USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

Wehrtechnik & Rüstung, Sicherheit und Verteidigung außerhalb Europas
theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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US tests ground-launched missile concept previously banned under INF
A DoD spokesperson told Jane's that the US Navy (USN), in partnership with the Strategic Capabilities Office, used a Mark 41 Vertical Launching System (Mk 41 VLS) to fire a "variant" of the Tomahawk LACM.
https://www.janes.com/article/90529/us- ... -under-inf

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Ein Blick ans andere Ende der Welt:

BRAHMOS Supersonic Cruise Missile, with major indigenous systems, successfully test-fired

https://www.facebook.com/DefenceMinIndi ... &__tn__=-R

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https://www.facebook.com/DefenceMinIndi ... ?__tn__=-R

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https://www.facebook.com/DPIDRDO/posts/ ... &__tn__=-R

Nato rejects Russian offer on nuclear missiles freeze (26. September 2019)
Nato has rejected a Russian proposal for a freeze in the deployment of short and medium-range nuclear missiles after the US withdrew from a landmark cold war-era anti-proliferation pact that banned the weapons.

The military alliance on Thursday dismissed the Kremlin offer as not credible, since it would leave in place batteries of such weapons that western states say have already been deployed in western Russia and are able to target many European capitals.
Oana Lungescu, Nato spokesperson, confirmed receipt of a letter from Russian authorities pitching the moratorium idea but said the western allies had “heard this proposal before” and saw it as “not a credible offer”.“It disregards the reality on the ground: Russia has already deployed the SSC-8, in violation of the INF treaty,” she said. “Unless and until Russia verifiably destroys the SSC-8 system, this moratorium on deployments is not a real offer. We call once again on Russia to behave like a responsible international actor.”

The letter suggests Moscow is open to discussions and will raise hopes that some form of negotiated settlement could be possible, as both Russia and the EU seek to avoid a costly and potentially dangerous arms race.

But previous attempts to rescue the INF deal or resurrect it in some form have been scuppered by Moscow’s denials that it was in breach of the rules, counterclaims from Russia that some EU-based US missile systems are also non-compliant, and the rise of China as a missile defence giant. Beijing was not a member of the INF treaty and has rebuffed any suggestions of joining such a pact.

Nato diplomats say Moscow had floated the moratorium plan in August, the month both the US and Russia pulled out of the INF treaty. Washington quit first on the grounds the SSC-8 had for years violated the agreement, which banned nuclear and conventional missiles with a 500km to 5,500km range.

Oana Lungescu, Nato spokesperson, confirmed receipt of a letter from Russian authorities pitching the moratorium idea but said the western allies had “heard this proposal before” and saw it as “not a credible offer”.

“It disregards the reality on the ground: Russia has already deployed the SSC-8, in violation of the INF treaty,” she said. “Unless and until Russia verifiably destroys the SSC-8 system, this moratorium on deployments is not a real offer. We call once again on Russia to behave like a responsible international actor.”

The letter suggests Moscow is open to discussions and will raise hopes that some form of negotiated settlement could be possible, as both Russia and the EU seek to avoid a costly and potentially dangerous arms race.

But previous attempts to rescue the INF deal or resurrect it in some form have been scuppered by Moscow’s denials that it was in breach of the rules, counterclaims from Russia that some EU-based US missile systems are also non-compliant, and the rise of China as a missile defence giant. Beijing was not a member of the INF treaty and has rebuffed any suggestions of joining such a pact.

Nato diplomats say Moscow had floated the moratorium plan in August, the month both the US and Russia pulled out of the INF treaty. Washington quit first on the grounds the SSC-8 had for years violated the agreement, which banned nuclear and conventional missiles with a 500km to 5,500km range.
https://www.ft.com/content/008a176a-e05 ... 5a370481bc
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Eigenartige Wortspenden. Nachdem eine Seite den INF-Vertrag bewusst gebrochen und die andere alles getan hat, um ihm schrittweise zu untergraben:
  • NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World

    Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller at the University of Oslo


    09 Sep. 2019
    I have no doubt if we undertook the effort to negotiate a new INF Treaty today, including China and maybe other countries, we could institute a ban on nuclear only ground-launched intermediate range missiles. That is what I call, ‘Putting the N back in INF’ – it’s a little bit ironic, but when INF entered into force in the late 80s it was called the INF Treaty but actually it banned all missiles, whether nuclear or conventional, of this ground-launched intermediate range. So now I talk about, ‘Putting the N back in INF’, thinking about banning only nuclear-armed missiles of a ground-launched sort, in the intermediate ranges.

    Alternatively, we could even impose a limit, although that inspection regime would be more challenging than for a ban. It’s always more complicated to figure out how you verify a limit than a ban, where no such missiles are allowed.
    https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opin ... dLocale=en
  • European security without the INF Treaty
    The expansion of Russia’s long-range strike capabilities, including the deployment of the SSC-8/9M729 missiles, has created gaps in NATO’s overall posture that need to be closed.

    To close them, NATO does not need to match Russian investments qualitatively or quantitatively. The question for the Alliance is not whether it should invest in new ground-launched missiles in Europe but how best to undermine Russia’s confidence in its strategy of winning “short of war” or in a “short war.” This requires measured, long-term and asymmetric adjustments across the whole spectrum of NATO’s overall mix of capabilities. This is what NATO has already signaled by examining various options, including strengthening conventional capabilities; investing in air and missile defence; ensuring that NATO’s nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective; boosting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance efforts; and ramping up exercises. However, the Allies have to take into account the fact that, in the post-INF Treaty world, addressing the challenges posed by Russia may force them to go further than they would prefer to go.

    Regarding conventional capabilities, the biggest challenge of the post-INF world for NATO is to ensure its ability to reinforce the most vulnerable Allies during a conflict. This is because Russia’s long-range strike capabilities could impede, delay or prohibit the movement of Allied forces into and across Europe. NATO needs to have credible means, including infrastructure, to transport and deploy follow-on forces to be able to convince Russia that a quick conventional fait accompli in Europe, even initially successful, would not last long.
    The post-INF Treaty world requires the Alliance to seek new solutions on how to conduct effective operations despite Russia’s anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, enhanced with the new intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles.
    However, it is plausible that, in the post-INF Treaty world, NATO will have to periodically reassess whether conventional ground-launched missiles would better contribute to security and stability in Europe.

    Russia’s deployment of the SSC-8/9M729 demonstrates the need for the Alliance to defend its critical civilian and military assets against Russia’s cruise missiles. Therefore, augmenting NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence to address this problem will be an important task. Depending on Moscow’s military investments, NATO may also be forced to seek ways to defend its key assets against a limited attack from Russian intermediate-range ballistic missiles. However, this does not change the fact that defending the whole of NATO territory and populations against all types of Russian missiles will remain beyond the Alliance’s reach. Re-orienting NATO’s territorial ballistic missile defence comprehensively against Russia would not be technically feasible or affordable.

    Credible nuclear deterrence will remain the key to deter Russia’s limited use of nuclear weapons or nuclear blackmail. To ensure it, NATO does not need to deploy new ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear-armed missiles in Europe and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The primary task for the Alliance is to maintain the effectiveness of the nuclear forces it already has at its disposal, in particular the option to deliver US nuclear weapons by NATO dual-capable aircraft.
    Concerning the “short war” risk, NATO arms control proposals should be aimed at constraining Russia’s ability to exploit its military time-distance advantage. To achieve this goal, these proposals should address the sources of Russia’s strength:

    1. its regional military superiority in areas close to its borders with NATO territory;

    2. its ability to quickly mobilise and move massive numbers of conventional forces across Russia’s vast territory; and

    3. its capabilities to deny, disrupt or complicate NATO’s reinforcement options, including with intermediate- and strategic-range strike capabilities.

    What seems most desirable is a holistic approach to arms control in which NATO aims to find a “sweet spot” that addresses all three sources of Russia’s military advantages. Yet, an arms control agreement that addresses even one source of Russia’s strength may indirectly affect the remaining two. For example, constraining Russia’s military advantage in local areas close to NATO borders may make it more difficult for Russia to take advantage of its follow-on forces and long-range strike capabilities. While limiting Russia’s options for conducting surprise long-range strikes is desirable in the post-INF Treaty world, denying Russia the benefits of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles may be achieved by arms control agreements related to other types of capabilities.
    Dr Jacek Durkalec is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

    This work was performed under the auspices of the United States Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. LLNL-JRNL-789610

    What is published in NATO Review does not necessarily represent the official position or policy of member governments, or of NATO.
    https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2019/A ... /index.htm

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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US Army set to lift range ceiling on PrSM
The US Army is set to revise the baseline objective range requirement for the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) to ‘beyond 500 km’, subsequent to prototype demonstration flights of both competitor solutions in November and December this year.

PrSM is an accelerated army initiative, dating from March 2017, to develop and field an all-weather long-range hypersonic precision strike capability, using ground-launched missile-delivered indirect fires, to engage imprecisely located area and point targets.

Intended to replace the legacy non-IM and Cluster Munition policy-compliant Lockheed Martin MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) currently in the US Army inventory, the PrSM requirement is being competed by both Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. The prototype requirement includes a Launch Pod Missile Container and a fully integrated surface-to-surface guided missile that will be compatible with the M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers. PrSM will be delivered as a two-missiles-per-pod system – one missile in each launch cell – which, compared with the current ATACMS capability, effectively doubles the PrSM load out in both the M142 and M270 launchers.

The current objective range requirement specified in the PrSM Capability Development Document (CDD) is set at 60 km to 499 km – the maximum range permitted for land-based ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers under the provisions of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) between the United States and the then-Soviet Union.
“We’ve now been relieved of the INF Treaty restrictions,” Brigadier General John Rafferty, Director at Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team, said at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) meeting in Washington in October. “After our first couple of flight tests, we will look at how [both competitors] are able to validate the models that will show the maximum capability of these missiles.
https://www.janes.com/article/92113/us- ... ng-on-prsm


Precision Strike Missile (PrSM)

https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/ms-prsm/


2019 Army Modernization Strategy

https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2 ... _final.pdf

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Is the US about to test a new ballistic missile? (13. November 2019)
The U.S. may be set to test a new ground-launched ballistic missile in the coming weeks, the first test of that particular weapon since the country withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty earlier this year.

In March, Pentagon officials told reporters that they intend to test an intermediate range ballistic missile in the November time frame. At the annual Defense News Conference in September, Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for policy for nuclear and missile defense, confirmed that the Pentagon is roughly on track for that test.

“I do believe it is still the plan to conduct a ballistic missile test before the end of the year," he said then.

Asked about Soofer’s comments and whether those tests are still planned, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Robert Carver could not “confirm or deny a test will take place in November. I am unable to provide any details on testing dates, times or locations.”

The test, should it happen as planned, is expected to involve a ballistic missile with a potential range of roughly 3,000-4,000 kilometers. Pentagon officials previously speculated that any deployment of such a weapon, potentially to Guam, would not be likely for at least five years.
https://www.defensenews.com/space/2019/ ... c-missile/

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Congress moves to ban Pentagon from acquiring, developing INF-banned weapons
House members approved the compromise fiscal year 2020 (FY 2020) defence authorisation bill on 11 December with a provision that would prevent the Department of Defense (DoD) from purchasing and developing new ground-launched missiles previously banned under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty unless the department submits a comprehensive report. The measure requires an "analysis of alternatives to such new missiles, basing options and foreign countries consulted including NATO", according to a summary of the report. As of 12 December, the Senate had not voted on the legislation, which is a required step before it is sent to the president's desk for his signature.

"The provision would also prohibit the use of any funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for research and development, procurement, or deployment of a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missile system, unless the Secretary of Defense submits a report to Congress related to the termination of the INF Treaty and the development or deployment of INF-range missile systems," lawmakers wrote in the bill.

Specifically, the defence bill requires the administration to provide lawmakers with an assessment detailing "the implications, in terms of military threat to the United States or its allies in Europe, of Russian deployment of intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles without restriction".
https://www.janes.com/article/93172/con ... ed-weapons

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Statement on the Fielding of the W76-2 Low-Yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releas ... llistic-m/


USA nehmen U-Boot mit neuer Atomwaffe in Betrieb

https://orf.at//#/stories/3153206/

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Lockheed Martin's PrSM Demonstrates Pinpoint Accuracy in Second U.S. Army Flight Test

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https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-03 ... 1584184079

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Acipenser
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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Langstreckenraketen sind meist mit mehrfach Sprengköpfen bestückt, bis zu 8 meines Wissens. Manche sind auch nur Dummies die Abwehrraketen stören oder ablenken sollen (Fächerschuss). Bei kleine zielgerichteten Sprengköpfen handelt es sich um den begrenzten Einsatz auf Einzelziele. Etwa den Vorstoß einer kleineren Gruppe an Aggressoren abzuwürgen. Birgt aber auch Gefahren hinsichtlich des Ausbruch eines totalen Krieges.

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

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US Army deciding if Raytheon can proceed in PrSM competition (9. März 2020)
As a result of technical problems that have prevented Raytheon from flight testing its Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) prototype, the US Army must now decide if the company can remain in the competition.

Brigadier General John Rafferty, the service's head of the Long Range Precision Fires Cross-Functional Team (CFT), told Jane's on 6 March that Raytheon's PrSM bid has yet to take flight, an event that was slated to occur by the end of 2019. As a result, the army's assistant secretary for acquisition, logistics, and technology (ASA(ALT)) Bruce Jette is determining if the company can move on to the next phase of the competition, slated to occur later this month, or if it will be kicked out, he explained.

"Right now, I know that Raytheon and ASA(ALT) are still in discussions about the ways in which they might be able to continue to compete," Brig Gen Rafferty explained. "From my end, it's an ASA(ALT) discussion, it's not a CFT decision. So, we're supporting Dr Jette [and his team] with whatever they need as they make this decision."

Raytheon told Jane's that a "technical issue" is to blame for the delay but declined to detail the nature of the problem.

"Raytheon has resolved the technical issue that delayed our planned DeepStrike flight test last November," the company wrote in a 6 March email. "The company is working with our US Army customer to plan [the] next steps in the competition for the PrSM programme."
https://www.janes.com/article/94784/us- ... ompetition

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