USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

Wehrtechnik & Rüstung, Sicherheit und Verteidigung außerhalb Europas
theoderich
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Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon" & "INF Range Ground-launched Missile System"

Beitrag von theoderich »

As U.S. Demands Nuclear Disarmament, It Moves to Expand Its Own Arsenal
But for the American arsenal, the initiatives are all going in the opposite direction, with a series of little-noticed announcements to spend billions of dollars building the factories needed to rejuvenate and expand America’s nuclear capacity.

The contrast has been striking. On Thursday evening, hours after Mr. Trump announced that his meeting with Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, would take place on June 12 in Singapore, the Pentagon and the Energy Department announced plans to begin building critical components for next-generation nuclear weapons at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.

The idea is to repurpose a half-built, problem-ridden complex that was originally intended to turn old nuclear weapons into reactor fuel to light American cities. Now the facility will be used to revitalize America’s aging nuclear weapons, and to create the capacity to make many hundreds more.

The Pentagon, in its main nuclear strategy report released in February, cited North Korea’s ability to “illicitly produce nuclear warheads” as a major justification for the new effort.

Also last week, a strategic forces subcommittee in the House approved Trump administration plans to build a new kind of low-yield nuclear weapon, launched from submarines, to match Russian nuclear advances.

The chairman of the subcommittee, Mike D. Rogers, Republican of Alabama, said the decision was a reaction to the new arms race with Moscow. Mr. Trump said in March that he intended to meet with President Vladimir V. Putin to discuss the arms race, which he said was “getting out of control.” (No such meeting has yet been scheduled.)

“This committee knows what Russia’s up to with its nuclear weapons,” Mr. Rogers said. “It’s both sobering and horrifying.”

While it is possible that the American buildup is part of a negotiating strategy, offering Mr. Trump something he can trade away before it gets started, the White House has made clear, in both statements and strategy, that it envisions the reduction of nuclear weapons as a one-way street.

Bild
The Energy Department’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where the administration plans to repurpose an unfinished building to construct components for next-generation nuclear weapons.
Reuters


It is hardly the first time the United States has seen no inconsistency in expanding its own nuclear capabilities while trying to persuade lesser powers to give up theirs.

In fact, the imbalance is built into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which went into effect in 1970. It prohibits all states that did not already have the bomb from building nuclear weapons. (Israel, Pakistan and India never joined, and North Korea dropped out.)

But it also requires the acknowledged nuclear powers — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — to work toward “the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament,” and ultimately to complete their own disarmament.

For the two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, both the United States and Russia could argue that they were making progress on that promise. The number of nuclear weapons deployed by the two countries fell, and fell again, under a series of arms control agreements, and as of earlier this year, both are now limited to 1,550 deployed weapons. Thousands more are in storage.

President Barack Obama argued that the United States could not urge other countries to give up nuclear programs while expanding its own. But many of his own aides later said they wished he had done far more to reduce America’s arsenal, arguing that it could safely drop below the number the Russians deployed.

Now Mr. Trump is heading in the other direction. The United States has dramatically stepped up the effort to overhaul the existing arsenal and prepare for the day when it might once again be enlarged. Unless the New Start Treaty is renewed for five years, any limits on the American and Russian arsenals will expire in February 2021, just days after Mr. Trump would enter his second term.

In the meantime, the American government is doing all it can to make clear it is preparing for an era of nuclear buildup.

At the center of the Savannah River announcement is the American production of something the nuclear industry calls “pits.” That is a term for a small atom bomb that, when detonated inside a warhead, acts as an extraordinarily hot match to ignite a much larger mass of thermonuclear fuel. The resulting blast can easily be 1,000 times as powerful as the atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

One of the most closely held secrets of the nuclear age is how to make pits very small yet highly reliable. Most are about the size of a grapefruit. The small size makes thermonuclear warheads compact and lightweight enough to fit atop long-range missiles — it is one of the technologies that North Korea has been seeking, and may have already figured out.

The announcement on Thursday sought to make lemonade out of two large federal lemons.

The pits have been made, until now, at the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, where America’s first nuclear weapons were built. But the lab has suffered a humiliating string of operating and safety failures, which in 2015 led the Obama administration to announce plans to end the current management contract there. Among the breakdowns was the management’s failure to come up with a credible plan for producing up to 80 pits a year.

Bild
The Los Alamos lab and the surrounding town. The lab has suffered a humiliating string of operating and safety failures. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

At the same time, cost estimates for the Savannah River project to turn tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for commercial power reactors had soared to $17 billion.

Now that project is scrapped, and the two-pronged plan announced on Thursday will also take the production pressure off Los Alamos — a move that seeks to maintain its profile as a scientific research center rather than as a munitions factory.

Los Alamos is to make 30 pits per year, and the South Carolina plant 50. That setup, the Energy and Defense Departments said, will improve “the resiliency, flexibility and redundancy of our nuclear security enterprise by not relying on a single production site.” But it also signals a return to production of new weapons, even as Mr. Trump is withdrawing from the 2015 deal with Iran in part because of “sunset provisions” that he says will eventually allow Tehran to do the same.

The federal rationale for making up to 80 pits a year is hidden in layers of secrecy but turns on stated fears that the plutonium fuel at the heart of American weapons will deteriorate with age, eventually rendering them useless.

Whether that fear is justified is a matter of debate. In 2006, a federal nuclear panel found that the plutonium pits aged far better than expected, with most able to work reliably for a century or more.

That judgment led critics to contend that the federal government was seeking a new generation of nuclear pits for reasons not of national security but of saber-rattling.

“No new pits are needed for any warhead,” Greg Mello, the executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, a private organization in Albuquerque that monitors the nation’s nuclear complex and opposes expansion, said recently. “There are thousands of pits stockpiled for possible reuse.”

The Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, published in February, called for the new capability to produce plutonium pits. It also called on Congress to approve the new low-yield nuclear weapons.

Last week, the full House Armed Services Committee endorsed the Nuclear Posture Review, but with Democrats overwhelmingly voting against it.

“We have to have a credible deterrence, but I think the Nuclear Posture Review goes way beyond credible nuclear deterrence,” said Representative Adam Smith of Washington, the top Democrat on the committee, warning that “we could stumble into a nuclear war.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/worl ... river.html


Joint Statement from Ellen M. Lord and Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty on Recapitalization of Plutonium Pit Production (10. Mai 2018)
An evolving and uncertain geopolitical landscape calls for the United States to recapitalize its defense plutonium capabilities. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has certified that the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) recommended alternative for recapitalization of these capabilities is acceptable and represents a resilient and responsive option to meet Department of Defense (DoD) requirements.

To achieve DoD’s 80 pits per year requirement by 2030, NNSA’s recommended alternative repurposes the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina to produce plutonium pits while also maximizing pit production activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. This two-prong approach – with at least 50 pits per year produced at Savannah River and at least 30 pits per year at Los Alamos – is the best way to manage the cost, schedule, and risk of such a vital undertaking.
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/jo ... tonium-pit


Congressional Research Service

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

February 13, 2018

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf


H.R. 5515 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019

https://armedservices.house.gov/about/m ... -year-2019
  • Chairman's Mark FY19 NDAA.pdf
    Section 3114—Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons

    This section would repeal section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136) related to low-yield nuclear weapons. This section would also authorize the Secretary of Energy, acting
    through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, to carry out the engineering development phase, and any subsequent phase, to modify or develop a low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
    https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/r ... 0Final.pdf

2. Februar 2018

News Briefing on the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review

https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcript ... e/1431945/
  • 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    Additionally, in the near-term, the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option, and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Unlike DCA, a low-yield SLBM warhead and SLCM will not require or rely on host nation support to provide deterrent effect. They will provide additional diversity in platforms, range, and survivability, and a valuable hedge against future nuclear “break out” scenarios.
    https://dod.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0218_npr/

GLOBAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MODERNIZATION:
GLOBAL NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY VEHICLES

RUSSIA
  • Russia is developing a diverse range of other strategic and non-strategic nuclear capabilities, including the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty-violating SSC-8 and the “Status-6” torpedo
  • Additionally, over the last decade Russia has also deployed a variety of low-yield nuclear capabilities
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2 ... ZATION.PDF


1. Februar 2018

Pentagon Official: Nuclear Posture Review Calls for Credible Deterrent

https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Ar ... deterrent/


12. Dezember 2017

H.R.2810 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (s.v. SEC. 1243. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY.)
(c) Development of INF Range Ground-launched Missile System.--

(1) Establishment of a program of record.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers, including research and development activities with respect to such cruise missile system.

(2) Report required.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the cost and schedule for, and feasibility of, modifying United States missile systems in existence or planned as of such date of enactment for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers as compared with the cost and schedule for, and feasibility of, developing a new ground-launched missile using new technology with the same range.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... -bill/2810


9. Dezember 2017

Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy
While the United States will continue to pursue a diplomatic solution, we are now pursuing economic and military measures intended to induce the Russian Federation to return to compliance. This includes a review of military concepts and options, including options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies, should the Russian Federation not return to compliance. This step will not violate our INF Treaty obligations. We are also prepared to cease such research and development activities if the Russian Federation returns to full and verifiable compliance with its INF Treaty obligations.
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/12/276363.htm


8. Dezember 2017

US Official Identifies Missile Believed to Violate INF Treaty
National Security Council official Christopher Ford revealed in a speech at the Wilson Center on November 29 that the Russian missile violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is the land-based cruise missile Novator 9M729 (NATO designation: SSC-8). The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement saying that Russia is not violating the treaty, and it will continue to fulfill its obligations. In the ministry’s press release, Russia voiced a willingness to enter a dialogue with the United States on the issues surrounding the treaty, however it condemns the ultimatums and the military and political pressure being placed on it by the United States.
https://missilethreat.csis.org/us-offic ... nf-treaty/


1. Dezember 2017

Advancing American Security through Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Look at the First 11 months of the Trump Administration
Below are remarks Dr. Ford delivered in his official capacity -- as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for WMD and Counterproliferation at the U.S. National Security Council -- on November 30, 2017, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.
Similarly, though it was eventually willing – and for very good reasons – to find Russia in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the previous administration also declined to take concrete steps to give Russia real incentives to return to compliance. As a result, not surprisingly, Russia did not return to compliance. Indeed, Moscow was presumably delighted to be able build the illegal missiles it wants, and thus pursue asymmetric advantage against the United States and its allies, while Washington continued carefully to observe the Treaty’s requirements. Sneering at American finger-wagging over the issue, the Russians never even officially admitted the existence of the missile in question, despite the General Director of the Russian arms company Novator himself having noted the Russian designator of the non-compliant missile during a public statement last March celebrating the accomplishments of Russia’s Kapustin Yar test range. (That Russian designator, by the way, is “9M729” – something which I think I am saying in public today for the first time.)

By contrast to our predecessors, the new administration decided that the INF status quo we inherited was unacceptable, and that we must make unavailable to the Russians the option of continuing to see us constrained while they remain free to do as they wish. The United States is now determined, at long last, to give Russia concrete reasons to change course – to finally come back into compliance – and we hope that it will do so, because we remain committed to the INF Treaty. The Russians now need to choose whether they share our steadfast desire to preserve the Treaty, or whether they will continue on their current path, which leads to the Treaty’s collapse. They no longer have the option of having their cake and eating it, too.
http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=2047

  • Поздравление с юбилеем генерального директора АО «ОКБ “Новатор”», генерального конструктора Павла Камнева

    Bild

    Примите искренние поздравления по случаю 70-летия со дня основания 4 ГЦМП МО РФ.

    Ваш коллектив вносит существенный вклад в разработку ракетных систем различного класса. В этом мы убеждались многократно при проведении испытаний таких ракет, как 9М82, 9М82МД, 9М83, 9М728, 9М729, 77Н6-Н, МН-300, 53Т6. За время сотрудничества с Вашим коллективом мы убедились в высокой компетентности офицеров, их умении находить решения сложных проблем, возникающих в процессе испытаний ракет.

    Министерство обороны поставило перед нами сложную задачу — завершит разработку новейших систем ВКО, по своим тактико-техническим характеристикам не имеющих аналогов в мире. Мы очень рассчитываем на Вашу помощь и на то, что наше сотрудничество получит дополнительные стимулы, что позволит в будущем успешно внедрять новые технические решения в ракетной технике.

    Мы уверены, что и в дальнейшем взаимное уважение, доверие и деловая атмосфера между нами будут сохраняться и развиваться, позволяя нам совместно решать новые, ещё более сложные задачи.


    Ещё раз, уважаемые коллеги, примите наши искренние поздравления, пожелания здоровья в дальнейших успехов вашему коллективу.


    От имени коллектива

    генеральный директор АО «ОКБ “Новатор”»,

    генеральный конструктор

    Павел Камнев
    https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forc ... cmsArticle

21. November 2017

https://twitter.com/gerhard_mangott/sta ... 3482654723


Senate and House Armed Services Committees Complete Conference on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (8. November 2017)

https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/p ... -year-2018
Countering Russian Aggression

Russia’s ongoing aggressive actions—including its invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, threats to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, rapid military modernization, advanced anti-access and area denial capabilities, increasing military activity in the Arctic region and Mediterranean Sea, evolving nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty — constitute a major challenge to the security interests of the United States and that of our allies and partners in Europe. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing malign influence activities — misinformation, disinformation, propaganda, cyberattacks, election interference, active measures, and hybrid warfare operations — pose not only a threat to the security interests of the United States and that of our allies and Partners in Europe but also to the integrity of Western democracies and the institutions and alliances they support. Therefore, the NDAA:

[...]
  • Authorizes $58 million for measures in response to the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, including a research and development program on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile, which would not place the United States in violation of the treaty.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Report of the Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

on

H.R. 2810

together with
Additional Views
[include cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

Section 1242—Findings

This section would make a series of findings by Congress related to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Russian Federation’s violations of that treaty.

Section 1243—Compliance Enforcement regarding Russian Violations of the INF Treaty

This section would make a statement of U.S. policy regarding Russian Federation compliance to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It would state:

(1) it is the policy of the United States that the actions undertaken by Russia in violation of the INF Treaty constitute a material breach of the treaty;

(2) in light of such a material breach, the United States is legally entitled to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in material breach; and

(3) for so long as Russia remains in noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the United States should take actions to encourage a return to compliance, including by providing additional funds for certain capabilities identified in section 1243(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92) and by seeking additional missile defense assets in the European theater to protect United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces from missile systems of Russia that are in noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

This section would also make available $50.0 million of the funds authorized by this Act for fiscal year 2018, as specified in the funding table in division D of this Act, for the development of active defenses to counter ground-launched missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers; counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks from such missiles; and, countervailing strike capabilities identified in section 1243(d) of Public Law 114–92.

Lastly, this section would authorize $25.0 million of the funds authorized by this section to be used for activities undertaken to carry out research and development activities contained elsewhere in this Act.

Section 1244—Development of INF Range Ground-Launched Missile System

This section would require the Secretary of Defense to establish a program of record to develop a conventional road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers. This section would further require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees, Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate within 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify existing and planned systems for ground launch with a range of between 500 and 5,500 Kilometers in order to meet the capabilities specified.
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-115h ... rpt200.pdf


National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018

Executive Summary

To those ends, the committee markup:

[...]

- Authorizes $65 million for a research and development program on a ground-launched intermediate-range missile in order to begin to close the capability gap opened by the Russian violation of the INF Treaty, without placing the United States in violation of the treaty.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/i ... mmary2.pdf


13. September 2017

2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report (30. Juni 2017)

http://www.nasic.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-S ... at-report/
In September 2014, Russia surpassed the US in deployed nuclear warheads with over 1,500 deployed on ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. Despite arms control limitations and resource constraints, development of new ICBM and SLBM Systems is proceeding, and Russia is expected to retain the largest force of strategic ballistic missiles outside the United States. According to official statements, a new missile called the Rubezh, which is smaller than the SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM, will be deployed. The Bulava SLBM has been deployed on the new DOLGORUKIY-class SSBNs. Officials have stated that Russia is set to begin flight-testing a new heavy, liquid-propellant ICBM called the Sarmat. Additionally, Russian industry officials have indicated deployment of a new rail-mobile ICBM is being considered.
http://www.nasic.af.mil/Portals/19/imag ... 083234-343


8. März 2017

Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements [ab 35:52]


https://armedservices.house.gov/legisla ... quirements
  • General Paul Selva, USAF
    Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    Russia, for example, is not only modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but remains in violation of its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty obligations and has threatened nuclear use against U.S. forces and allies in Europe.
    https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00 ... 170308.pdf

16. Februar 2017
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017

This bill states that it is the policy of the United States that: (1) Russian actions undertaken in violation of the the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF treaty) constitute a material breach of the treaty, (2) the United States is legally entitled to suspend the INF treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in material breach, and (3) the United States should take certain actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance.

The bill authorizes additional appropriations for: (1) development of active defenses to counter ground launched missile systems; (2) counterforce and countervailing capabilities; (3) missile system transfers to allied countries; and (4) research, development, and evaluation activities for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system.

The Department of Defense (DOD) shall: (1) develop such a system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers; (2) report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify the Tomahawk, Standard Missile-3, Standard Missile-6, Long-Range Stand Off Cruise Missile, and Army Tactical Missile System missiles for ground-launch with such range; and (3) report on the number and location of AEGIS Ashore sites with anti-air warfare capability necessary in Asia and Europe to defend U.S. forces and allies from Russian ground launched missile systems.

The Director of National Intelligence, every 90 days for five years, shall determine whether Russia has flight tested, produced, or possesses a system that is inconsistent with the INF treaty and that has reached initial operational capability, is deployed, or is about to be deployed.

No funds may be obligated or expended to extend the New START Treaty, permit Russian flights over the United States or U.S. allies pursuant to the Open Skies Treaty, or permit the approval of new or updated implementation decisions through the Open Skies Consultative Commission unless the President certifies that Russia has eliminated all missiles that are in violation of, or that may be inconsistent with, the INF treaty.

The Department of State shall conduct a review of the RS-26 Ballistic Missile system.

Upon a determination that Russia has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of certain missiles, the President shall: (1) suspend the application of the INF treaty with respect to the United States, and (2) notify the other state parties to the INF treaty that Russia is in material breach of the INF treaty and of the U.S. decision to suspend the INF treaty.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... e-bill/430


14. Februar 2017

Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump
The Obama administration had sought to persuade the Russians to correct the violation while the missile was still in the test phase. Instead, the Russians have moved ahead with the system, deploying a fully operational unit.

Administration officials said the Russians now have two battalions of the prohibited cruise missile. One is still located at Russia’s missile test site at Kapustin Yar in southern Russia near Volgograd. The other was shifted in December from that test site to an operational base elsewhere in the country, according to a senior official who did not provide further details and requested anonymity to discuss recent intelligence reports about the missile.

American officials had called the cruise missile the SSC-X-8. But the “X” has been removed from intelligence reports, indicating that American intelligence officials consider the missile to be operational and no longer a system in development.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/worl ... ule=inline


Report to Congress

The Department of Defense Plan for Military Response Options to the Russian Federation Violations of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

July 12, 2016

F. Deployment of Military Reponse Measures

DoD is investing in a broad range of capabilities that could respond to the challenges created by Russia's intermediate-range systems. For specific information, please see the classified Annex.
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Docum ... ations.pdf


Russia delays demonstrating new RS-26 ballistic missile to US inspectors till 2016 (18. November 2015)
The demonstration of Russia’s newest RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile to US inspectors has been delayed until next year, a source in the Russian Defense Ministry told TASS on Wednesday.

"By decision of the Defense Ministry, the demonstration of our new intercontinental ballistic missile RS-26 to a group of US inspectors has been rescheduled from November 2015 to 2016 and the new time schedule of the demonstration has not yet been determined," the source said.

"The US side has been notified of this decision and has taken note of it," the source said.

According to the source, as the missile will be demonstrated at the Votkinsk machine-building enterprise in Udmurtia in the Urals in compliance with the new START Treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation, the US side will get "certain data" on its technical characteristics, which make it different from the existing Yars and Topol-M missiles.

In addition, the Russian side will also give US inspectors photos of the RS-26 missile, if it receives a relevant request. Finally, the US inspectors will be able to examine and measure the missile but they won’t be allowed to touch it or make video footage of it and they also won’t see the missile launcher.

Russia’s Federal Space Agency (Roscosmos) announced a tender in spring for organizing the demonstration of the RS-26 missile to US inspectors. Over 11 million rubles ($178,000) were planned to be allocated for this event, including organizing the trip of the US inspectors and accompanying Russian officials, providing food, accommodation and souvenirs.
http://tass.com/defense/837402


Final test launch of Russia's new RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile successful — designer (31. März 2015)
The final test launch of Russia's solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile RS-26 in mid-March was successful, a senior official at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology told TASS on Tuesday.

"Yes, the launch was successful," said Vladimir Georgiyevsky, an assistant of the general constructor.

The RS-26 Rubezh missile based on the previous RS24 Yars is expected to be put on combat dutiy in 2015.

A source at the Russian General Staff told TASS earlier that the first missile would be deployed at the Irkutsk missile division in Siberia.
http://tass.com/russia/786100


Russia Successfully Test-Fires RS-26 Ballistic Missile (26. März 2015)
Russia carried out a successful test-firing of an RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile from its southern Kapustin Yar launch center, a military representative said.

The missile’s dummy warhead hit its target at the Sary Shagan range in Kazakhstan just minutes after takeoff from the Kapustin Yar rocket launch and development site in the southern Astrakhan region on March 18, Kommersant newspaper reported Thursday, citing a Defense Ministry source in Moscow.

The initial test launch of the RS-26 ICBM from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on September 28, 2011, fell through, with the missile veering off course and landing just eight kilometers from the launch site. All subsequent tests in 2012, 2013 and 2015 proved successful.

Currently it is unknown whether this missile carries a single warhead or Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Both configurations were tested in 2013.
The RS-26 Rubezh is expected to become operational in 2016.
https://sputniknews.com/russia/201503261020029499/


31. Juli 2014

2014 Compliance Report
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Elimination of all declared missiles and launchers under the Treaty was completed in 1991.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration and bans the possession, production, and flight-testing of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The Treaty required the complete elimination of all the approximately 800 U.S. and approximately 1,800 former Soviet ground-launched missiles with maximum ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (km), their launchers, and their associated support equipment and structures. All such items were eliminated by May 28, 1991.

The Treaty established a verification regime using national technical means of verification (NTM), notifications, and an on-site inspection regime to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime concluded on May 31, 2001, that is, 13 years following the Treaty’s entry into force. The remainder of the verification regime continues for the duration of the Treaty.

FINDING

The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.

[...]

Compliance Discussions

In 2013, the United States raised these concerns with the Russian Federation on repeated occasions in an effort to resolve U.S. concerns. The United States will continue to pursue resolution of U.S. concerns with Russia.
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/index.htm


July 17, 2014

STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES ON THE FUTURE OF THE INF TREATY

By Jim Thomas
Vice President and Director of Studies
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments


http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/ ... 717-U1.pdf


29. Januar 2014

U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty
The United States informed its NATO allies this month that Russia had tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, raising concerns about Moscow’s compliance with a landmark arms control accord.

American officials believe Russia began conducting flight tests of the missile as early as 2008. Such tests are prohibited by the treaty banning medium-range missiles that was signed in 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader at the time, and that has long been viewed as one of the bedrock accords that brought an end to the Cold War.

Beginning in May, Rose Gottemoeller, the State Department’s senior arms control official, has repeatedly raised the missile tests with Russian officials, who have responded that they investigated the matter and consider the case to be closed. But Obama administration officials are not yet ready to formally declare the tests of the missile, which has not been deployed, to be a violation of the 1987 treaty.

With President Obama pledging to seek deeper cuts in nuclear arms, the State Department has been trying to find a way to resolve the compliance issue, preserve the treaty and keep the door open to future arms control accords.

“The United States never hesitates to raise treaty compliance concerns with Russia, and this issue is no exception,” Jen Psaki, the State Department spokeswoman, said. “There’s an ongoing review process, and we wouldn’t want to speculate or prejudge the outcome.”

Other officials, who asked not to be identified because they were discussing internal deliberations, said there was no question the missile tests ran counter to the treaty and the administration had already shown considerable patience with the Russians. And some members of Congress, who have been briefed on the tests on a classified basis for well over a year, have been pressing the White House for a firmer response.
There have been repeated rumors over the last year that Russia may have violated some of the provisions of the 1987 treaty. But the nature of that violation has not previously been disclosed, and some news reports have focused on the wrong system: a new two-stage missile called the RS-26. The Russians have flight-tested it at medium range, according to intelligence assessments, and the prevailing view among Western officials is that it is intended to help fill the gap in Russia’s medium-range missile capabilities that resulted from the 1987 treaty. The treaty defines medium-range missiles as ground-launched ballistic or cruise missiles capable of flying 300 to 3,400 miles.

But because Russia has conducted a small number of tests of the RS-26 at intercontinental range, it technically qualifies as a long-range system and will be counted under the treaty known as New Start, which was negotiated by the Obama administration. So it is generally considered by Western officials to be a circumvention, but not a violation, of the 1987 treaty

One member of Congress who was said to have raised concerns that the suspected arms control violation might endanger future arms control efforts was John Kerry. As a senator and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, he received a classified briefing on the matter in November 2012 that dealt with compliance concerns, according to a report in The Daily Beast.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/worl ... reaty.html


14. Januar 2014

S.1924 - A bill to require a report on INF Treaty compliance information sharing.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-con ... -bill/1924


16. Juli 2013

3. Juli 2013
Russian aggression: Putin violating nuclear missile treaty

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Free Beacon - - Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Russia is engaged in a major violation of the terms of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States by building a new medium-range missile banned under the accord, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

Disclosure of the treaty violation comes as President Barack Obama last week called for a new round of arms negotiations with Moscow aimed at cutting deployed nuclear warheads by one-third.

Intelligence officials said internal assessments identified Russia’s new Yars M missile that was tested earlier this month as an INF missile with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers.

“The intelligence community believes it’s an intermediate-range missile that [the Russians] have classified as an ICBM because it would violate the INF treaty” if its true characteristics were known, said one official.

However, Russia is denying its new Yars M missile represents an INF violation.

Retired Lt. Gen. Victor Yesin, a former commander of Russian strategic forces and current consultant to the chief of the general staff, said in an email to the Washington Free Beacon that Russia is complying with the terms of INF because the Yars M, also known as RS-26, is an ICBM and not a banned intermediate-range system.

“According to the information I have, Russia closely follows the obligations arising from the 1987 INF Treaty and 2010 New START Treaty,” Yesin said. “The RS-26 ballistic missile, which is a Topol class ICBM, is not covered by the INF Treaty as its range is over 5,500 kilometers. Russia officially informed the U.S. about that in August 2011.

The issue of Russian INF compliance was raised in Moscow on Monday by presidential aide Sergei Ivanov, who told a television interviewer that Russia would not adhere to INF treaty constraints indefinitely.

“A legitimate question arises: On the one hand, we have signed the Soviet-U.S. treaty, and we are honoring it, but this can’t last endlessly,” Ivanov said according to Interfax.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said June 19 that some of Russia’s “neighbors,” a reference to China, were developing INF missiles and suggested Moscow would not allow the INF treaty to hinder its strategic arms buildup.

“We cannot accept a situation that would put the strategic deterrent system out of balance and make our nuclear forces less effective,” Putin said on the same day Obama announced plans for a one-third cut in the U.S. deployed nuclear warhead arsenal.

Two U.S. intelligence officials said the new Yars M mobile missile is not an ICBM and that the administration needs to confront the Russians on the system or risk undermining the entire arms control agenda.

The Russian INF violation initially was disclosed in vague terms by members of Congress, including House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon (R., Calif.), and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Rep. Mike Rogers (R., Mich.).

McKeon and Rogers wrote to Obama in April describing earlier concerns over what they called “a massive Russian violation and circumvention of an arms control obligation to the United States of great significance to this nation and its NATO allies.”

“Briefings provided by your administration have agreed with our assessment that Russian actions are serious and troubling, but have failed to offer any assurance of any concrete action to address these Russian actions,” the two chairman stated in the April 12 letter.

They noted that Senate Intelligence Committee members also have raised concerns about “clear examples of Russia’s noncompliance with its arms control obligations.”

McKeon and Rogers said they expected the administration’s annual arms control compliance report, due to Congress April 15, to “directly confront the Russian violations and circumventions.”

“We also seek your commitment not to undertake further reductions to the U.S. nuclear deterrent or extended deterrent until this Russian behavior is corrected,” they said.

McKeon said in a statement in response to Obama’s Berlin disarmament speech that “Russia is cheating on a major existing nuclear arms control treaty.”

“I have been urging the president through classified and unclassified correspondence to take seriously these violations by Russia since last year, but the president has ignored these concerns,” he said.

In February, McKeon and Rogers wrote to Obama asking why he had not responded to a classified Oct. 17 letter outlining “significant arms control violations by the Russian federation.”

“It is clear that the Russian Federation is undertaking both systemic violation and circumvention of a significant arms control obligation to the United States,” they said. “Such is the reality that confronts the United States, despite four years of your best efforts to ‘reset’ relations with that country.”

White House National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said the administration reports to Congress regularly through the annual report on arms control compliance.

“We take very seriously the importance of compliance with arms control treaties and agreements,” she said. “When compliance questions arise, we routinely seek to resolve them with our treaty partners, and we will continue to do so. We also keep Congress informed of such matters.”

Alexandra Bell, spokeswoman for Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, said the annual arms compliance report would be issued “in the near future” and will address issues of concern to Congress.

None of the administration or congressional officials interviewed for this report would identify the treaty in question.

However, the intelligence officials said the violations directly apply to the INF treaty.

“How can President Obama believe [the Russians] are going to live up to any nuclear treaty reductions when he knows they are violating the INF treaty by calling one of their missiles something else?” one official said.

The Reagan-era INF treaty banned ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 1,000 kilometers and 5,500 kilometers, or 620 miles and 3,418 miles. The treaty led to the elimination of U.S. nuclear-tipped Pershing ballistic and Ground-Launched Cruise missiles in Europe, along with Russian SS-20, SS-12, SS-23, SS-4, and SSC-X-4 missiles.

U.S. officials said the first details about the INF-range RS-26 missile emerged last year and intelligence assessments later confirmed the missile violates the INF treaty.

However, senior Obama administration officials so far have played down or dismissed the violation to avoid upsetting current and future arms talks with Moscow, the officials said.

Mark B. Schneider, a specialist on Russian missiles at the National Institute for Public Policy in Virginia, said the new Yars M missile appears to be an INF violation.

“There is increasing evidence that the ‘new’ Russian ICBM that they now call the Yars M or Rubezh is either a circumvention or violation of the INF Treaty,” Schneider stated in an email.

Other potential INF violations outlined in Russian press reports include Moscow’s development of a new ground-launched cruise missile, and reports that the Russians have used anti-ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles as surface-to-surface missiles, Schneider said.

The June 6 test of the Yars M, first disclosed by the Free Beacon June 7, revealed it was launched from a missile base at Kapustin Yar and landed at an impact range at Sary-Shagan, about 2,000 kilometers (1,242 miles) away. That is “clearly INF range,” Schneider said.

Schneider said that if the Russians tested a single-stage SS-27 Topol ICBM during that test, its expected range would be around 3,000 kilometers and under New START counting rules it would not be classified as an SS-27 ICBM. “Hence it would be a violation of the INF Treaty,” he said.

Excessive “Soviet-level” secrecy surrounding the new Yars M missile also is raising questions among western missile experts about whether it violated the INF treaty, Schneider said.

A House Armed Services Committee staff member said administration officials recently told Congress that Russia was complying with the New START treaty.

The staff member said the issue of Russian treaty violations is not new and efforts were made in last year’s defense authorization bill to press the administration for answers to concerns expressed by both House and Senate members.

The refusal to address what one official called a “militarily significant” arms treaty violation led to the inclusion of language in last year’s version of the defense authorization bill that limited implementation of the 2010 New START arms treaty.

The fiscal 2014 defense bill includes a similar provision passed by the House earlier this month.

McKeon said the current legislation was approved “by an overwhelming margin” and “would prohibit further reductions while Russia is violating—if not in material breach of—its current obligations.”

“There is bipartisan agreement that faithfulness and an honest, open exchange are the heart of any successful arms control process,” McKeon said.

In response to the legislative provision in last year’s bill, Obama threated to veto it if the provisions blocking New START implementation were in the final bill.

In June 2012, Rep. Michael R. Turner (R., Ohio), then-chairman of the Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, wrote to senior Obama administration national security officials questioning whether recent Russian strategic missile tests were carried out in violation of the INF treaty.

Turner asked the officials, including current Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, whether Russia was developing capabilities “in configurations that violate the INF treaty.”

In response, James N. Miller, undersecretary of defense for policy, sidestepped the questions in an Aug. 3, 2012, letter to Turner said last year’s ICBM tests were “not subject to any provisions or restrictions under the INF Treaty.”

However, Miller added: “The United States continues to monitor-these issues very closely. Further information on the matters you raised will be available in the forthcoming Annual Compliance Report.”

Article VI of the INF treaty states that neither party shall “produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.”
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20 ... le-treaty/


2013 Compliance Report
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987, and entered into force on June 1, 1988. Elimination of all declared missiles and launchers under the Treaty was completed in 1991.

The Treaty is of unlimited duration and bans the possession, production, and flight testing of intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems. The Treaty required complete elimination of all the approximately 800 U.S. and approximately 1,800 former Soviet ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and structures. All such items were eliminated by May 28, 1991.

The Treaty established a verification regime using national technical means of verification (NTM), notifications, and an on-site inspection regime to detect and deter violations of Treaty obligations. The inspection regime concluded on May 31, 2001, that is, 13 years following the Treaty’s entry into force. All inspection activities have now ceased in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The remainder of the verification regime continues for the life of the Treaty.

The Parties to the Treaty last met in the Special Verification Commission in October 2003. There were no issues raised during this reporting period.
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/index.htm
Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)

https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm


BGM-109G "Gryphon" Ground-launched Cruise Missile
The General Dynamics/McDonnell Douglas BGM-109G "Gryphon" Ground-launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) was developed in the 1970s to provide the Air Force with a highly mobile, reliable, precision-guided, ground-based system for delivering tactical thermonuclear warheads. Congress approved the project on the contingency that it be an adaptation of the Navy's BGM-109 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). Consequently, the Air Force entered into a cooperative effort with the U.S. Navy in which it provided no assistance in the development of the missile itself, but instead developed the mobile launcher and Launch Control Center (LCC) necessary to make the SLCM land-mobile. Vehicle development began in October 1977 and field trials of the prototype Transporter/Erector/Launcher (TEL) got underway in 1980. The first GLCM launch from a TEL came in March 1980 and the first launch using guidance data from a mobile LCC happened in February 1982.

The TEL was fifty-six feet long and eight feet wide. It weighed 80,000 pounds and could carry four GLCMs. Deployment came in "flights" comprised of two Launch Control Centers, four TELs (each having four spare missiles in addition to the four loaded aboard), sixteen support vehicles, and sixty-nine USAF personnel. In peacetime, the GLCM flights would remain on their home bases in hardened shelters. During wartime they would disperse into the surrounding countryside and set up operation.
http://www.hill.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sh ... e-missile/


https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/theater/glcm.htm

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/membe ... f-a-a266ef

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/a-fro ... her-01843b

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-82d0e3

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-d2b1db

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/an-ae ... air-922647


Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1954-2003

http://www.losangeles.af.mil/Portals/16 ... 112851-807


United States Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missiles: A Study in Technology, Concepts and Deterrence

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a258351.pdf


Bild
http://web.archive.org/web/200605111748 ... ic.htm#s2s
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Sa 2. Feb 2019, 18:42, insgesamt 38-mal geändert.

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

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House rejects limit on new nuclear warhead
The U.S. House on Wednesday shot down a proposed limit on the Trump administration’s pursuit of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

It was among several amendments to the House draft of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act that were voted down Wednesday afternoon. Of the 558 amendments filed for the NDAA debate this week, the House Rules Committee made in order 271 of them and the House voted to adopt 98 of them Tuesday night.

The rejected amendment would have fenced half the 2019 funding for low-yield nuclear warhead development in lieu of an assessment of its impact on strategic stability and options to reduce the risk of miscalculation. Reps. Jim Garamendi, D-Calif., and Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore., sponsored it.

The amendment was defeated 188-226 largely along party lines, with seven Democrats voting “no” with Republicans and five Republicans voting “yes” with Democrats.
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/20 ... r-warhead/

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »

New sub-launched nuke clears congressional hurdle
The U.S. Senate voted Wednesday to scuttle legislation that would have forced the Trump administration to seek congressional approval for a new low-yield, tactical nuclear weapon.

The narrow 47-51 vote that tabled that legislation—a proposed amendment to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—was the latest move in a partisan chess game over development of a new, tactical submarine-launched nuclear missile.
The vote saw only Sens. Susan Collins, R-Maine; Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska; and Rand Paul, R-Ky., cross party lines to vote with Democrats. It was not enough, and Democrats lost the vote.

The Senate on Wednesday was close to ending debate on its $716 billion NDAA. That bill contains a provision that would remove statutory restrictions on the U.S. development or deployment of such a weapon without congressional authorization.

That language would grant the energy secretary new authority to carry out the weapon’s energy development phase, or any subsequent phase, without Congress’ specific approval.

Senate Armed Services Committee ranking member Jack Reed, D-R.I., offered the amendment to preserve congressional oversight.

“It simply maintains the status quo and says if we’re going to develop a new weapons system, come to us,” Reed said of his amendment before the vote.

“We get to debate it, we approve it or we don’t approve it. But the American people can rest assured that this is not something that has simply moved through the administrative channels of any executive ― this president or any other president.”

The panel’s No. 2 Republican, Sen. Jim Inhofe — who stewarded the bill while SASC Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz., is battling cancer at home — opposed Reed’s amendment, citing the administration’s call for the new weapon in the new Nuclear Posture Review.
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/20 ... al-hurdle/
  • https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... -bill/5515
    • S.Amdt. 2842 — 115th Congress (2017-2018)

      https://www.congress.gov/amendment/115t ... 42/actions
      Amendment No. 2842 to Amendment No. 2366

      Mr. REED. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 2842 to the Lee amendment.

      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

      The senior assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

      The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. REED] proposes an amendment numbered 2842 to amendment No. 2366.

      Mr. REED. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

      The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

      The amendment is as follows:

      (Purpose: To require the authorization of appropriation of amounts for the development of new or modified nuclear weapons)

      In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted, insert the following:

      (c) Authorization by Congress.--Section 4209(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2529(a)(1)) is amended--

      (1) by striking "the Secretary shall'' and inserting the following: "the Secretary -- "(A) shall''; and

      (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting "; and''; and "(B) may carry out such activities only if amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with section 660 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7270).''.


      Mr. REED. Mr. President, this amendment is a technical correction to the previous amendment I offered, and I ask that it be accepted for consideration.

      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is pending.

      Mr. REED. Mr. President, I believe the amendment is pending.

      I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

      The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

      The senior assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

      Mr. WHITEHOUSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

      The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
      https://www.congress.gov/congressional- ... le/S3739-1

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »

Tactical nuclear weapon launches into development with Pentagon policy bill
The Trump administration is poised to get Congressional authorization to start building a controversial new submarine-launched low-yield, nuclear weapon.

The Senate and House came together Monday on a $716 billion defense authorization report that authorizes $65 million to develop the weapon, aimed at deterring Russia, according to the bicameral compromise conference report.
H.R.5515 - John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019

https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con ... 5D%7D&r=23
  • Conference report to accompany H.R. 5515—John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (H. Rept. 115-863)
    SEC. 3111. DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    (a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator for Nuclear Security, may carry out the engineering development phase, and any subsequent phase, to modify or develop a low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

    (b) MODIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON DEVELOPMENT.—Section 3116(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108–136; 117 Stat. 1746; 50 U.S.C. 2529 note) is amended by striking ‘‘specifically authorized by Congress’’ and inserting ‘‘the Secretary specifically requests funding for the development of that weapon pursuant to section 4209(a) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2529(a))’’.
    • National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994
      SEC. 3136. PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOWYIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

      (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States not to conduct research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a new low-yield nuclear weapon, including a precision low-yield warhead.

      (b) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Energy may not conduct, or provide for the conduct of, research and development which could lead to the production by the United States of a low-yield nuclear weapon which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, has not entered production.

      (c) EFFECT ON OTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.—Nothing in this section shall prohibit the Secretary of Energy from conducting, or providing for the conduct of, research and development necessary—

      (1) to design a testing device that has a yield of less than five kilotons;

      (2) to modify an existing weapon for the purpose of addressing safety and reliability concerns; or

      (3) to address proliferation concerns.

      (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘low-yield nuclear weapon’’ means a nuclear weapon that has a yield of less than five kilotons.
    • National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
      Subtitle B—Program Authorizations, Restrictions, and Limitations

      [...]

      SEC. 3116. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

      (a) REPEAL.—Section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 107 Stat. 1946; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) is repealed.

      (b) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in the repeal made by subsection (a) shall be construed as authorizing the testing, acquisition, or deployment of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

      (c) LIMITATION.—The Secretary of Energy may not commence the engineering development phase, or any subsequent phase, of a low-yield nuclear weapon unless specifically authorized by Congress.

      (d) REPORT.—(1) Not later than March 1, 2004, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall jointly submit to Congress a report assessing whether or not the repeal of section 3136 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 will affect the ability of the United States to achieve its nonproliferation objectives and whether or not any changes in programs and activities would be required to achieve those objectives.

      (2) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
    (c) REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section 4209(a)(1) of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2529(a)(1)) is amended—

    (1) by striking ‘‘the Secretary shall’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘the Secretary— ‘‘(A) shall’’; and

    (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and ‘‘(B) may carry out such activities only if
    amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with section 660 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7270).’’.
    https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calend ... tID=108627
The report for the sweeping 2019 National Defense Authorization Act is expected to come to a vote in the House this week and the Senate next week. The annual must-pass bill covers military hardware, personnel and a wide swath of hot-button national security issues.

In a win for opponents of the new weapon, Congress would retain a requirement for an act of Congress to develop or modify nuclear warheads going forward, per the Senate version of the NDAA.

That language bars the secretary of energy from starting the engineering and development phase, or any subsequent phase, of a low-yield nuclear weapon unless specifically authorized by Congress. House negotiators backed off their chamber’s language, which would have nullified the requirement, enshrined in the 2004 NDAA.
https://www.defensenews.com/congress/20 ... licy-bill/

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

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REPS. LIEU, SMITH, GARAMENDI, BLUMENAUER AND SEN. MARKEY INTRODUCE BICAMERAL BILL BANNING LOW-YIELD NUKES (18. September 2018)

https://lieu.house.gov/media-center/pre ... -bicameral

theoderich
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Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

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Remarks by President Trump Before Air Force One Departure
Q What’s Ambassador Bolton’s message to the Russians going to be?

THE PRESIDENT: Ambassador Bolton?

Q The message to the Russians. Is he going to pull out of that —

THE PRESIDENT: You got to talk louder.

Q His message to the Russians. Is he going to pull out of the arms control treaty?

THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, Russia has violated the agreement. They’ve been violating it for many years. And I don’t know why President Obama didn’t negotiate or pull out. And we’re not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons, and we’re not allowed to.

We’re the ones that have stayed in the agreement, and we’ve honored the agreement. But Russia has not, unfortunately, honored the agreement. So we’re going to terminate the agreement and we’re going to pull out.

Q That’s the INF?

THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. The INF.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... parture-4/


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vCxKZB48_cY


John Bolton pushing Trump to withdraw from Russian nuclear arms treaty
Bolton, Donald Trump’s third national security adviser, has issued a recommendation for withdrawal from the 1987 intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty (INF), which the US says Russia has been violating with the development of a new cruise missile.

Withdrawal from the treaty, which would mark a sharp break in US arms control policy, has yet to be agreed upon by cabinet and faces opposition from within the state department and the Pentagon. A meeting on Monday at the White House to discuss the withdrawal proposal was postponed.

The INF faces a congressionally imposed deadline early next year. An amendment in the 2019 defence spending bill requires the president to tell the Senate by 15 January whether Russia is in “material breach” of the treaty, and whether the INF remains legally binding on the US.
Former US officials say Bolton is blocking talks on extending the 2010 New Start treaty with Russia limiting deployed strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. The treaty is due to expire in 2021 and Moscow has signaled its interest in an extension, but Bolton is opposing the resumption of a strategic stability dialogue to discuss the future of arms control between the two countries.

The US has briefed its European allies this week about the proposal, sounding out reactions. The briefing alarmed UK officials who see the INF as an important arms control pillar. The treaty marked the end of a dangerous nuclear standoff in 1980s Europe pitting US Pershing and cruise missiles against the Soviet Union’s SS-20 medium-range missiles.

The US alleges Russia is now violating the treaty with the development and deployment of a ground-launched cruise missile, known as the 9M729. Moscow insists the missile does not violate the range restrictions in the INF and alleges in return that a US missile defence system deployed in eastern Europe against a potential Iranian threat can be adapted to fire medium-range offensive missiles at Russia.

Asked for comment on the future of the INF, a senior administration official said: “Across two administrations, the United States and our allies have attempted to bring Russia back into full and verifiable compliance with INF. Despite our objections, Russia continues to produce and field prohibited cruise misses and has ignored calls for transparency.”

“The US has started to brief allies with the possibility of withdrawal. But I don’t believe there has been any kind of interagency process in the administration,” said Jon Wolfsthal, a former senior director for non-proliferation and arms control at the NSC.

The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, released in February, called for the US to do research on its own ground-launched medium-range missiles as a way of pressuring Moscow back into INF compliance. It did not advocate leaving the treaty.
Provisional plans had been made to resume a strategic stability dialogue in September, led on the US side by Andrea Thompson, the under secretary for arms control at the state department and the Russian deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov.

Bolton’s meeting with his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in Geneva in August, was expected to give the final green light to the dialogue, but Bolton is said to have blocked it. He is due to visit Moscow next week, when the Kremlin said he may meet Vladimir Putin.

The New York Times reported on Friday that Bolton intended to use his Moscow trip to inform Russian leaders of the administration’s plans to exit the INF agreement. Under the terms of the treaty, withdrawal would take six months.

In remarks in Sochi on Thursday, Putin appeared to suggest that Russia would adopt a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons.

“We have no concept of a pre-emptive strike,” he told a conference. “[W]e expect to be struck by nuclear weapons, but we will not use them first,” he said.

A meeting of Nato defence ministers earlier this month in Brussels issued a joint statement saying the INF “has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security and we remain fully committed to the preservation of this landmark arms control treaty”.

However, the US defence secretary, James Mattis, made it clear that all options were on the table in Washington’s response to Russian violations.

“Our discussions here were to ensure that we answered all questions that any of the nations had, and that we look at what options do we have, and to make certain that all the nations had input to me as I go into the discussions in Washington,” Mattis said. “This will be a decision obviously made in concert with our allies by the president, and we’ll take it from there.”
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/201 ... p-lobbying





WOOLF Amy F.: Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf


Department of Defense News Briefing by Admiral James Foggo in the Pentagon Briefing Room on the upcoming Trident Juncture 18 Exercise

Admiral James G. Foggo III, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Africa; Colonel Rob Manning, Director, Defense Press Office
(5. Oktober 2018)
COL. MANNING: Lara Seligman, Foreign Policy.

Q: Hi, sir. Thanks for being here. I was hoping you could talk a little bit about the Russian initiative to build a -- an intermediate range ballistic missile and what we can -- what we can do in terms of our missile defense capability and in -- in the region and not just ours but also shoring up our allies’ missile defense capabilities, on Aegis, Aegis Ashore, those types of capabilities. Can you talk about that, please?

ADM. FOGGO: Yes, Lara. Thanks very much for the question. I think you're referring to the recent discussion of the breakout with the Novator missile SSC-8. It's also got a nomenclature of 9M729. And this missile recently was revealed to have a range that's an INF treaty buster. General Mattis, Secretary Mattis, talked about that recently.

That is indeed unfortunate in the abrogation of a treaty which we have observed -- the United States has observed for a very long time.

But these things happen, and so it's necessary to have strong defensive capabilities in terms of defensive weapon systems.

And also, we're still a signature, and we still observe the INF Treaty, so it remains to be seen what at the policy level will be done about any breakout on the Russian side. So I won't comment on that; that's really for the third deck and for policy.

As to other things that we can do or are doing in the region, you mentioned Aegis Ashore, a very capable system which resides in Romania and we're building a new one in Poland. That system carrying the interceptor SM-3 is the most capable in the world. We demonstrate it every other year during Formidable Shield '15, '17, and we're going to do it again in '19. All the allies come. They all want to be part of this, many of them want to be part of missile defense of Europe.

The interceptor and Aegis Ashore is really designed to counter Iranian ballistic missiles that are coming over the horizon and threatening European capitals. And as you see the ups and downs of the relationship between the United States and Iran, or Europe and Iran, you can understand why that's important and why there's backing for that system inside Romania, a NATO partner, and also in Poland.

Other things that Barb mentioned -- I didn't answer her question -- other systems that are out there S-400, S-300, Bastion anti-ship cruise missile.

So the Russians are taken full advantage of their illegal annexation of Crimea in the territory to build up a capability there that tries to deny access, anti-access area denial capability in the area around Crimea, in the Black Sea, in Kaliningrad, and now in the Eastern Mediterranean because they have a foothold in Tartus and Latakia. That's a concern to all of us. We watch that very carefully.

However, we are not going to be deterred in conducting freedom of navigation operations or securing the sea lines of communications in international waters in any of those places. Because those waters are meant -- they call them the commons for region -- reason. They are common water for everybody to use.

And so whether it's in NATO in a standing NATO maritime group or in the United States in a FONOP -- and, you recently saw one with Decatur in the South China Sea -- we will continue to operate undeterred by any of these systems. And we will develop, and do the R&D and fielding of systems that can counter those threats in the theater.
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcript ... agon-brie/


Mattis: Russia violation of missile treaty ‘untenable’ (4. Oktober 2018)
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on Thursday said Russia’s deployment of nuclear-capable missiles in violation of an arms treaty is “untenable” and unless Moscow changes, the U.S. will have to match that military capability.

Speaking to reporters at the close of a NATO defense ministers meeting, Mattis said the U.S. is reviewing its diplomatic and military options because of Russia’s continued violation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.


“Russia must return to compliance with the INF Treaty or the U.S. will need to respond to its cavalier disregard of the treaty’s specific limits,” Mattis said in prepared remarks. “Make no mistake: The current situation, with Russia in blatant violation of this treaty, is untenable.”

Mattis said that he and his NATO counterparts looked at options for a possible response and that he answered questions from allies.

“There was no disagreement about the fact that the Russians were in violation here among the nations,” he said, but declined to say what options the U.S. is considering.

“We will respond as we think is appropriate. But we are trying to bring them still back into compliance. Now is the time. It’s gone on long enough,” Mattis said.

His comments underscored assertions made Tuesday by Kay Bailey Hutchinson, the U.S. ambassador to NATO. She warned that unless Russia complies with the treaty, the U.S. will be looking at ways to “take out” the system. America, she said, doesn’t want to violate the treaty but Russia could force its hand.

She later said she wasn’t talking about preemptively striking Russia, but making the point that Moscow needs to adhere to the treaty.
https://apnews.com/8f6eefdfc7b34beda62a524122b7f9d5

________________________________________________________________

Zur РС-26 «Рубеж» findet man online fast überhaupt nichts. Auf der Website der russischen Raketenstreitkräfte ist sie nicht gelistet:

https://structure.mil.ru/structure/forc ... eapons.htm

2015 gab es eine Ankündigung zu einem Teststart im März:
  • Источник: контрольный пуск новой баллистической ракеты РС-26 намечен на март (2. Februar 2015)

    https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1738392
2017 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report (30. Juni 2017)
Although the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force will continue to decrease because of arms control agreements, aging missiles, and resource constraints, Russia probably will retain the largest ICBM force outside the United States. Efforts to maintain and modernize the force are underway. According to official statements, the new RS-26 Rubezh is smaller than the SS-27 Mod 2.
https://www.nasic.af.mil/About-Us/Fact- ... at-report/ Am 22. März 2018 wurde die Einstellung des Programms «Рубеж» verkündet. Es sei im Rüstungsprogramm durch den Hyperschallflugkörper «Авангард» ("Avangard") ersetzt worden:
  • Источник: комплекс "Авангард" заменил "Рубеж" в госпрограмме вооружения до 2027 года

    https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/5055517

Neue russische Rüstungsprojekte "Kinzhal", "Avangard", u.a.

viewtopic.php?f=10&t=29


Es gibt einen Seezielflugkörper gleichen Namens, der bei den russischen Streitkräften im Dienst steht:

Bild
https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/ph ... =3&theater

Bild

Bild
https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/po ... &__tn__=-R

Bild
https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/ph ... &__tn__=-R

https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/vi ... &__tn__=-R

________________________________________


Die Jahresberichte von OKB "Novator" (ОАО Новатор) sind hier zu finden:

ОАО Новатор
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Do 25. Apr 2019, 21:37, insgesamt 4-mal geändert.

theoderich
Beiträge: 6253
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »

  • The Rest Of The Story: Trump, DoD & Hill Readied INF Pullout For Years
    Unreleased Pentagon documents and Congressional demands for information reveal that Washington has long planned for the day when the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) with Russia would be ripped up.

    The report by the Joint Staff and Strategic Command, exclusively obtained by Breaking Defense, make clear that as far back as 2013 — a year before the Obama administration first publicly complained about Russian violations of the treaty — the Defense Department was considering which technologies the US could develop should Washington walk away from the INF.

    The report points to four ways the US could quickly develop and field missiles with a range between 300 and 3,400 miles, banned under the 30 year-old treaty.

    Specifically, it says that there could be:
    • Modifications to existing short range or tactical weapon systems to extend range.
    • Forward-based, ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs)
    • Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
    • Forward-based, ground-launched intermediate-range missiles with trajectory shaping vehicles (TSVs).
    “Without INF prohibitions,” the report said, the United States could develop ground-launched systems “capable of using any trajectory (ballistic,shaped,or non-ballistic). This would result in systems with the required timeliness, effects on target, and survivability needed to close the existing capability gap.”

    The limitations of the treaty don’t account for hypersonic boost-glide missiles, and “without INF, the key benefit would be the ability to field a ground-launched ballistic system, such as an IRBM with a TSV,” the report said. “This type of system could deliver the same or better capability as a boost-glide vehicle, with potentially less technological risk and cost.”
    The Hill is still waiting for an overdue report from the Pentagon mandated in the 2018 defense authorization bill that would lay out options for developing systems that would fill the capabilities gaps that have grown between the US and Russia and China. In April, the Pentagon’s chief weapons buyer Ellen Lord sent a letter to the heads of the defense committees asking for more time, saying the department was in the “early stages” of assessing cost, requirements and what systems might be best suited to fit the bill. It was unclear, she explained, what “existing missile systems could be modified for such a role.”

    Pentagon spokesperson Lt. Col. Michelle Baldanza confirmed to me today that the department continues to work on “a review of U.S. options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems, which would enable the United States to defend ourselves and our allies, should Russia fail to return to compliance.”

    It is not clear if the report was ever delivered to lawmakers.
    https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/the ... for-years/

Lavrov: Possible US Exit From INF Treaty to Be Met With Russian 'Counteraction'
US National Security Advisor John Bolton arrived in Moscow on Monday for a series of talks with senior Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev.

Washington has not yet formally begun to implement the procedure for withdrawing from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) arms control agreement, Sergei Lavrov said on Monday.

"The treaty itself contains a procedure which provides for the possibility of withdrawing from the treaty. But this procedure hasn't yet been triggered," the foreign minister explained, adding that Moscow's response would be forthcoming after it receives clarification from its US counterparts. Russia will "decide on our position based not on intentions, but on clearly expressed decisions," Lavrov stressed.

Commenting on the possible US withdrawal from the treaty, Lavrov reiterated that a decision to do so would be met with firm opposition from Moscow.

"Of course, as we have stated repeatedly, and President Putin has confirmed at the Valdai Forum in Sochi, any action in this area would be met with counteraction, because strategic stability can only be achieved on the basis of parity. Such parity will be preserved in all circumstances. We are responsible for global stability, and hope that the United States will not give up its share of responsibility as well," the top Russian diplomat said.

Lavrov also said that Russia was ready to renew discussion on the New START Treaty, and was prepared for dialogue with Washington on the issue. However, all issues, whether relating to the New START or the INF, should be discussed in a "professional" manner "in accordance with the procedures that are stipulated by each of these treaties," he said.

For his part, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov categorically rejected Washington's claims that Moscow was violating the provisions of the INF.

"On the contrary, quite expertly at various levels, we have provided evidence that it was the United States which has been eroding the foundations and main provisions of this treaty — installing missile defences which can serve not only as interceptors, but also as short and medium-range missiles, using strike drones which de-facto serve as nothing other than short-range and medium-range missiles," Peskov said, presumably referring to US missile shield installations in Romania and Poland.

Peskov added that Russia "has been and remains committed to the provisions of [the INF] treaty. And we believe that the [US] intention to withdraw from this document is cause for concern, because such steps, if implemented, will make the world a more dangerous place."
https://sputniknews.com/world/201810221 ... ty-bolton/







Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure

Issued on: October 22, 2018
Q Mr. President, are you prepared to build up the U.S. nuclear arsenal? You said you’re going to pull out of the arms deal.

THE PRESIDENT: Until people come to their senses, we will build it up. Until people come to their senses. Russia has not adhered to the agreement. This should’ve been done years ago. Until people come to their senses — we have more money than anybody else, by far. We’ll build it up. Until they come to their senses. When they do, then we’ll all be smart and we’ll all stop. And we’ll — and by the way, not only stop, we’ll reduce, which I would love to do. But right now, they have not adhered to the agreement.

Q Is that a threat to Vladimir Putin?

THE PRESIDENT: It’s a threat to whoever you want. And it includes China, and it includes Russia, and it includes anybody else that wants to play that game. You can’t do that. You can’t play that game on me.

Q You want more nukes is what you’re saying? You’re building up the nuclear arsenal.

Q (Inaudible.)

THE PRESIDENT: Until people get smart. Until they get smart. They have not adhered to the spirit of that agreement, or to the agreement itself — Russia. China is not included in the agreement. They should be included in the agreement. Until they get smart, there will be nobody that’s going to be even close to us.

Q But have you talked to Putin about it?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I have not. I have not.

Q The Russians say they’ve been complying.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t have to speak to him. I don’t have to speak. I’m terminating the agreement because they violated the agreement. I’m terminating the agreement.

Thanks everybody. Thank you.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st ... arture-18/


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pk_6ZpFs-6I


Trump says US is ending decades-old nuclear arms treaty with Russia (21. Oktober 2018)
President Donald Trump announced Saturday that the US is pulling out of the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, a decades-old agreement that has drawn the ire of the President.

"Russia has violated the agreement. They've been violating it for many years," Trump told reporters before boarding Air Force One to leave Nevada following a campaign rally.

"And I don't know why President Obama didn't negotiate or pull out. And we're not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we're not allowed to," he said. "We're the ones that have stayed in the agreement and we've honored the agreement.

"But Russia has not, unfortunately, honored the agreement. So we're going to terminate the agreement. We're gonna pull out," he said of the agreement, which was signed in December 1987 by former President Ronald Reagan and former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Following the announcement, Russia's state-run news agency, RIA Novosti, reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to discuss the decision with US national security adviser John Bolton when he visits Russia this week.

According to the report, the Kremlin's spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said, "It's likely that an explanation from the US will be required following the latest scandalous statements."
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/20/poli ... index.html


P.S.: Einige russische Hersteller ballistischer Raketen und Marschflugkörper:
  • Акционерное общество «Научно-производственная корпорация „Конструкторское бюро машиностроения“» [Hersteller der Kurzstreckenrakete "Iskander-E", Reichweite: 50 - 280 km]

    https://www.kbm.ru/ru/
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Do 25. Apr 2019, 21:39, insgesamt 1-mal geändert.

theoderich
Beiträge: 6253
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »









Bild
https://www.facebook.com/mod.mil.rus/ph ... =3&theater


Has Trump Met the Burden of Proof for Ripping Up an Arms Deal With Russia? (Video, Ankündigung des US-Präsidenten vor der "Air Force One" in Elko, Nevada, den INF-Vertrag zu kündigen.)
Russia has denied any violation and has demanded proof from the United States to back up the claims. That information is secret, the U.S. said in response, and revealing it would compromise America’s spies capability to gather intelligence inside Russia. However, now that Trump is prepared to tear up the 31-year-old agreement, nuclear arms experts are calling for some of the evidence to be shared publicly in order to prove the Kremlin’s defiance to the world.
“We should make our case publicly,” said Andrew Weber, who spent 30 years on nuclear weapons issues in the U.S. State and Defense departments before retiring in 2015. “It would certainly be helpful. I’m not sure why they haven’t already done so. They could make a declassified disclosure in a way that would protect sources and methods.”

The burden of proof — in the form of photos, video, or other evidence —becomes all that more important with a leader like Trump, who is known to make broad and controversial claims without offering much evidence, the analysts say.
Underwhelmed by that tactic, the Trump Administration went a little further by publicly revealing the name of the missile as the 9M729 in December 2017. The disclosure later prompted Russia to admit for the first time that it did, indeed, possess a new type of ground-launched missile, according to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. (The weapon was derisively nicknamed the SSC-8 “Screwdriver” by NATO analysts because “Russia used it to screw us,” officials say.)

The U.S. has routinely briefed NATO allies on the intelligence about the missile, but there are limits on how much information can be shared. There are tell-tale signs that some U.S. allies remain unconvinced by the evidence.

Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, pointed to NATO’s July summit declaration that said there were “doubts” about Russia’s INF compliance, instead of certainty. “It did not state NATO allies are convinced about the facts, only that Russia’s lack on answers makes a violation the most likely assessment,” he said. “U.S. officials still insist that the launcher and deployment locations are secrets. But releasing that would further increase pressure on Russia. Ironically, the details the U.S. have been showing Russia are probably more extensive than what it has been willing to tell the public.”
Philip Breedlove, a retired U.S. Air Force general who commanded all NATO forces in Europe from 2013 to 2016, says the U.S. has a responsibility to explain to the American public what’s at stake by leaving the INF. The electorate also needs to know how, when, and where Russia violated this agreement, he said.

”We have to get the story out that Russia has abrogated this treaty already and that we either need to respond or bring them back into compliance, because I don’t think Joe and Sally Sixpack in America understand that,” Breedlove said during a teleconference organized by the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank. “We need people to understand that this more than just, ‘They have nukes and we have nukes.’”
Ellen Tauscher, a former undersecretary of State for arms control and international security from 2009 to 2012, said the Trump Administration must be mindful of the risks before ripping up the INF. “The Administration is on a terrible path of for getting the United States’ blamed for this when it’s actually the Russians’ (fault),” she said during the teleconference. “We have not worked with our allies; we have not prepped people for what this means.”
http://time.com/5431467/donald-trump-in ... d=tcoshare
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Do 8. Nov 2018, 20:07, insgesamt 1-mal geändert.

theoderich
Beiträge: 6253
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »








Mattis says in close contact with European allies on INF treaty

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-e ... KKCN1N106Z





Statement from Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn On U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty (22. Oktober 2018)

https://www.nti.org/newsroom/news/state ... nf-treaty/
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Sa 2. Feb 2019, 19:53, insgesamt 1-mal geändert.

theoderich
Beiträge: 6253
Registriert: So 29. Apr 2018, 18:13

Re: USA: "Low-yield nuclear weapon"

Beitrag von theoderich »

'No plans' for new US missiles in Europe despite treaty pullout
by ​Agence France-Presse in Brussels
The US has ‘no plans’ to deploy new missiles to Europe, a senior official said on 8 November, despite announcing it will pull out of a landmark nuclear arms control treaty with Russia.
While Trump has signalled the US will pull out, officials said that as yet no legal steps have been taken to put the decision into effect and American officials are currently in Europe to consult allies and try to reassure them.

A senior administration official told reporters in Brussels that Russian President Vladimir Putin's allegation that Washington is stoking a new arms race was unfounded, saying ‘there is only one runner and that's Russia - they've been building these missiles for five years as fast as they can’.

‘We have no plans to deploy anything new to Europe,’ the official said, stressing that in particular there were no plans for new US nuclear weapons to come to Europe.

However the official did not rule out possible future deployments.
https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/defe ... reaty-pul/

Das zu behaupten ist leicht, wenn man noch keine Systeme zur Verfügung hat, die in Europa stationiert werden können. Aber wenn sie erst entwickelt sind, werden Forderungen kommen, sie in Mittel- und Osteuropa aufzustellen.








Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress

Updated October 29, 2018

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832


INF-Vertrag
Mittlere Reichweite

8. November 2018, 18:55 Uhr
Wenn sie es denn will, kann die US-Regierung sehr rücksichtsvoll sein. Selbst mit einem Donald Trump als Präsidenten an der Spitze. Im Sommer des vergangenen Jahres, sieben Wochen vor der Bundestagswahl, traf eine geheime Depesche in Berlin ein, Absender war der damalige deutsche Botschafter in Washington, Peter Wittig. Der Spitzendiplomat war kurz zuvor im Weißen Haus davon unterrichtet worden, dass eine schlechte Nachricht näherrücken könnte. Aber dass man darüber erst einmal Stillschweigen bewahren wolle, aus Rücksicht auf "übergeordnete politische Belange". Es ging um den sogenannten INF-Vertrag, eines der bedeutendsten nuklearen Rüstungsabkommen.
Wittig erfuhr, dass die Trump-Regierung dabei war, über den Ausstieg nachzudenken aus dem Abkommen, das Besitz, Produktion und Tests landgestützter Flugkörper mit mittlerer und kurzer Reichweite von 500 bis 5500 Kilometer verbietet. Hintergrund war die Überzeugung der USA, dass Russland die Vereinbarung mit der Stationierung des neuen Marschflugkörpers SSC-8 gebrochen habe. Aber in keinem Fall werde es, wurde von den Amerikanern versprochen, entsprechende Ankündigungen vor den deutschen Wahlen geben. "No public announcement before German elections", zitierte Wittig seine Gesprächspartner. Vor allem im Kanzleramt wurde die Nachricht mit Erleichterung aufgenommen.

Kein Land hat stärker von dem Abkommen profitiert als Deutschland

Die Zusage zu schweigen wurde eingehalten. Mit einem zweiten Versprechen - die Nato-Partner würden in den "weiteren Prozess eng eingebunden" - klappte es dagegen weniger gut. Als Trump im Oktober nach einem Wahlkampftermin in Nevada das Ende des INF verkündete, erfuhren die Deutschen dies von den Nachrichtenagenturen. Allerdings erging es wohl selbst seinen eigenen Leuten in Washington nicht viel besser. Davon geht man jedenfalls in Berlin aus.
Zudem ist die Kritik an Russland bereits alt, schon Trumps Vorgänger Barack Obama machte sie 2014 öffentlich. Im Auswärtigen Amt ist man davon überzeugt, dass auch ein demokratischer Präsident sich für den Ausstieg entschieden hätte.
In den deutschen Überlegungen geht es nun darum, wie man den 2008 gescheiterten Vorstoß wiederbeleben könnte. Im Auswärtigen Amt wurden die Optionen bereits durchgespielt: Den Russen die Stationierung von Kurz- und Mittelstreckenraketen jenseits des Ural zu erlauben, wurde verworfen. Zu schnell ließen sich solche Waffensysteme wieder nach Westen verlegen. Zudem würde man die Verbündeten in Asien damit brüskieren. Stattdessen soll versucht werden, die Chinesen zu Verhandlungen zu bewegen. Mehr als Hälfte ihrer Raketen fällt unter die Reichweite des INF-Vertrages. Maas reist an diesem Wochenende nach Peking. Er wolle dort für größere Transparenz und Rüstungskontrolle werben, kündigte Maas am Donnerstag im Bundestag an. "Dort ist es bitter notwendig", sagte er. Wirklich aussichtsreich scheint dies allerdings nicht zu sein, China hat bisher wenig Interesse an solchen Diskussionen gezeigt - und sieht vor allem die nuklearen Großmächte Russland und die USA in der Pflicht abzurüsten.
Man müsse sich auch auf das Schlimmste einstellen, heißt es inzwischen in der Bundesregierung. Wie dies aussehen würde hat das Auswärtige Amt - kurz bevor Botschafter Wittig sein Kabel aus Washington schickte - schon einmal in einer internen Analyse zu Papier gebracht. Mit dem Ende des INF-Vertrages, einer Kündigung des Iran-Abkommens und der womöglich ausbleibenden Verlängerung des sogenannten New Start-Abkommens, das die Anzahl der strategischen Waffen begrenzt, drohe ein "Worst Case-Szenario." Ein "völliger Zusammenbruch der Rüstungskontrollarchitektur mit einhergehendem signifikantem Sicherheitsverlust."

Die Folge könnte, befürchtet man in der Bundesregierung, eine Wiederauflage des Wettrüstens sein, wie Europa es in den 1980-er Jahren erlebt hat. Anders als Deutschland, wo immer wieder der Abzug der auf dem Fliegerhorst in Büchel stationierten Atomwaffen gefordert wird, ist zu erwarten, dass etwa Polen die Stationierung nuklearer Sprengköpfe willkommen heißen würde - womit die Nato-Russland-Grundakte obsolet wäre. Bei den Regierungskonsultationen kürzlich in Warschau kam die deutsche Seite denn auch auf den INF-Vertrag zu sprechen. Verlässliche Verbündete für die Rettung des Dokuments fand sie bei den polnischen Gastgebern eher nicht.
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/inf ... -1.4202491
Zuletzt geändert von theoderich am Sa 2. Feb 2019, 19:52, insgesamt 3-mal geändert.

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