Großbritannien: Verteidigungspolitik nach dem BREXIT

[theoderich]

https://twitter.com/GrantTurnbull_/stat ... 1673499649


UK should be free to exclude EU from defence contracts, says MoD

The UK should be free to exclude EU companies from major defence contracts after Brexit to ensure maximum benefit to the British economy, according to a report commissioned by the Ministry of Defence.

Under EU competition law, Britain is required to invite European companies to bid for defence contracts unless the MoD can show they are essential to national security interests.

But the report by the Conservative MP and former defence minister Philip Dunne calls on the MoD “to take early action to safeguard its freedom of manoeuvre in procurement post Brexit”.

Mr Dunne said that while he was not arguing for the MoD to only “buy British”, the move was one of a number of steps it could take to enhance economic prosperity from the UK defence sector.

“Part of the rationale is that we have the largest defence footprint in Europe— we need to sustain that,” he added.

Mr Dunne’s report forms part of efforts by defence secretary Gavin Williamson to persuade the chancellor Philip Hammond to increase military spending as the MoD faces a £20bn funding shortfall over the next decade.

The initial findings from a long running review of UK defence capability, the defence modernisation programme, were due to be announced by Mr Williamson before a Nato summit this week, but have so far been blocked by Mr Hammond and the prime minister Theresa May.

Following Mrs May’s pledge last month to increase spending on the National Health Service by £20bn in real terms by 2023-24, military officials fear the public finances will be too squeezed to boost the defence budget.

Mr Dunne’s report found that while the MoD was starting to give greater attention to the wider benefit to the UK economy when awarding multi billion pound defence contracts, more needed to be done.

The input from defence, said Mr Dunne, was “considerable and has significant potential to grow the UK’s prosperity further still. But it is generally unrecognised or taken for granted”.

Although the Treasury and Office for National Statistics do not measure the economic benefit from defence, Mr Dunne’s report said the sector’s direct contribution to gross domestic product was £43bn in terms of annual spending and exports.

Any move to guarantee more contracts for UK defence companies will be welcomed by trade unions which have called for the government to do more to protect jobs in the aerospace and shipbuilding industries.

This year the MoD faced criticism after it announced a contract to build three support ships for Britain’s new £6bn aircraft carriers would be opened up to international competition.

The decision followed the publication of a national shipbuilding strategy in 2017 which stated only warships would be UK-only contests.

Ian Waddell, general secretary of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, said: “It’s vital that shipbuilding strategy and broader defence industrial strategy underpins the ability of the UK workforce to design, build and maintain naval vessels.”

https://www.ft.com/content/e3d5f61c-812 ... tlhomepage


British prosperity relies on defence according to independent review

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/brit ... ent-review

• Independent report
  Growing the contribution of defence to UK prosperity: a report for the Secretary of State for Defence by Philip Dunne MP
  

  Impact of Brexit
  
  Brexit offers the opportunity to consider whether it remains appropriate for Defence to operate as if the Defence and Security Directive and Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty continue to apply to defence procurements. There should be a conscious strategic decision as to whether and how to take advantage of any new dispensation, rather than just a rolling-over of the substance of the current process.
  
  The practice of when to apply the existing Article 346 exemption could be examined, to ensure that the UK maintains its critical skills for development of capability which ensures freedom of action and operational advantage. As customer nations for our defence exports who are not members of the EU increasingly seek industrial participation in-country as part of their contractual arrangements, Brexit provides an opportunity to consider if the UK should seek greater UK prosperity benefits from our own procurement.
  
  Such arguments are being reflected in the current debate about the Type 31e frigate and Fleet Solid Support (FSS) procurements for the Royal Navy. The Type 31e has clearly been defined as a complex warship which will be built in the UK, but with a competitive tender process, including international contractors to help ensure best value for money. By contrast the FSS, as a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel, is not currently classed as a warship and therefore will not be subject to the Article 346 exemption. For FSS and as part of the early objective-setting for other future significant procurements, whether competitive or single source, development of relevant prosperity weighting for UK content and criteria to assess tenders should be considered.
  
  When developing selection criteria for new procurements starting after withdrawal from the EU and during the implementation period, it would be desirable for some weighting to be attached to the prosperity impact in the UK and for the criteria to be transparent to the tenderers, whether international or domestic. (Recommendation 6.34)
  
  Some internal criticism of the time and complexity in procuring equipment and services generally stems from overly rigid application of the EU procurement rules. Acknowledging that the current regime is likely to continue through the implementation period, there is a clear opportunity for the MOD to consider whether it wishes to seek any changes in approach when the UK can frame its own procurement regulations.
  
  MOD to take early action to safeguard its freedom of manoeuvre in procurement post Brexit. (Recommendation 6.35)
  
  Consideration needs to be given as to whether and how any differing UK prosperity weighting and criteria should apply to major procurements expected to be placed after the implementation period following Brexit. (Recommendation 6.36)

  https://www.gov.uk/government/publicati ... p-dunne-mp

Defence is important for Welsh prosperity, independent review concludes

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defe ... -concludes


BREXIT - Milit. Folgen des EU Austritts der Briten

http://www.doppeladler.com/forum/viewto ... 56&p=50661

[theoderich]

https://twitter.com/GrantTurnbull_/stat ... 5365780482

[theoderich]

Das britische Militär spielt in einer anderen Liga

Als strategischer Akteur spielt Großbritannien in einer gänzlich anderen Liga als die EU. Das Land ist atomar bewaffnet und erneuert mit dem Bau zweier mit Tarnkappenflugzeugen der fünften Generation bestückten Flugzeugträgern in hohem Tempo die Schlagkraft seiner Marine.

Europa hingegen ist bloß eine internationale Organisation ohne eigene militärische Mittel. Großbritannien ist in der Tat mit einigem Abstand die führende Militärmacht Europas.

Mit seinen Militärbasen in Gibraltar und Zypern wacht Großbritannien auch über die Ein- und Ausfahrt ins Mittelmeer und es ist das einzige europäische Land, das eine tatsächlich globale militärische Präsenz hat. Während Großbritannien jetzt die EU verlässt, bleiben diese strategischen Fakten bestehen.

Auch die britischen geostrategischen Ziele in Europa ein Kräfteverhältnis zugunsten eines liberalen Europas zu wahren, werden sich nicht ändern. Auf dieser Grundlage hat Großbritannien eine seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs ununterbrochene militärische Präsenz auf dem europäischen Festland gewahrt. In Deutschland sind 5000, in Estland 850 und in Polen 150 Soldaten stationiert und Kampfjets der britischen Luftwaffe RAF sind regelmäßig über Rumänien, Litauen und Island im Einsatz.

Großbritannien hat mehr Truppen in anderen Nato Staaten stationiert als alle anderen Verbündeten mit Ausnahme der Vereinigten Staaten. Anders als Frankreich, das nicht Mitglied der Nuklearen Planungsgruppe der Nato ist, dient die nukleare Abschreckung Großbritanniens zudem „unter allen Umständen“ dem Schutz des gesamten Nato-Gebiets.

Für Großbritannien bleibt die Nato der Kern europäischer Geopolitik und allgemeiner Garant des Friedens in Europa. Entsprechend rangiert die EU im weiteren auf britischer und amerikanischer strategischer Stärke beruhenden atlantischen Rahmen nur auf einem untergeordneten Rang. Viele EU-Länder scheinen daher davon überzeugt zu sein, dass es an der Zeit ist, eine EU-„Souveränität“ bzw. -„Autonomie“ zu entwickeln – in Richtung dessen, was EU Kommissionspräsident Jean-Claude Juncker als „Verteidigungsunion“ bezeichnet hat. Ohne eine substantielle Steigerung der europäischen Verteidigungsausgaben scheint dieses Ziel jedoch kaum verwirklichbar.

Kooperation mit Großbritannien notwendig

Nach jahrelangen Kürzungen seines Militärhaushalts hat Frankreich nicht mehr die Mittel (obwohl das Land Atomwaffen unterhält, ist sein Verteidigungshaushalt mit dem Deutschlands vergleichbar). Deutschland verfügt weder über das volle Spektrum militärischer Fähigkeiten noch hat es den politischen Willen, diese aktiv (militärische Interventionen) oder passiv (Abschreckung) einzusetzen. Daraus folgt, dass die Europäer mehr mit Großbritannien werden kooperieren müssen, wenn sie militärische Mittel und Fähigkeiten bewahren, geschweige denn erweitern wollen. Britische Bedenken in Bezug auf die Richtung, die eine solche Verteidigungsunion nehmen könnte und deren Potential, die Nato zu unterlaufen, könnten solche Partnerschaften schwierig machen.

Für die Verteidigungszusammenarbeit zwischen Großbritannien und der EU könnten sich daher EU-externe Strukturen, in die EU-Staaten eingebunden sind, wie etwa die Interventionsinitiative des französischen Präsidenten Emmanuel Macron und die britisch-französischen Combined Expeditionary Forces als fruchtbarer erweisen. Manche der in diese Initiativen eingebunden Länder sind näher an Großbritanniens aktiver strategischer Kultur, die der EU völlig fehlt.

In der Tat ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Großbritannien in zunehmend jeder Form europäischer strategischer Zusammenarbeit ablehnend gegenüber stehen wird, sollte der Graben zwischen der EU und Großbritannien größer werden. Dies ist eine Frage, die die EU und die Länder Europas sorgfältig analysieren müssen. Für Europäer könnte das zunehmend wichtig werden, dann nämlich, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten entweder vom Unwillen vieler europäischer Länder ihr volles Gewicht einzubringen müde werden oder ihren Fokus mehr auf Ostasien legen. Dann könnten sich alte Freunde noch immer als die besten Freunde erweisen.


Alan Mendoza ist Gründer und Leiter der Henry Jackson Society und James Rogers ist Leiter des Global Britain Programme der Henry Jackson Society

http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausl ... 03473.html

[theoderich]

London steigt auch militärisch aus der EU aus

Großbritannien wird sich nach Informationen unseres Brüsseler Korrespondenten Hans Uwe Mergener aus seinen Beteiligung an Missionen im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union mit Ablauf der Übergangsphase für den Austritt des Landes aus der EU, also mit Ablauf des 31. Dezember 2020, zurückziehen.

Eine Beteiligung des Vereinigten Königreiches bleibt weiterhin durch eine (bereits vorliegende) Rahmenvereinbarung möglich. Auch Ad-Hoc-Missionen stehen den Briten weiter offen. Die Teilnahme von Drittländern an EU-Missionen und -Operationen ist bereits geübte Praxis: Türkei und Chile sind in Bosnien-Herzegovina, Serbien bei einigen afrikanischen Missionen, Norwegen in Palästina dabei.

Auf militärischer Ebene wurde bereits vorgesorgt. 2019 wechselte das Hauptquartier der Operation Atalanta von Northwood nach Rota (Spanien). Die Repräsentanz britischer Soldaten wurde weitgehend zurückgefahren (EUTM Mali, Somalia, EUFOR Althea, EUAM Ukraine).

https://esut.de/2020/10/meldungen/23485 ... er-eu-aus/

[theoderich]

Collection
The Integrated Review 2021

https://www.gov.uk/government/collectio ... eview-2021

• Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
  

  To meet this ambition, the National Space Council will develop the UK’s first national space strategy in 2021. This strategy will establish an integrated approach across military and civil space policy, under which we will:
  

  • Establish a new Space Command by summer 2021, ensuring that the armed forces have cutting-edge capabilities to advance UK interests on Earth and in space – enhancing our cooperation with allies and ensuring we can compete with our adversaries.

  • Develop a commercial launch capability from the UK – launching British satellites from Scotland by 2022 as part of the UK Space Agency’s programme to enable a UK-wide market for spaceflight services. This will give us greater strategic autonomy and flexibility in terms of what the UK puts into space, and when.

  Shetland Space Centre
  
  https://shetlandspacecentre.com/
  
  
  
  
  https://consultation.shetlandspacecentre.com/
  

  The United States will remain the UK’s most important strategic ally and partner.

  Our European neighbours and allies remain vital partners.

  We have a deep and long-standing security and defence partnership with France, underpinned by the Lancaster House treaties and exemplified by our Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF). We will continue working together to counter terrorism and state threats, and to sustain international security. [...] Our intention is to enhance this partnership and to build on the Lancaster House treaties in the UK-France Summit in 2021.

  3.1.2 Defence and deterrence through collective security
  
  [...]
  
  14. NATO is the foundation of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic area, where our commitment to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains our most powerful deterrent. In an era of rapid developments in technology and doctrine, the Alliance must be equipped to deal with the full range of possible threats. These include long-range precision strike weapons, cyber weapons and weapons aimed at degrading space-based infrastructure. They also include malign activity intended to test the boundary between peace and war, and our resolve in response. Russia is the most acute threat in the region and we will work with NATO Allies to ensure a united Western response, combining military, intelligence and diplomatic efforts. We will continue to support closer practical cooperation between NATO and the EU in pursuit of this goal. We will cooperate with the EU on matters of security and defence as independent partners, where this is in our interest.
  
  15. To bolster collective security with our allies worldwide – especially in the Euro-Atlantic and with a new emphasis on the Indo-Pacific – our priority actions will be:
  

  • To reaffirm our commitment to leadership in NATO, supporting its adaptation to threats above and below the threshold of war under international law. We will increase our defence budget by over £24 billion over the next four years and remain the largest European spender on defence in NATO, with our expenditure now standing at 2.2% of GDP. We will continue to: commit a full spectrum of forces to the Alliance, from our nuclear deterrent to offensive cyber capabilities; make a leading contribution to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and Response Force; and ensure we are at the forefront of implementing NATO’s new Deterrence and Defence Concept. We will also continue to serve as a framework nation able to connect and coordinate NATO’s forces effectively, while more UK equipment will be prepositioned in Germany to facilitate rapid response.

  • To modernise the UK armed forces, maintaining a full spectrum of capabilities, as set out in the Defence Command Paper. We will prioritise the development and integration of new technologies – including those required for near-peer, high-tech warfighting – and a ‘digital backbone’ to enable multi-domain operations and interoperability with allies and partners. In the Euro-Atlantic, the UK will be one of only two NATO Allies to bring to bear nuclear, offensive cyber, precision strike weapons and fifth-generation strike aircraft. We will also contribute to missile defence, to space awareness and resilience (including through a new Space Command) and to CBRN resilience. A new generation of warships will support our historic role in keeping the North Atlantic open. Our highly mobile airborne and amphibious forces will be able to reinforce Allies at short notice. Our land force will undergo its most comprehensive modernisation for two decades, becoming better integrated with other domains, better able to intervene quickly and effectively over large distances, better protected from electronic, air and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle threats, and better able to engage an adversary at long range. Our Special Forces will be ready to operate in the most hostile environments and against our most sophisticated adversaries. With international partners including Italy and Sweden, we will continue to develop FCAS as a replacement for our Typhoon fast jets, drawing on ground-breaking technologies from the defence sector and beyond.

  To provide a more solid overseas foundation we will invest in the strategic hubs that give our forces reach, access, influence and insight. As well as investing in our facilities and infrastructure in Cyprus, Gibraltar and Germany, we will improve those in Oman, Singapore and Kenya.

  The nuclear deterrent
  
  [...]
  
  In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.
  
  To ensure that our deterrent is not vulnerable to pre-emptive action by potential adversaries, we will maintain our four submarines so that at least one will always be on a Continuous At Sea Deterrent patrol. Our submarines on patrol are at several days’ notice to fire and, since 1994, we do not target our missiles at any state. We remain committed to maintaining the minimum destructive power needed to guarantee that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible and effective against the full range of state nuclear threats from any direction.
  
  [...]
  
  Nuclear cooperation remains an important element of the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, enhancing transatlantic security. We will continue to work closely with the United States on nuclear matters, including nuclear deterrence policy. The 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) has been central to our shared nuclear security goals and we are committed to its renewal in 2024.

  Our future capability
  
  [...]
  
  Parliament has voted to renew our nuclear deterrent and replace the Vanguard Class submarines with four new Dreadnought Class submarines. The programme remains within budget and on track for the First of Class to enter service in the early 2030.
  
  To ensure we maintain an effective deterrent throughout the commission of the Dreadnought Class, we will replace our existing nuclear warhead. We will work with the Atomic Weapons Establishment to build the highly skilled teams, facilities and capabilities needed to deliver this, while also sustaining the current warhead until it is withdrawn from service. We will continue to work closely with the United States to ensure our warhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon System, our cooperation underpinned by both the MDA and the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement.

  https://www.gov.uk/government/publicati ... ign-policy

Und der APA/dem ORF fällt dazu nur so etwas ein - ein aus fremden Artikeln und Presseaussendungen zusammengeschusterter Text eines Journalisten, der die IRSDDFP offensichtlich nie gelesen hat:

Großbritannien will Atomwaffenarsenal vergrößern

Die Zahl der nuklearen Sprengköpfe soll von 180 auf 260 erhöht werden, wie aus einem heute vorgelegten Bericht zu einer Neuausrichtung der Sicherheits-, Verteidigungs- und Außenpolitik hervorgeht.

Die Kampagne zur nuklearen Abrüstung (CND) nannte einen Ausbau des britischen Atomarsenals „schockierend“. „Wir wollen nicht mehr Nuklearwaffen. Wir wollen gar keine“, erklärte die CND, nachdem Einzelheiten aus dem Bericht bereits zuvor in Medien durchgesickert waren. Die Geschäftsführerin der Internationalen Kampagne zur Abschaffung von Atomwaffen (ICAN), Beatrice Fihn, warf der Regierung in London vor, ein „neues atomares Wettrüsten“ zu befeuern.

In dem Bericht soll Russland als „aktive Bedrohung“ eingestuft sein, China hingegen eher als Systemherausforderung.

https://orf.at/#/stories/3205532/

[Maschin]

Der Einsparungsplan der Royal Air Force.

20 Super Pumas (sollen ab Mitte der 2020er Jahre durch einen neuen mittleren HS ersetzt werden.)
9 Chinooks (werden durch neue ersetzt.),
die 5 (3) E-3D Sentry's bis 2021, zulauf von nur mehr 3 E-7 Wedgetail ab 2023.
25 Eurofighter Typhoons Tranche 1 bis 2025, aber es sollen alle 7 EFT Staffeln erhalten bleiben.
die letzten 14 C-130J Herkules bis 2023,
alle Hawk T1 (technisch am Ende) außer der Reds bis wsl 2030.
Es sollen nach den 48 F-35B Lightning II weitere F-35 beschafft werden. So der Plan

[theoderich]

Corporate report
Defence in a Competitive Age

https://www.gov.uk/government/publicati ... titive-age

[opticartini]

2 Milliarden Pfund (£2 billion) werden in das "Tempest"-Programm gesteckt, die nächste Kampfflugzeug-Generation.

Dafür werden die Tranche 1 Typhoons, die seit 2015 für die heimische Luftraumüberwachung und Feinddarstellung verwendet wurden, bereits im Jahr 2025 außer Dienst gestellt, statt ursprünglich geplant 2030. Die C130 Hercules wird 2023 ausgeschieden.

Artikel: https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/24-typh ... d-by-2025/

Zitate aus dem Dokument "Defence in a Competitive Age":

"7.44 The Royal Air Force will retire equipment that has increasingly limited utility in the digital and future operating environment. This will include rationalising older fleets to improve efficiency, retiring Typhoon Tranche 1 by 2025, and Hawk T1."

Es wird in die vorhandenen Eurofighter Typhoons investiert, das Herzstück wird das "Radar 2" werden, ein AESA-Radar mit EW-Fähigkeiten:

7.41. The Royal Air Force will continue to grow its Combat Air capacity over the next few years as we fully establish all seven operational Typhoon Squadrons and grow the Lightning II Force, increasing the fleet size beyond the 48 aircraft that we have already ordered. Together they will provide a formidable capability, which will be continually upgraded to meet the threat, exploit multi-domain integration and expand utility. The Royal Air Force will spiral develop Typhoon capability, integrate new weapons such as the UK-developed ‘SPEAR Cap 3’ precision air-launched weapon and invest in the Radar 2 programme to give it a powerful electronically scanned array radar.

[Berni88]

Mal was auf deutsch:
https://www.flugrevue.de/militaer/neue- ... ft-weiter/

[theoderich]

BRIEFING PAPER
Number 9188, 30 March 2021

Defence Command Paper 2021: equipment cuts

https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/re ... /cbp-9188/