https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/worl ... river.htmlBut for the American arsenal, the initiatives are all going in the opposite direction, with a series of little-noticed announcements to spend billions of dollars building the factories needed to rejuvenate and expand America’s nuclear capacity.
The contrast has been striking. On Thursday evening, hours after Mr. Trump announced that his meeting with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, would take place on June 12 in Singapore, the Pentagon and the Energy Department announced plans to begin building critical components for next-generation nuclear weapons at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
The idea is to repurpose a half-built, problem-ridden complex that was originally intended to turn old nuclear weapons into reactor fuel to light American cities. Now the facility will be used to revitalize America’s aging nuclear weapons, and to create the capacity to make many hundreds more.
The Pentagon, in its main nuclear strategy report released in February, cited North Korea’s ability to “illicitly produce nuclear warheads” as a major justification for the new effort.
Also last week, a strategic forces subcommittee in the House approved Trump administration plans to build a new kind of low-yield nuclear weapon, launched from submarines, to match Russian nuclear advances.
The chairman of the subcommittee, Mike D. Rogers, Republican of Alabama, said the decision was a reaction to the new arms race with Moscow. Mr. Trump said in March that he intended to meet with President Vladimir V. Putin to discuss the arms race, which he said was “getting out of control.” (No such meeting has yet been scheduled.)
“This committee knows what Russia’s up to with its nuclear weapons,” Mr. Rogers said. “It’s both sobering and horrifying.”
While it is possible that the American buildup is part of a negotiating strategy, offering Mr. Trump something he can trade away before it gets started, the White House has made clear, in both statements and strategy, that it envisions the reduction of nuclear weapons as a one-way street.
The Energy Department’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where the administration plans to repurpose an unfinished building to construct components for next-generation nuclear weapons.
It is hardly the first time the United States has seen no inconsistency in expanding its own nuclear capabilities while trying to persuade lesser powers to give up theirs.
In fact, the imbalance is built into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970. It prohibits all states that did not already have the bomb from building nuclear weapons. (Israel, Pakistan and India never joined, and North Korea dropped out.)
But it also requires the acknowledged nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — to work toward “the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament,” and ultimately to complete their own disarmament.
For the two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both the United States and Russia could argue that they were making progress on that promise. The number of nuclear weapons deployed by the two countries fell, and fell again, under a series of arms control agreements, and as of earlier this year, both are now limited to 1,550 deployed weapons. Thousands more are in storage.
President Barack Obama argued that the United States could not urge other countries to give up nuclear programs while expanding its own. But many of his own aides later said they wished he had done far more to reduce America’s arsenal, arguing that it could safely drop below the number the Russians deployed.
Now Mr. Trump is heading in the other direction. The United States has dramatically stepped up the effort to overhaul the existing arsenal and prepare for the day when it might once again be enlarged. Unless the New Start Treaty is renewed for five years, any limits on the American and Russian arsenals will expire in February 2021, just days after Mr. Trump would enter his second term.
In the meantime, the American government is doing all it can to make clear it is preparing for an era of nuclear buildup.
At the center of the Savannah River announcement is the American production of something the nuclear industry calls “pits.” That is a term for a small atom bomb that, when detonated inside a warhead, acts as an extraordinarily hot match to ignite a much larger mass of thermonuclear fuel. The resulting blast can easily be 1,000 times as powerful as the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.
One of the most closely held secrets of the nuclear age is how to make pits very small yet highly reliable. Most are about the size of a grapefruit. The small size makes thermonuclear warheads compact and lightweight enough to fit atop long-range missiles — it is one of the technologies that North Korea has been seeking, and may have already figured out.
The announcement on Thursday sought to make lemonade out of two large federal lemons.
The pits have been made, until now, at the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, where America’s first nuclear weapons were built. But the lab has suffered a humiliating string of operating and safety failures, which in 2015 led the Obama administration to announce plans to end the current management contract there. Among the breakdowns was the management’s failure to come up with a credible plan for producing up to 80 pits a year.
The Los Alamos lab and the surrounding town. The lab has suffered a humiliating string of operating and safety failures. Joe Raedle/Getty Images
At the same time, cost estimates for the Savannah River project to turn tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for commercial power reactors had soared to $17 billion.
Now that project is scrapped, and the two-pronged plan announced on Thursday will also take the production pressure off Los Alamos — a move that seeks to maintain its profile as a scientific research center rather than as a munitions factory.
Los Alamos is to make 30 pits per year, and the South Carolina plant 50. That setup, the Energy and Defense Departments said, will improve “the resiliency, flexibility and redundancy of our nuclear security enterprise by not relying on a single production site.” But it also signals a return to production of new weapons, even as Mr. Trump is withdrawing from the 2015 deal with Iran in part because of “sunset provisions” that he says will eventually allow Tehran to do the same.
The federal rationale for making up to 80 pits a year is hidden in layers of secrecy but turns on stated fears that the plutonium fuel at the heart of American weapons will deteriorate with age, eventually rendering them useless.
Whether that fear is justified is a matter of debate. In 2006, a federal nuclear panel found that the plutonium pits aged far better than expected, with most able to work reliably for a century or more.
That judgment led critics to contend that the federal government was seeking a new generation of nuclear pits for reasons not of national security but of saber-rattling.
“No new pits are needed for any warhead,” Greg Mello, the executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, a private organization in Albuquerque that monitors the nation’s nuclear complex and opposes expansion, said recently. “There are thousands of pits stockpiled for possible reuse.”
The Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, published in February, called for the new capability to produce plutonium pits. It also called on Congress to approve the new low-yield nuclear weapons.
Last week, the full House Armed Services Committee endorsed the Nuclear Posture Review, but with Democrats overwhelmingly voting against it.
“We have to have a credible deterrence, but I think the Nuclear Posture Review goes way beyond credible nuclear deterrence,” said Representative Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the committee, warning that “we could stumble into a nuclear war.”
Joint Statement from Ellen M. Lord and Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty on Recapitalization of Plutonium Pit Production (10. Mai 2018)
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/jo ... tonium-pitAn evolving and uncertain geopolitical landscape calls for the United States to recapitalize its defense plutonium capabilities. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has certified that the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) recommended alternative for recapitalization of these capabilities is acceptable and represents a resilient and responsive option to meet Department of Defense (DoD) requirements.
To achieve DoD’s 80 pits per year requirement by 2030, NNSA’s recommended alternative repurposes the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to produce plutonium pits while also maximizing pit production activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. This two-prong approach – with at least 50 pits per year produced at Savannah River and at least 30 pits per year at Los Alamos – is the best way to manage the cost, schedule, and risk of such a vital undertaking.
Congressional Research Service
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
February 13, 2018
H.R. 5515 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019
https://armedservices.house.gov/about/m ... -year-2019
- Chairman's Mark FY19 NDAA.pdf
https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/r ... 0Final.pdfSection 3114—Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons
This section would repeal section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136) related to low-yield nuclear weapons. This section would also authorize the Secretary of Energy, acting
through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, to carry out the engineering development phase, and any subsequent phase, to modify or develop a low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
2. Februar 2018
News Briefing on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcript ... e/1431945/
- 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0218_npr/Additionally, in the near-term, the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Unlike DCA, a low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect. They will provide additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and a valuable hedge against future nuclear “break out” scenarios.
GLOBAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MODERNIZATION:
GLOBAL NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY VEHICLES
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2 ... ZATION.PDFRUSSIA
- Russia is developing a diverse range of other strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, including the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty-violating SSC-8 and the “Status-6” torpedo
- Additionally, over the last decade Russia has also deployed a variety of low-yield nuclear capabilities
1. Februar 2018
Pentagon Official: Nuclear Posture Review Calls for Credible Deterrent
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Ar ... deterrent/
12. Dezember 2017
H.R.2810 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (s.v. SEC. 1243. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY.)
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... -bill/2810(c) Development of INF Range Ground-launched Missile System.--
(1) Establishment of a program of record.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including research and development activities with respect to such cruise missile system.
(2) Report required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the cost and schedule for, and feasibility of, modifying United States missile systems in existence or planned as of such date of enactment for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers as compared with the cost and schedule for, and feasibility of, developing a new ground-launched missile using new technology with the same range.
9. Dezember 2017
Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276363.htmWhile the United States will continue to pursue a diplomatic solution, we are now pursuing economic and military measures intended to induce the Russian Federation to return to compliance. This includes a review of military concepts and options, including options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies, should the Russian Federation not return to compliance. This step will not violate our INF Treaty obligations. We are also prepared to cease such research and development activities if the Russian Federation returns to full and verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations.
8. Dezember 2017
US Official Identifies Missile Believed to Violate INF Treaty
https://missilethreat.csis.org/us-offic ... nf-treaty/National Security Council official Christopher Ford revealed in a speech at the Wilson Center on November 29 that the Russian missile violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is the land-based cruise missile Novator 9M729 (NATO designation: SSC-8). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement saying that Russia is not violating the treaty, and it will continue to fulfill its obligations. In the ministry’s press release, Russia voiced a willingness to enter a dialogue with the United States on the issues surrounding the treaty, however it condemns the ultimatums and the military and political pressure being placed on it by the United States.
1. Dezember 2017
Advancing American Security through Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Look at the First 11 months of the Trump Administration
Below are remarks Dr. Ford delivered in his official capacity -- as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation at the U.S. National Security Council -- on November 30, 2017, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=2047Similarly, though it was eventually willing – and for very good reasons – to find Russia in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the previous administration also declined to take concrete steps to give Russia real incentives to return to compliance. As a result, not surprisingly, Russia did not return to compliance. Indeed, Moscow was presumably delighted to be able build the illegal missiles it wants, and thus pursue asymmetric advantage against the United States and its allies, while Washington continued carefully to observe the Treaty’s requirements. Sneering at American finger-wagging over the issue, the Russians never even officially admitted the existence of the missile in question, despite the General Director of the Russian arms company Novator himself having noted the Russian designator of the non-compliant missile during a public statement last March celebrating the accomplishments of Russia’s Kapustin Yar test range. (That Russian designator, by the way, is “9M729” – something which I think I am saying in public today for the first time.)
By contrast to our predecessors, the new administration decided that the INF status quo we inherited was unacceptable, and that we must make unavailable to the Russians the option of continuing to see us constrained while they remain free to do as they wish. The United States is now determined, at long last, to give Russia concrete reasons to change course – to finally come back into compliance – and we hope that it will do so, because we remain committed to the INF Treaty. The Russians now need to choose whether they share our steadfast desire to preserve the Treaty, or whether they will continue on their current path, which leads to the Treaty’s collapse. They no longer have the option of having their cake and eating it, too.
https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forc ... cmsArticleПоздравление с юбилеем генерального директора АО «ОКБ “Новатор”», генерального конструктора Павла Камнева
Примите искренние поздравления по случаю 70-летия со дня основания 4 ГЦМП МО РФ.
Ваш коллектив вносит существенный вклад в разработку ракетных систем различного класса. В этом мы убеждались многократно при проведении испытаний таких ракет, как 9М82, 9М82МД, 9М83, 9М728, 9М729, 77Н6-Н, МН-300, 53Т6. За время сотрудничества с Вашим коллективом мы убедились в высокой компетентности офицеров, их умении находить решения сложных проблем, возникающих в процессе испытаний ракет.
Министерство обороны поставило перед нами сложную задачу — завершит разработку новейших систем ВКО, по своим тактико-техническим характеристикам не имеющих аналогов в мире. Мы очень рассчитываем на Вашу помощь и на то, что наше сотрудничество получит дополнительные стимулы, что позволит в будущем успешно внедрять новые технические решения в ракетной технике.
Мы уверены, что и в дальнейшем взаимное уважение, доверие и деловая атмосфера между нами будут сохраняться и развиваться, позволяя нам совместно решать новые, ещё более сложные задачи.
Ещё раз, уважаемые коллеги, примите наши искренние поздравления, пожелания здоровья в дальнейших успехов вашему коллективу.
От имени коллектива
генеральный директор АО «ОКБ “Новатор”»,
21. November 2017
https://twitter.com/gerhard_mangott/sta ... 3482654723
Senate and House Armed Services Committees Complete Conference on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (8. November 2017)
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/p ... -year-2018
Countering Russian Aggression
Russia’s ongoing aggressive actions—including its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, threats to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, rapid military modernization, advanced anti-access and area denial capabilities, increasing military activity in the Arctic region and Mediterranean Sea, evolving nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty — constitute a major challenge to the security interests of the United States and that of our allies and partners in Europe. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing malign influence activities — misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks, election interference, active measures, and hybrid warfare operations — pose not only a threat to the security interests of the United States and that of our allies and Partners in Europe but also to the integrity of Western democracies and the institutions and alliances they support. Therefore, the NDAA:
- Authorizes $58 million for measures in response to the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, including a research and development program on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile, which would not place the United States in violation of the treaty.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
Report of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
[include cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-115h ... rpt200.pdfSection 1242—Findings
This section would make a series of findings by Congress related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Russian Federation’s violations of that treaty.
Section 1243—Compliance Enforcement regarding Russian Violations of the INF Treaty
This section would make a statement of U.S. policy regarding Russian Federation compliance to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It would state:
(1) it is the policy of the United States that the actions undertaken by Russia in violation of the INF Treaty constitute a material breach of the treaty;
(2) in light of such a material breach, the United States is legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in material breach; and
(3) for so long as Russia remains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the United States should take actions to encourage a return to compliance, including by providing additional funds for certain capabilities identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) and by seeking additional missile defense assets in the European theater to protect United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces from missile systems of Russia that are in noncompliance with the INF Treaty.
This section would also make available $50.0 million of the funds authorized by this Act for fiscal year 2018, as specified in the funding table in division D of this Act, for the development of active defenses to counter ground-launched missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from such missiles; and, countervailing strike capabilities identified in section 1243(d) of Public Law 114–92.
Lastly, this section would authorize $25.0 million of the funds authorized by this section to be used for activities undertaken to carry out research and development activities contained elsewhere in this Act.
Section 1244—Development of INF Range Ground-Launched Missile System
This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. This section would further require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned systems for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 Kilometers in order to meet the capabilities specified.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/i ... mmary2.pdfTo those ends, the committee markup:
- Authorizes $65 million for a research and development program on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile in order to begin to close the capability gap opened by the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, without placing the United States in violation of the treaty.
13. September 2017
- S.Amdt.1007 to H.R.2810 (s.v. SEC. 1635. MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO NONCOMPLIANCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INF TREATY.)
https://www.congress.gov/amendment/115t ... 07?r=1&s=a
2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report (30. Juni 2017)
http://www.nasic.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-S ... at-report/
http://www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/imag ... 083234-343In September 2014, Russia surpassed the US in deployed nuclear warheads with over 1,500 deployed on ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Despite arms control limitations and resource constraints, development of new ICBM and SLBM Systems is proceeding, and Russia is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. According to official statements, a new missile called the Rubezh, which is smaller than the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM, will be deployed. The Bulava SLBM has been deployed on the new DOLGORUKIY-class SSBNs. Officials have stated that Russia is set to begin flight-testing a new heavy, liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat. Additionally, Russian industry officials have indicated deployment of a new rail-mobile ICBM is being considered.
8. März 2017
Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements [ab 35:52]
https://armedservices.house.gov/legisla ... quirements
- General Paul Selva, USAF
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00 ... 170308.pdfRussia, for example, is not only modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but remains in violation of its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty obligations and has threatened nuclear use against U.S. forces and allies in Europe.
16. Februar 2017
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... e-bill/430Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017
This bill states that it is the policy of the United States that: (1) Russian actions undertaken in violation of the the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF treaty) constitute a material breach of the treaty, (2) the United States is legally entitled to suspend the INF treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in material breach, and (3) the United States should take certain actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance.
The bill authorizes additional appropriations for: (1) development of active defenses to counter ground launched missile systems; (2) counterforce and countervailing capabilities; (3) missile system transfers to allied countries; and (4) research, development, and evaluation activities for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shall: (1) develop such a system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers; (2) report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify the Tomahawk, Standard Missile-3, Standard Missile-6, Long-Range Stand Off Cruise Missile, and Army Tactical Missile System missiles for ground-launch with such range; and (3) report on the number and location of AEGIS Ashore sites with anti-air warfare capability necessary in Asia and Europe to defend U.S. forces and allies from Russian ground launched missile systems.
The Director of National Intelligence, every 90 days for five years, shall determine whether Russia has flight tested, produced, or possesses a system that is inconsistent with the INF treaty and that has reached initial operational capability, is deployed, or is about to be deployed.
No funds may be obligated or expended to extend the New START Treaty, permit Russian flights over the United States or U.S. allies pursuant to the Open Skies Treaty, or permit the approval of new or updated implementation decisions through the Open Skies Consultative Commission unless the President certifies that Russia has eliminated all missiles that are in violation of, or that may be inconsistent with, the INF treaty.
The Department of State shall conduct a review of the RS-26 Ballistic Missile system.
Upon a determination that Russia has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of certain missiles, the President shall: (1) suspend the application of the INF treaty with respect to the United States, and (2) notify the other state parties to the INF treaty that Russia is in material breach of the INF treaty and of the U.S. decision to suspend the INF treaty.
14. Februar 2017
Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/worl ... ule=inlineThe Obama administration had sought to persuade the Russians to correct the violation while the missile was still in the test phase. Instead, the Russians have moved ahead with the system, deploying a fully operational unit.
Administration officials said the Russians now have two battalions of the prohibited cruise missile. One is still located at Russia’s missile test site at Kapustin Yar in southern Russia near Volgograd. The other was shifted in December from that test site to an operational base elsewhere in the country, according to a senior official who did not provide further details and requested anonymity to discuss recent intelligence reports about the missile.
American officials had called the cruise missile the SSC-X-8. But the “X” has been removed from intelligence reports, indicating that American intelligence officials consider the missile to be operational and no longer a system in development.
Report to Congress
The Department of Defense Plan for Military Response Options to the Russian Federation Violations of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
July 12, 2016
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docum ... ations.pdfF. Deployment of Military Reponse Measures
DoD is investing in a broad range of capabilities that could respond to the challenges created by Russia's intermediate-range systems. For specific information, please see the classified Annex.
Russia delays demonstrating new RS-26 ballistic missile to US inspectors till 2016 (18. November 2015)
http://tass.com/defense/837402The demonstration of Russia’s newest RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile to US inspectors has been delayed until next year, a source in the Russian Defense Ministry told TASS on Wednesday.
"By decision of the Defense Ministry, the demonstration of our new intercontinental ballistic missile RS-26 to a group of US inspectors has been rescheduled from November 2015 to 2016 and the new time schedule of the demonstration has not yet been determined," the source said.
"The US side has been notified of this decision and has taken note of it," the source said.
According to the source, as the missile will be demonstrated at the Votkinsk machine-building enterprise in Udmurtia in the Urals in compliance with the new START Treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation, the US side will get "certain data" on its technical characteristics, which make it different from the existing Yars and Topol-M missiles.
In addition, the Russian side will also give US inspectors photos of the RS-26 missile, if it receives a relevant request. Finally, the US inspectors will be able to examine and measure the missile but they won’t be allowed to touch it or make video footage of it and they also won’t see the missile launcher.
Russia’s Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) announced a tender in spring for organizing the demonstration of the RS-26 missile to US inspectors. Over 11 million rubles ($178,000) were planned to be allocated for this event, including organizing the trip of the US inspectors and accompanying Russian officials, providing food, accommodation and souvenirs.
Final test launch of Russia's new RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile successful — designer (31. März 2015)
http://tass.com/russia/786100The final test launch of Russia's solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile RS-26 in mid-March was successful, a senior official at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology told TASS on Tuesday.
"Yes, the launch was successful," said Vladimir Georgiyevsky, an assistant of the general constructor.
The RS-26 Rubezh missile based on the previous RS24 Yars is expected to be put on combat dutiy in 2015.
A source at the Russian General Staff told TASS earlier that the first missile would be deployed at the Irkutsk missile division in Siberia.
Russia Successfully Test-Fires RS-26 Ballistic Missile (26. März 2015)
Russia carried out a successful test-firing of an RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile from its southern Kapustin Yar launch center, a military representative said.
The missile’s dummy warhead hit its target at the Sary Shagan range in Kazakhstan just minutes after takeoff from the Kapustin Yar rocket launch and development site in the southern Astrakhan region on March 18, Kommersant newspaper reported Thursday, citing a Defense Ministry source in Moscow.
The initial test launch of the RS-26 ICBM from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on September 28, 2011, fell through, with the missile veering off course and landing just eight kilometers from the launch site. All subsequent tests in 2012, 2013 and 2015 proved successful.
Currently it is unknown whether this missile carries a single warhead or Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Both configurations were tested in 2013.
https://sputniknews.com/russia/201503261020029499/The RS-26 Rubezh is expected to become operational in 2016.
31. Juli 2014
2014 Compliance Report
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/index.htmINTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Elimination of all declared missiles and launchers under the Treaty was completed in 1991.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration and bans the possession, production, and flight-testing of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The Treaty required the complete elimination of all the approximately 800 U.S. and approximately 1,800 former Soviet ground-launched missiles with maximum ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (km), their launchers, and their associated support equipment and structures. All such items were eliminated by May 28, 1991.
The Treaty established a verification regime using national technical means of verification (NTM), notifications, and an on-site inspection regime to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime concluded on May 31, 2001, that is, 13 years following the Treaty’s entry into force. The remainder of the verification regime continues for the duration of the Treaty.
The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.
In 2013, the United States raised these concerns with the Russian Federation on repeated occasions in an effort to resolve U.S. concerns. The United States will continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia.
July 17, 2014
STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES ON THE FUTURE OF THE INF TREATY
By Jim Thomas
Vice President and Director of Studies
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/ ... 717-U1.pdf
29. Januar 2014
U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty
The United States informed its NATO allies this month that Russia had tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, raising concerns about Moscow’s compliance with a landmark arms control accord.
American officials believe Russia began conducting flight tests of the missile as early as 2008. Such tests are prohibited by the treaty banning medium-range missiles that was signed in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader at the time, and that has long been viewed as one of the bedrock accords that brought an end to the Cold War.
Beginning in May, Rose Gottemoeller, the State Department’s senior arms control official, has repeatedly raised the missile tests with Russian officials, who have responded that they investigated the matter and consider the case to be closed. But Obama administration officials are not yet ready to formally declare the tests of the missile, which has not been deployed, to be a violation of the 1987 treaty.
With President Obama pledging to seek deeper cuts in nuclear arms, the State Department has been trying to find a way to resolve the compliance issue, preserve the treaty and keep the door open to future arms control accords.
“The United States never hesitates to raise treaty compliance concerns with Russia, and this issue is no exception,” Jen Psaki, the State Department spokeswoman, said. “There’s an ongoing review process, and we wouldn’t want to speculate or prejudge the outcome.”
Other officials, who asked not to be identified because they were discussing internal deliberations, said there was no question the missile tests ran counter to the treaty and the administration had already shown considerable patience with the Russians. And some members of Congress, who have been briefed on the tests on a classified basis for well over a year, have been pressing the White House for a firmer response.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/worl ... reaty.htmlThere have been repeated rumors over the last year that Russia may have violated some of the provisions of the 1987 treaty. But the nature of that violation has not previously been disclosed, and some news reports have focused on the wrong system: a new two-stage missile called the RS-26. The Russians have flight-tested it at medium range, according to intelligence assessments, and the prevailing view among Western officials is that it is intended to help fill the gap in Russia’s medium-range missile capabilities that resulted from the 1987 treaty. The treaty defines medium-range missiles as ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of flying 300 to 3,400 miles.
But because Russia has conducted a small number of tests of the RS-26 at intercontinental range, it technically qualifies as a long-range system and will be counted under the treaty known as New Start, which was negotiated by the Obama administration. So it is generally considered by Western officials to be a circumvention, but not a violation, of the 1987 treaty
One member of Congress who was said to have raised concerns that the suspected arms control violation might endanger future arms control efforts was John Kerry. As a senator and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he received a classified briefing on the matter in November 2012 that dealt with compliance concerns, according to a report in The Daily Beast.
14. Januar 2014
S.1924 - A bill to require a report on INF Treaty compliance information sharing.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-con ... -bill/1924
16. Juli 2013
- Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Violations—Where’s the Beef?
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front ... -the-beef/
3. Juli 2013
- Russian Missile Test Creates Confusion and Opposition in Washington
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20 ... le-treaty/Russian aggression: Putin violating nuclear missile treaty
By Bill Gertz - The Washington Free Beacon - - Tuesday, June 25, 2013
Russia is engaged in a major violation of the terms of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States by building a new medium-range missile banned under the accord, according to U.S. intelligence officials.
Disclosure of the treaty violation comes as President Barack Obama last week called for a new round of arms negotiations with Moscow aimed at cutting deployed nuclear warheads by one-third.
Intelligence officials said internal assessments identified Russia’s new Yars M missile that was tested earlier this month as an INF missile with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers.
“The intelligence community believes it’s an intermediate-range missile that [the Russians] have classified as an ICBM because it would violate the INF treaty” if its true characteristics were known, said one official.
However, Russia is denying its new Yars M missile represents an INF violation.
Retired Lt. Gen. Victor Yesin, a former commander of Russian strategic forces and current consultant to the chief of the general staff, said in an email to the Washington Free Beacon that Russia is complying with the terms of INF because the Yars M, also known as RS-26, is an ICBM and not a banned intermediate-range system.
“According to the information I have, Russia closely follows the obligations arising from the 1987 INF Treaty and 2010 New START Treaty,” Yesin said. “The RS-26 ballistic missile, which is a Topol class ICBM, is not covered by the INF Treaty as its range is over 5,500 kilometers. Russia officially informed the U.S. about that in August 2011.
The issue of Russian INF compliance was raised in Moscow on Monday by presidential aide Sergei Ivanov, who told a television interviewer that Russia would not adhere to INF treaty constraints indefinitely.
“A legitimate question arises: On the one hand, we have signed the Soviet-U.S. treaty, and we are honoring it, but this can’t last endlessly,” Ivanov said according to Interfax.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said June 19 that some of Russia’s “neighbors,” a reference to China, were developing INF missiles and suggested Moscow would not allow the INF treaty to hinder its strategic arms buildup.
“We cannot accept a situation that would put the strategic deterrent system out of balance and make our nuclear forces less effective,” Putin said on the same day Obama announced plans for a one-third cut in the U.S. deployed nuclear warhead arsenal.
Two U.S. intelligence officials said the new Yars M mobile missile is not an ICBM and that the administration needs to confront the Russians on the system or risk undermining the entire arms control agenda.
The Russian INF violation initially was disclosed in vague terms by members of Congress, including House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.), and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Mich.).
McKeon and Rogers wrote to Obama in April describing earlier concerns over what they called “a massive Russian violation and circumvention of an arms control obligation to the United States of great significance to this nation and its NATO allies.”
“Briefings provided by your administration have agreed with our assessment that Russian actions are serious and troubling, but have failed to offer any assurance of any concrete action to address these Russian actions,” the two chairman stated in the April 12 letter.
They noted that Senate Intelligence Committee members also have raised concerns about “clear examples of Russia’s noncompliance with its arms control obligations.”
McKeon and Rogers said they expected the administration’s annual arms control compliance report, due to Congress April 15, to “directly confront the Russian violations and circumventions.”
“We also seek your commitment not to undertake further reductions to the U.S. nuclear deterrent or extended deterrent until this Russian behavior is corrected,” they said.
McKeon said in a statement in response to Obama’s Berlin disarmament speech that “Russia is cheating on a major existing nuclear arms control treaty.”
“I have been urging the president through classified and unclassified correspondence to take seriously these violations by Russia since last year, but the president has ignored these concerns,” he said.
In February, McKeon and Rogers wrote to Obama asking why he had not responded to a classified Oct. 17 letter outlining “significant arms control violations by the Russian federation.”
“It is clear that the Russian Federation is undertaking both systemic violation and circumvention of a significant arms control obligation to the United States,” they said. “Such is the reality that confronts the United States, despite four years of your best efforts to ‘reset’ relations with that country.”
White House National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said the administration reports to Congress regularly through the annual report on arms control compliance.
“We take very seriously the importance of compliance with arms control treaties and agreements,” she said. “When compliance questions arise, we routinely seek to resolve them with our treaty partners, and we will continue to do so. We also keep Congress informed of such matters.”
Alexandra Bell, spokeswoman for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, said the annual arms compliance report would be issued “in the near future” and will address issues of concern to Congress.
None of the administration or congressional officials interviewed for this report would identify the treaty in question.
However, the intelligence officials said the violations directly apply to the INF treaty.
“How can President Obama believe [the Russians] are going to live up to any nuclear treaty reductions when he knows they are violating the INF treaty by calling one of their missiles something else?” one official said.
The Reagan-era INF treaty banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 1,000 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers, or 620 miles and 3,418 miles. The treaty led to the elimination of U.S. nuclear-tipped Pershing ballistic and Ground-Launched Cruise missiles in Europe, along with Russian SS-20, SS-12, SS-23, SS-4, and SSC-X-4 missiles.
U.S. officials said the first details about the INF-range RS-26 missile emerged last year and intelligence assessments later confirmed the missile violates the INF treaty.
However, senior Obama administration officials so far have played down or dismissed the violation to avoid upsetting current and future arms talks with Moscow, the officials said.
Mark B. Schneider, a specialist on Russian missiles at the National Institute for Public Policy in Virginia, said the new Yars M missile appears to be an INF violation.
“There is increasing evidence that the ‘new’ Russian ICBM that they now call the Yars M or Rubezh is either a circumvention or violation of the INF Treaty,” Schneider stated in an email.
Other potential INF violations outlined in Russian press reports include Moscow’s development of a new ground-launched cruise missile, and reports that the Russians have used anti-ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles as surface-to-surface missiles, Schneider said.
The June 6 test of the Yars M, first disclosed by the Free Beacon June 7, revealed it was launched from a missile base at Kapustin Yar and landed at an impact range at Sary-Shagan, about 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) away. That is “clearly INF range,” Schneider said.
Schneider said that if the Russians tested a single-stage SS-27 Topol ICBM during that test, its expected range would be around 3,000 kilometers and under New START counting rules it would not be classified as an SS-27 ICBM. “Hence it would be a violation of the INF Treaty,” he said.
Excessive “Soviet-level” secrecy surrounding the new Yars M missile also is raising questions among western missile experts about whether it violated the INF treaty, Schneider said.
A House Armed Services Committee staff member said administration officials recently told Congress that Russia was complying with the New START treaty.
The staff member said the issue of Russian treaty violations is not new and efforts were made in last year’s defense authorization bill to press the administration for answers to concerns expressed by both House and Senate members.
The refusal to address what one official called a “militarily significant” arms treaty violation led to the inclusion of language in last year’s version of the defense authorization bill that limited implementation of the 2010 New START arms treaty.
The fiscal 2014 defense bill includes a similar provision passed by the House earlier this month.
McKeon said the current legislation was approved “by an overwhelming margin” and “would prohibit further reductions while Russia is violating—if not in material breach of—its current obligations.”
“There is bipartisan agreement that faithfulness and an honest, open exchange are the heart of any successful arms control process,” McKeon said.
In response to the legislative provision in last year’s bill, Obama threated to veto it if the provisions blocking New START implementation were in the final bill.
In June 2012, Rep. Michael R. Turner (R., Ohio), then-chairman of the Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, wrote to senior Obama administration national security officials questioning whether recent Russian strategic missile tests were carried out in violation of the INF treaty.
Turner asked the officials, including current Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, whether Russia was developing capabilities “in configurations that violate the INF treaty.”
In response, James N. Miller, undersecretary of defense for policy, sidestepped the questions in an Aug. 3, 2012, letter to Turner said last year’s ICBM tests were “not subject to any provisions or restrictions under the INF Treaty.”
However, Miller added: “The United States continues to monitor-these issues very closely. Further information on the matters you raised will be available in the forthcoming Annual Compliance Report.”
Article VI of the INF treaty states that neither party shall “produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.”
2013 Compliance Report
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/index.htmINTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Elimination of all declared missiles and launchers under the Treaty was completed in 1991.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration and bans the possession, production, and flight testing of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The Treaty required complete elimination of all the approximately 800 U.S. and approximately 1,800 former Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and structures. All such items were eliminated by May 28, 1991.
The Treaty established a verification regime using national technical means of verification (NTM), notifications, and an on-site inspection regime to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime concluded on May 31, 2001, that is, 13 years following the Treaty’s entry into force. All inspection activities have now ceased in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The remainder of the verification regime continues for the life of the Treaty.
The Parties to the Treaty last met in the Special Verification Commission in October 2003. There were no issues raised during this reporting period.
Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)
BGM-109G "Gryphon" Ground-launched Cruise Missile
http://www.hill.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sh ... e-missile/The General Dynamics/McDonnell Douglas BGM-109G "Gryphon" Ground-launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) was developed in the 1970s to provide the Air Force with a highly mobile, reliable, precision-guided, ground-based system for delivering tactical thermonuclear warheads. Congress approved the project on the contingency that it be an adaptation of the Navy's BGM-109 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Consequently, the Air Force entered into a cooperative effort with the U.S. Navy in which it provided no assistance in the development of the missile itself, but instead developed the mobile launcher and Launch Control Center (LCC) necessary to make the SLCM land-mobile. Vehicle development began in October 1977 and field trials of the prototype Transporter/Erector/Launcher (TEL) got underway in 1980. The first GLCM launch from a TEL came in March 1980 and the first launch using guidance data from a mobile LCC happened in February 1982.
The TEL was fifty-six feet long and eight feet wide. It weighed 80,000 pounds and could carry four GLCMs. Deployment came in "flights" comprised of two Launch Control Centers, four TELs (each having four spare missiles in addition to the four loaded aboard), sixteen support vehicles, and sixty-nine USAF personnel. In peacetime, the GLCM flights would remain on their home bases in hardened shelters. During wartime they would disperse into the surrounding countryside and set up operation.
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/membe ... f-a-a266ef
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/a-fro ... her-01843b
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-82d0e3
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-d2b1db
https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-922647
Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1954-2003
http://www.losangeles.af.mil/Portals/16 ... 112851-807
United States Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missiles: A Study in Technology, Concepts and Deterrence
http://web.archive.org/web/200605111748 ... ic.htm#s2s