in the EO, the Golden Dome will include space-based interceptors and sensors. Some U.S. technology in space such as space-based sensors and air and missile defense exist today, but all of the systems comprising the Golden Dome architecture will need to be seamlessly integrated. Golden Dome will be fielded in phases, prioritizing defense where the threat is greatest.

The DoD is working with the Office of Management and Budget to develop a plan to fund recommended capabilities arising from the President's directive, allowing sufficient time for consideration by the President before finalization of the Fiscal Year 2026 (FY 2026) Budget. We are working with Congress to secure $25B of funding in the One Big Beautiful reconciliation bill for critical capabilities necessary to ensure the protection of the U.S. homeland from the aerial threats of today and tomorrow. We look forward to continuing that work with Congress to secure funding for critical capabilities necessary in the FY26 budget request.

The United States will continue to enhance its existing capabilities to provide a thorough layered defense for its homeland. This EO does not represent an abandonment of existing ground, sea, and air-based kinetic defenses focused on missile interception in the midcourse or terminal phases of flight. Golden Dome is being designed in close coordination with NORAD, USNORTHCOM, USSPACECOM, and other DoD stakeholders to ensure full interoperability and real-time integration with our existing defense architecture.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/R ... r-america/

Realsatire ...

[muck]

Realsatire ...

Absolut.

Ein lückenloser Schutz des gesamten US-Territoriums scheint auch für die USA finanziell nicht abbildbar.

Nur mal eine Milchmädchenrechnung zur sehr groben Veranschaulichung, von was für gewaltigen Kosten wir hier reden: Das (im Gegensatz zu "Golden Dome") marktverfügbare Arrow 3 schützt etwa 30.000 km² vor SRBM, MRBM und bestimmten ICBM. Deutschland zahlte für eine Batterie mit Radar €1,2 Mrd.

Um die 9.867.000 km² der USA abzudecken, wären also knapp 330 Batterien zu etwa €400 Mrd. nötig.

Allerdings geht es hier um ein System, das auch ICBM uneingeschränkt abfangen soll. Und das, außer in einigen Grundlagentechnologien, noch nicht existiert. Mit $175 Mrd. ist es da nicht getan, selbst die vom Kongress geschätzten Entwicklungs- und Lebenszykluskosten von über $800 Mrd. scheinen allzu optimistisch.

Prophezeiung: Das Projekt wird spätestens zu Beginn der 2030er wegen Kostenüberschreitung eingestampft.

Immerhin kann es einen gewissen Erkenntnisgewinn bringen und den technologischen Vorsprung der USA sichern—wobei diese Ziele durch gezielte Forschungsförderung vermutlich billiger zu haben wären.

Natürlich ist es möglich, dass es gar nicht darum geht, irgendwelche greifbaren Ergebnisse zu erzielen:

Exclusive: Musk's SpaceX is frontrunner to build Trump's Golden Dome missile shield

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerosp ... 025-04-17/

"Drain the swamp".

[Woyzeck]

Korrekt - es ist eine riesige Umverteilungsmaschinerie von Staatsvermögen zu den Tech Bros, also ein weiterer Schritt in Richtung Oligarchie. Mit SDI konnte man wenigstens die Soviets in den Ruin treiben, aber diesmal scheint es die eigene Bevölkerung zu sein.

[theoderich]

We are working with Congress to secure $25B of funding in the One Big Beautiful reconciliation bill for critical capabilities necessary to ensure the protection of the U.S. homeland from the aerial threats of today and tomorrow.

H.R.1 - One Big Beautiful Bill Act

SEC. 20003. ENHANCEMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES FOR INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE.

(a) Next Generation Missile Defense Technologies.--In addition to amounts otherwise available, there are appropriated to the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 2025, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to remain available until September 30, 2029--

(1) $183,000,000 for Missile Defense Agency special programs;

(2) $250,000,000 for development and testing of directed energy capabilities by the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering;

(3) $300,000,000 for classified military space superiority programs run by the Strategic Capabilities Office;

(4) $500,000,000 for national security space launch infrastructure;

(5) $2,000,000,000 for air moving target indicator military satellites;

(6) $400,000,000 for expansion of Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonic Test Bed program;

(7) $5,600,000,000 for development of space-based and boost phase intercept capabilities;

(8) $2,400,000,000 for the development of military non-kinetic missile defense effects; and

(9) $7,200,000,000 for the development, procurement, and integration of military space-based sensors.

(b) Layered Homeland Defense.--In addition to amounts otherwise available, there are appropriated to the Secretary of Defense for fiscal year 2025, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to remain available until September 30, 2029--

(1) $2,200,000,000 for acceleration of hypersonic defense systems;

(2) $800,000,000 for accelerated development and deployment of next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile defense systems;

(3) $408,000,000 for Army space and strategic missile test range infrastructure restoration and modernization in the United States Indo-Pacific Command area of operations west of the international dateline;

(4) $1,975,000,000 for improved ground-based missile defense radars; and

(5) $530,000,000 for the design and construction of Missile Defense Agency missile instrumentation range safety ship.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-con ... ill/1/text

Das sind eher 23,9 Mrd. $. Trotzdem eine obszöne Summe.


In der Reagan- und der Bush-Ära gab es im Rahmen von SDI bzw. GPALS ein ähnlich verrücktes Konzept, namens "Brilliant Pebbles":

• The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (Hrsg.): Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1988)
  

  Space-Based Interceptor
  
  Project Description
  
  The SBI project will develop rocket interceptors launched from space platforms to home in on, impact, and destroy strategic missiles during the first phases of ballistic flight. Specific targets are boosters, post-boost vehicles (PBVs), reentry vehicles (RVs), and direct ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missiles. Space-based sensors will identify the beginning of a strategic missile attack.
  
  External battle management will select the strategic missiles to be engaged by each platform. Upon receipt of a release command, the selected interceptors will be sent to a predicted impact point. The interceptors will continue to get target data from the SBI weapon platform fire control sensors during their flight. Upon arrival at the predicted mkJcourse point, the passive IR seeker on the interceptor will be turned on to acquire the target. This seeker has sufficient resolution, when combined with the interceptor's maneuver capability, to give very high probabilities of direct impact kill against all types of targets (boosters, PBVs, and RVs) against all types of backgrounds (earth, space, nuclear). Kill assessment will be performed by the fire control sensors on the weapon platforms and by external space-based sensors.

  https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA321530.pdf

• Ballistic Missile Protection (= AUSA Background Brief 36, December 1991)
  
  https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/file ... ection.pdf

• Strategic Defense Initiative: Estimates of Brilliant Pebbles' Effectiveness Are Based on Many Unproven Assumptions (March 1992)
  
  https://www.gao.gov/products/nsiad-92-91

[theoderich]

Missile Defense Space Based Interceptors (SBI) Request for Information (RFI)

1.0 Introduction

The Space Force PEO Space Combat Power is conducting market research to identify Space Based Interceptor (SBI) capabilities to address the threat of attack by ballistic and hypersonic missiles. The purpose of this RFI is to identify existing space-based missile defense capabilities and strategize on an architecture of a proliferated SBI constellation capable of boost-phase, mid-course-phase, and glide-phase intercepts.

This is not a request for proposals. The Government does not intend to award a contract on the basis of this request. The Government will not reimburse costs associated with the documentation submitted under this request. Responders are solely responsible for all expenses associated with responding to this inquiry. Responses to this RFI will aid in the Government’s acquisition strategy.

Capable sources can submit responses that address end-to-end solutions for any or all SBI Areas of Interest (i.e., two Space Based Interceptor areas, Common Ground element, and Fire Control element). Capable sources are not required to submit responses to all elements. Responses shall be no more than five (5) pages for the Exoatmospheric SBI Area of Interest, five (5) pages for the Endoatmospheric SBI Area of Interest, five (5) pages for the Common Ground element Area of Interest, and five (5) pages for the Fire Control element Area of Interest. Executive-level introductions, summaries, and conclusions count toward the page limit. Two (2) pages are allowed for cover page, non-government advisor acknowledgement, and POC information only.

2.0 Notional SBI Architecture

The Government defines the following SBI architecture elements that are used throughout this RFI.

• Space-based Interceptors are a class of weapon systems designed to intercept and destroy enemy targets (missiles or associated payloads) in flight. This element comprises multiple variants and components:
  • Exoatmospheric SBIs are designed to destroy targets in the boost and mid-course phases outside the Earth’s atmosphere (above 120 km), employing a kill vehicle (KV), guidance and navigation systems, communications, and propulsion for both initial engagement and terminal guidance maneuvers.
  • Endoatmospheric SBIs are designed to destroy targets within the Earth’s atmosphere (below 120 km), employing a KV, guidance and navigation systems, communications, and propulsion for initial engagement and terminal guidance maneuvers while accounting for atmospheric effects.
  • Terminal Guidance enables the SBI to acquire and track the target autonomously after weapon release from its host satellite, executing precise maneuvers during the final phase of flight to achieve a successful intercept.
  • In-Flight Target Update provides the ability to modify the SBI’s target information while it is in flight, based on new sensor data or changes in the threat trajectory.
  • Host Satellite is a space-based platform that provides power, communication, and other essential services to the SBI payload while on orbit prior to the initiation of an intercept.

• SBI Common Ground Element (CGE): The CGE serves as the central command and control hub for generating and sending commands to the SBI constellation, receiving telemetry and messages from the SBI constellation, and controlling and managing communications links to the SBI constellation through the Space Data Transport Layer and antenna services. These functions are automated to the maximum extent possible. The CGE manages a large constellation of several interceptor variants (multiple exoatmospheric and endoatmospheric variations from multiple vendors) in a variant- and vendor-agnostic manner using an open commanding and telemetry database scheme. CGE ensures constellation health and status, safety, and continuity of operations. This includes autonomous station-keeping and constellation configuration adjustment required due to anomalies to minimize coverage gaps and maximize SBI constellation effectiveness, all with minimal or no operator intervention. It also exchanges commands, orders, and messages with the Fire Control Element as well as integrates data from diverse sources, including the Ground/Space Battle Management Element (GSBME). When directed by the President and commanded by the Fire Control Element, CGE will enable weapons for release and command intercepts computed by the Fire Control Element.

• SBI Fire Control Element (FCE): The FCE ingests fire control-quality data from the missile warning/missile track sensor layers and SBI constellation health and status from the CGE. FCE conducts combat identification based on intelligence-based order of battle and real-time sources and performs weapon-target pairing based on rules of engagement to prioritize and engage multiple simultaneous targets. The FCE calculates the predicted intercept point for the assigned SBI, commands weapon release and continuously reassesses target track data to develop and send in-flight target updates (IFTUs) to the SBI until the SBI switches to on-board terminal guidance.

Architectural elements external to and not covered by this RFI include:

• Space Data Transport Layer provides 24/7 telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) services to the SBI constellation and the CGE and delivers IFTUs to interceptors after weapons release, ensuring continuous communication and effective engagement.

• Ground/Space Battle Management Element (GSBME) serves as the central orchestration and decision-making node for integrated missile defense across all missile defense layers, receiving threat data, assigning targets to respective missile defense layers, overseeing battle damage assessment to determine engagement effectiveness, and orchestrating re-engagement actions as necessary to ensure complete threat negation across the battlespace. GSBME requires robust automation and machine-to-machine integration with the SBI CGE and FCE for timely and effective responses.

https://sam.gov/opp/0692aee377c340a39d8 ... be159/view